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The Oversight Responsibilities of Audit Committees: 
The Problems Facing the Development of Audit Committees in Egypt 
Abstract 
An increasing number of earnings restatements by publicly traded companies in the USA 
coupled with allegations of financial statement fraud and lack of responsible corporate 
governance have sharpened the ever increasing attention on corporate governance in general 
and the audit committee in particular. Over the past three decades, the value of audit 
committees as a means of enhancing external financial reporting and ensuring the 
independence of external auditors has been recognised and these committees have become 
widely established in many parts of the world. In Egypt, the implementation of an economic 
reform programme has resulted in an active effort by people in authority and those who work 
in accounting and the auditing profession to enhance the quality of financial reporting which 
is considered to be one of the factors necessary to increase the effectiveness of economic 
performance in Egypt. Through these efforts, evolved the idea of implementing audit 
committees in Egyptian firms. 
In this study, old institutional economics is the underpinning methodology. It was selected on 
the grounds that it has the ability to offer a better understanding of the comparative audit 
committee practices in Egypt, the USA, and the UK. Also, it is used to explain the interplay 
between the institutions and actions in the economy, society, and culture which cover the 
problem of the transference of Anglo Saxon management and accounting theories and 
concepts such as audit committees to developing countries, such as Egypt. Old institutional 
economics aims to explain that, the transference between cultures is possible, but the process 
oftransference has to be culturally sensitive. 
VIII 
This study aims to measure audit committees effectiveness in order to have indicators about 
its oversight responsibilities in general and its development in Egypt in particular. The study 
involves both theoretical and empirical analysis. It begins with a review of the available 
literature which provides a basis for constructing the framework of this study. Survey and 
case study methodologies were the main instruments for the empirical investigation. The 
surveys were used to gather data from the UK and Egyptian audit committee member samples 
in order to examine audit committee oversight responsibilities from the internal perspective of 
audit committee members in both countries to draw comparison with the DeZoort (1997) 
study in the USA. Scenarios were developed regarding the oversight responsibilities of audit 
committees on the basis of, literature, CP A professional examinations, current 
recommendations in the USA, and the UK, and current issues which faced the public banking 
sector in Egypt. These were used to gather data from audit committee members in the public 
banking sector in Egypt in order to measure the effectiveness of audit committees and 
examine the effect of audit committee members' independence and experience on audit 
committee effectiv~ness. 
In this study, the effectiveness of the audit committee is measured, in particular, on the extent 
to which audit committee members carry out their oversight responsibilities regarding 
financial reporting, external auditing, and internal auditing. The results, in general, assert the 
low effectiveness of audit committee members in carrying out their oversight responsibilities. 
In this case, the results highlight the important role of the audit committee charter which 
define the committee's oversight responsibilities. Also, the results indicate that audit 
committee effectiveness is significantly and positively related to the independence and 
experience of audit committee members. 
IX 
Chapter One- Context of the Study: An Overview 
Overview of the Problem 
1-1. Background 
The separation of owners and managers creates the need for corporate governance, which 
comprises mechanisms that ensure efficient decision-making and maximise the value of the 
firm (Vinten and Lee 1993). Moreover, through the expansion of capital markets in the 1990s, 
the increasing numbers of companies listed, and the globalization of investors, there is a 
growing need for good corporate governance mechanisms, as the separation of ownership and 
control increases (Cuervo 2002). Corporate governance is not a new issue. It may be traced 
back to when incorporation with limited liability became available in the nineteenth century, 
and with it the need for legislation and regulation (Vinten 1998). 
Recently, the rising numbers of accounting scandals and cases of mismanagement by top level 
senior executives in major USA and UK companies are often found to be the consequences of 
unacceptable corporate governance practices (Demirag and Solomon 2003). The current 
legislation in the USA and the recent meeting of European Union (EU) ministers to deal with 
this issue, illustrate the urgency of corporate governance issues on the worldwide platform. 
There seems to be a common realization that increased corporate transparency and greater 
accountability to shareholders are essential requirements for improving business worldwide. 
The Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals have cast the spotlight on an urgent need for 
corporate governance reform across the globe (Hussain and Mallin 2002). At the individual 
country level, numerous codes of practice have been developed, with governments worldwide 
recognizing the need for corporate governance reform in order to improve their country's 
competitiveness and ability to attract international capital (Demirag and Solomon 2003). The 
other side of the same coin is that institutional investors, who can invest anywhere in the 
world, will look to place their funds where standards of disclosure, timely, accurate financial 
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reporting, and equal treatment of all shareholders are met (Cadbury 2002). As the World Bank 
Report (1999) states: "what makes corporate governance increasingly important in today's 
global market is the demand from growing businesses for external domestic and international 
capital in quantities and ways which would have been inconceivable just a decade ago". 
In the USA, in response to recent financial collapses, the government passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002) which aims to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
corporate disclosures and reforming corporate governance practices. A significant part of the 
Act provides for tighter regulation of the accounting profession and of auditing and financial 
reporting functions. It is clear that by introducing the Act, the USA Government hopes that 
company directors as well as major accounting and auditing firms will be deterred from 
fraudulent and corrupt practices in the future by means of stricter regulation and heavier 
penalties. 
As regards Europe, the EU finance ministers called a special meeting in April 2002 to review 
the impact of Enron and formulate their reaction to the events. Their focus was on the role of 
non-executive directors and members of supervisory boards, management remuneration, and 
responsibility for financial reporting and auditing practices. Auditor independence and 
reducing conflicts of interest were areas that received primary attention (Demirag and 
Solomon 2003). Other major issues are possible mandatory disclosure of corporate 
governance practices, improvements in shareholders' rights and continued convergence of 
corporate governance codes of practice in EU Member States (European Shadow Financial 
Regulatory Committee 2002). Although stricter regulation is being considered, the EU is 
more likely to adopt a voluntary framework. There is a clear recognition within EU countries 
that sound corporate governance cannot move forward with either completely free markets or 
3 
with prescriptive regulation: the right balance needs to achieved in order to create a spirit of 
transparency and accountability rather than compliance with form alone (Van Hulle 2002). 
1-1-1. Introducing Non-executive Directors 
Boards consist of two types of director, executive and non-executive. Executive directors are 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the company. They have direct responsibility 
for aspects of the business such as finance and marketing. They also help to formulate and 
implement corporate strategy. Their key strengths are that they bring specialized expertise and 
a wealth of knowledge to the business. They are full-time employees of the company and 
should have clearly defined roles and responsibilities (Vinten and Lee 1993). However, given 
that the executive directors are subordinates of the CEO, they are not in a strong position 
either to monitor or discipline the CEO (Daily and Dalton 1993). It is therefore important that 
there is a mechanism to monitor the actions of the CEO and executive directors and to ensure 
that they pursue shareholder interests (Weir and Laing 2001). 
It is a common practice to have outside, non-executive directors on the boards of companies. 
Legally and commercially this is seen as an important guarantee of the integrity and 
accountability of companies (Dare 1998). It is assumed the interests of those who invest in a 
company or do business with it, will be safeguarded by the presence on the board of those 
who can exercise independent judgment. Also, non-executive directors are often considered to 
bring valuable external business experience which can contribute to the strategic success of a 
company (Clarke 1998). In defining non-executive directors, Laing and Weir (1999) 
explained that: 
"Non-executive directors are outside directors who monitor the decisions made by the 
executive directors. They are part time, whereas executive directors are full time 
employees of the company. As with executive directors, non-executive directors are 
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eligible to vote at board meetings. They can therefore oppose plans which they believe 
will be against the interests of shareholders. Non-executive directors may also attempt 
to remove some of the executive directors after a period of poor performance. Many 
non-executive directors are also executive directors of other public companies. It is 
therefore in their interests to ensure that all decisions reflect shareholder interests so 
that no damage is done to their reputation". 
In the UK four major reports on corporate governance have added weight to the significance 
and authority of the role of non-executive directors. The Cadbury Committee (1992) was 
commissioned by the Stock Exchange in response to a spate of company failures in the 
aftermath of the 1980s boom, collapses in which it was clear that boards of directors were not 
fully in control, or even aware of what was happening to the companies they were 
accountable for. Given the reluctance to consider continental style two-tier boards, and the 
unwillingness to admit further statutory regulation, the solution to achieving higher standards 
of monitoring and accountability was to strengthen the numbers and powers of non-executive 
directors. The Greenbury Report (1995) was instigated as a result of public disquiet about the 
unprecedented pay increases which senior executives in the privatized utilities paid to 
themselves which appeared unrelated either to their personal experience and calibre, or to any 
corporate performance improvement which they could claim to have inspired. Among the 
recommendations Greenbury offered was the introduction of remuneration committees, 
composed entirely of non-executive directors, ensuring executives could no longer directly 
influence the settlement of their own pay awards. The Hampel Report (1998) was instructed 
by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to review the implementation of the Cadbury and 
Green bury codes of practice, and to inquire into how to promote higher standards of corporate 
governance in the interests of investor protection and the standing of companies listed on the 
Stock Exchange. Hampel further confirmed and developed the responsibilities of non-
executive directors, recommending that non-executives should make up at least one-third of 
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the membership of boards, that a leading non-executive director should be identified, even 
when the roles of chairman and chief executive are separate, and that nomination, 
remuneration and audit committees should be composed largely of independent non-executive 
directors. The Higgs Report (2003) sets out a determined and realistic agenda for change, 
building on the existing framework of UK corporate governance. The report envisages a more 
demanding and important role for non-executive directors. The review focuses directly on the 
effectiveness of non-executive directors in promoting company performance as well as on 
issues of accountability. The report's recommendations aim to increase transparency in the 
appointment process to foster meritocracy and widen the spread of experience in UK 
boardrooms. 
1-1-2. Non-Executive Directors and Company Performance 
The Cadbury Committee (1992) recommended that there should be at least three non-
executive directors on the boards of quoted companies. This should enable non-executive 
directors to exercise independent influence over board decisions. It is expected that non-
executive directors will be effective monitors of the executive directors and thus the 
proportion of non-executives on a board should be positively related to performance. Ezzamel 
and Watson (1993 ), and Pearce and Zhara (1992) found a positive relationship between the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board and performance. Also, Dare (1998) 
argued that non-executive directors are effective monitors when they question company 
strategy and ask awkward questions. In addition, they are able to provide independent 
judgement when dealing with the executive directors in areas such as pay awards, executive 
director appointments and dismissals. 
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Weir and Laing (200 1) explained that effective monitoring reqmres that non-executive 
directors are independent of the executive directors on the board. If non-executive directors 
were effective monitors, their effectiveness would increase in line with their board 
representation and should result in improved corporate performance. 
A more general consequence of the Cad bury Committee ( 1992) was that it drew attention to 
the importance of the role of non-executive directors on boards and strengthened their 
position in the corporate structure through recommending the establishment of audit and 
remuneration committees. These committees were to be wholly made up of non-executive 
directors. This meant that the directors on them were involved in the affairs of the company 
beyond their attendance at the board meetings and that they worked with senior managers as 
well as with executive directors (Cadbury 2002). In this way, non-executive directors assist 
the board to achieve effective management and leadership, and to ensure high standards of 
financial probity through observation of the internal control system and audits (Treadway 
Commission 1987, Cad bury Committee 1992, and Blue Ribbon Committee 1999). The 
establishment of an audit committee provides a platform on which the non-executive directors 
can perform their duties (Vinten and Lee 1993). 
1-2: The Rise of Audit Committees 
The rise of audit committees is an international phenomenon. Since 1978, the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) has required all listed companies to have audit committees made up 
solely of independent non-executive directors. The Treadway Commission (1987) concluded 
that audit committees played a crucial role in ensuring the integrity of USA corporate 
financial reporting. Even where they may have been formed mainly to meet listing 
requirements, rather than from conviction, American experience has shown that audit 
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committees soon proved their worth and developed into essential committees of the board 
(Cadbury 2002). Since 1999, audit committees have been dealing with changes brought about 
by the reforms resulting from the report and recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee 
on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC 1999). Also, in contrast 
to the current environment of reforms, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and the proposals of 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National Associations of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) represent some of the most sweeping changes and regulations ever to address audit 
committees' oversight responsibilities. In January 2003, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) proposed new rules regarding audit committee requirements as a 
consequence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
In the UK, although audit committees are not mandatory, there is effectively a requirement for 
listed companies to have them because the London Stock Exchange requires UK listed 
companies to prepare a statement in their annual report of compliance with Cadbury 
Committee (1992) and to give details of any non-compliance. The Cadbury Committee 
recognized the important role, which the audit committee can play, and recommended that all 
listed UK companies form audit committees which should be made up of at least three non-
executive directors, the majority of whom should be independent. The audit committee's role 
in the UK has been expanded following the recommendations of the Tumbull Report (1999) 
of the need to carry out an annual review of the effectiveness of the internal control system. 
Recently, following the corporate failures in the USA, the Financial Review Council (FRC) 
was asked to set up an independent group to clarify the role and responsibilities of audit 
committees and develop a 'Combined Code' of guidance. This group, under the chairmanship 
of Sir Robert Smith, published its report in January 2003. The report also proposed significant 
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changes to the 'Combined Code' for audit committees' oversight responsibilities related to the 
financial reporting processes, auditing, and internal control. 
In Egypt, increasing attention has been paid to audit committees by both regulatory authorities 
and academics because the role of such committees has become a key element in corporate 
governance practice. As a result, in 2000, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), which is 
considered a supervisor for all Egyptian banks, required all public banks to establish audit 
committees as sub-committees of the main board of directors, charged with specific 
responsibilities relating to the monitoring of, financial reporting, external auditors, and 
internal control including the internal auditing function. In June 2002 the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) issued statement No.30 article No.7, to the listed companies in the Cairo & 
Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE) requiring them to have an audit committee. The Board of 
Directors should, from its members, appoint the audit committee members and the audit 
committee should comprise at least three non-executive directors, each of whom should be 
diligent and have good experience of the company's business environment. The audit 
committee should carry out its duties independently from company management and present 
monthly reports to the Board of Directors including its suggestions and recommendations. 
1-2-1. Defining the Concept 
The term audit committee is often not defined on the grounds that the form and composition 
of the committee may legitimately vary from company to company and that there is a 
consensus on what an audit committee is (Collier 1994). However for the purposes of clarity 
of this study it is essential to develop a definition. 
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Parker (1992) defined an audit committee as "A committee appointed by a company as a 
liaison between the Board of Directors and the external auditors. The committee normally has 
a majority of non-executive directors and is expected to view the company's affairs in a 
detached and dispassionate manner". 
Collier (1994) defined an audit committee as "An audit committee is deemed to exist if there 
is a sub-committee of the board which has a membership limited to non-executive directors or 
at least has a majority of non-executive directors each of whom is independent and financially 
literate. The responsibilities of the committee must include all of the following: the review of 
the annual financial statements; the review of accounting principles and practice; meeting the 
external auditors and discussing their audit of the financial statements; and assessing the 
adequacy of financial control systems". 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act. (2002 sec.2) defined an audit committee as "A committee 
established by and amongst the Board of Directors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing 
(1) the accounting and financial reporting processes of the issuer: and (2) audits of the 
financial statements of the issuer". 
A review of the above definitions of the audit committee shows audit committees are defined 
by reference to their composition and function .The three features most commonly cited are: a 
sub-committee of the board, composed exclusively of non -executive directors each of whom 
is independent and financially literate, and its oversight responsibilities for the review of 
financial reporting and assessment of the adequacy of financial internal control systems, and 
the review of external and internal auditing functions. The above characteristics were used to 
give the following definition of an audit committee for this study. 
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"An audit committee is a sub-committee of the Board of Directors which has a 
membership limited to non-executive directors, each of whom is independent and 
financially literate. The committee is charged with providing oversight of financial 
reporting and auditing processes" 
This definition corresponds closely with the current recommendations and requirements of 
regulatory and professional committees, such as the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC 1999), 
the USA Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), and the UK Smith Report (2003). 
1-2-2. Research into the Effectiveness of Audit Committees 
The issue of corporate governance has brought audit committees under the spotlight. An 
effective audit committee can be seen as enhancing the corporate governance practices of the 
company (Carson 2002). The issue of audit committee effectiveness has been a subject of 
considerable research, which so far has failed to reach definitive conclusions (Pomeranz 
1997). Along these lines, Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) stated that "little empirical research has 
been conducted to investigate the effectiveness of audit committees and conclude that the 
evidence collected to date is weak". Also, DeZoort et al. (2003) argued that despite the audit 
committee's important role, both the professional and academic literature raise questions 
about audit committee effectiveness. However, some research into audit committee 
effectiveness has been undertaken as discussed below. 
Knapp (1987) examined audit committee effectiveness in an experimental framework in terms 
of whether the audit committee sides with the auditors in a dispute and found that the 
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composition of the audit committee was important m determining audit committee 
effectiveness. 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) evaluated audit committee effectiveness in terms of the power of 
its members. A questionnaire was used to measure power and audit committee effectiveness 
variables. The results showed that audit committee effectiveness is highly associated with 
referent power (power derived from the personal qualities of the audit committee members), 
expert power (level of knowledge of accounting, auditing, and financial controls of the audit 
committee member), information power (level of knowledge of the company and industry 
possessed by audit committee members), and diligence (preparation, commitment, vigilance, 
independence, and level of activity of audit committee members in carrying out their duties). 
There was also a strong link between effectiveness and "sanctionary power", in terms of the 
degree of responsibility given to the audit committee to determine the activities of internal 
and external auditors and the resources devoted to these internal and external auditors. 
In the UK, Collier and Gregory (1996) examined audit committee effectiveness in an 
experimental study in terms of whether audit committees are effective in ensuring audit 
quality by protecting the auditors from fee cuts which might affect audit quality, and signal 
tighter internal controls which help to reduce audit time and hence audit fees. The results 
showed that the audit committee is effective in its role of overseeing the external audit and 
ensuring that the scope of the audit is adequate, but that there is no conclusive evidence to 
suggest that it is effective in engendering a stronger internal control environment that is 
reflected in audit fees. 
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Rezaee (1997) discusses a questionnaire survey designed to establish the nature of audit 
committee activity, including its effectiveness. Rezaee states that " the effectiveness of the 
audit committee's involvement in corporate governance depends on the availability of 
resources and the degree to which audit committee members are independent of 
management", but there is no discussion of the meaning of effectiveness, resources, or 
independence. 
Spira (1998) examines the effectiveness of audit committees over time, finding that audit 
committees tend to mature by becoming more active in their involvement in the governance 
of the company. This is subject to the influence of various catalysts in the life and evolution 
of the audit committee. 
Although these studies focus on important areas affecting audit committee effectiveness, the 
purpose of audit committee activity is not clearly defined and the criteria used to evaluate 
effectiveness often exhibit the confusion (Spira 1998). Also, these studies did not recognize 
the distinction between effectiveness and the factors which enable committees to be effective 
(Kalbers and Fogarty 1993). 
Audit committee effectiveness has been defined as the committee's ability to satisfy fully its 
oversight responsibilities (DeZoort 1998 and Rittenberg and Nair 1993). Overseeing the 
financial reporting process and the internal control structure is a critical part of that oversight 
responsibility. The audit committee, with the assistance of the internal and external auditors, 
is responsible for ensuring that the financial disclosures made by management are complete 
and accurate. The audit committee has been charged with reviewing the scope of the external 
audit, ensuring there is proper communication and coordination between the internal and 
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external auditors, reviewing the appropriateness of the accounting methods and estimates used 
in the preparation of the statements, and approving the quarterly and annual financial 
statements before they are issued to the public (Tread way Commission 1987, Cad bury 
Committee 1992, BRC 1999, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, and Smith Report 2003). In this 
study, audit committee oversight responsibilities are used as tools to examine the 
effectiveness ofaudit committees in the public banking sector in Egypt. In addition, the study 
examined the effect of audit committee members' independence and experience on audit 
committee effectiveness. 
1-2-3. Benefits of having an Audit Committees 
One major motivation for companies to establish audit committees would derive from the 
benefits they bring. The Cadbury Committee (1992) suggested that audit committees can 
provide a range of benefits provided they are effective in carrying out their functions. The 
benefits which might encourage the establishment of audit committees can be summarized 
from the viewpoint of the parties involved. 
The Board o[Directors 
The audit committee could assist directors in meeting their statutory and fiduciary 
responsibilities, especially as regards accounting records, annual accounts and the audit 
(Collier 1994). Further, the audit committee should improve communication between the 
board and the external auditors. Menon and Williams (1994) explained that there are two 
potential monitoring advantages to be gained from assigning these board oversight 
responsibilities. Firstly, the independence and integrity of monitoring may be enhanced by 
having internal and external auditors report to a subset of the board which consists of outside 
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directors. Secondly, board committees could help improve the efficiency of board 
functioning. 
The External Auditors 
Recent criticism of the external audit function has spurred standard-setting bodies to adopt 
several measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the independent auditor's role. Many of 
these new rules and regulations mandate greater involvement of the audit committees in the 
audit process (Knapp 1991 ). The Auditing Standards Board issued several Statements on 
Auditing Standards (SASs) regarding audit committees' relationship with external auditors. 
SAS Nos. 53 and 54, The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and 
Irregularities and Illegal Acts by Clients, respectively require auditors to notify the audit 
committee of any suspected fraud or illegal acts; SAS No.60, Communication of Internal 
Control Structure Related Matters Noted in an Audit, requires auditors to report a broader set 
of internal control deficiencies to the audit committee than required previously; and SAS 
No.61, Communication With Audit Committee, requires the auditors to disclose certain 
potential and unresolved matters pertaining to the audit committee. Also SAS No.71, Interim 
Financial Information, requires the auditors to communicate certain matters to the audit 
committee, as they relate to interim financial information before the company files its form 
1 0-Q and preferably before it publicly announces its financial results. In 1999, The Auditing 
Standard Board (ASB) issued SAS No.90, Audit Committee Communication, which requires 
the auditors to discuss with the company's audit committee his or her judgement about the 
quality, not just the acceptability, of the accounting principles applied in the company's 
financial reports (American Institute of CPA's 2000). The Independent Standards Board (IS B) 
in the USA (1999) adopted Independence Standard No.l, Independence Discussions with 
Audit Committees. This standard recommends that auditors communicate in writing with the 
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audit committee matters likely to influence audit independence. The Blue Ribbon Committee 
(BRC 1999) recommends that audit committee charters specify that "the outside auditor is 
ultimately accountable to the board of directors and the audit committee, which have the 
ultimate authority and responsibility to select, evaluate, and, where appropriate, replace the 
outside auditor". It is contended that reporting to an audit committee will enhance the external 
auditor's independent position since the external auditors can communicate directly with 
those directors who are not activity engaged in the management of the company (Collier 
1994). An independent audit committee reinforces the independence of the corporation's 
external auditor, and thereby helps assure that the auditor will have a 'free rein' in the audit 
process (Deli and Gillan 2000). 
The Internal Auditors 
The presence of the audit committee often enables the internal auditor to gain a useful higher 
profile. The very fact that internal auditors meet with the committee and report to it their 
activities, helps the auditors to gain serious recognition and greater co-operation from 
management (Vinten and Lee 1993). Also, an audit committee provides the opportunity for 
internal auditors to report to board members and thus improve communication between the 
board and the internal audit function (Collier 1994 ). As with external auditors, reporting to an 
audit committee should enhance the independence of internal auditors. Through concern for 
internal auditor independence, the Treadway Commission (1987) discouraged the situation 
where the internal audit function reports to the senior officer directly responsible for preparing 
the accounts. Instead it suggests that internal auditors report to the chief executive officer and 
in many companies there is a dual reporting responsibility to the chief executive and the audit 
committee. Miller (1988) opines that "the best liability insurance coverage a corporate board 
can have is an effective internal audit department" and argues that the audit committee is 
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crucial in determining the effectiveness of the internal audit department as it ensures the 
independence of the function and reviews the scope, results and quality of its work. When 
examining the relationship between audit committees and the internal auditor, Scarbrough et 
al. (1998) found that audit committees consisting of non-executive directors were more likely 
to be supportive of the role of the internal audit by having frequent meetings with the chief 
internal auditor, and reviewing the internal audit programme and the results of internal audit 
work. 
The Investors and Other Users o[Financial Reports 
The Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees 
(BRC 1999) highlighted the importance of audit committees for investors when it stated: "the 
Committee believes audit committees will be more active in helping to ensure the 
transparency and integrity of financial reporting and, thereby, maintain the investor 
confidence that makes our securities markets the deepest and most liquid in the world". 
Collier (1994) argued that the existence of an audit committee increases the credibility and 
objectivity of financial reports by demonstrating the board's intention to give due weight to 
reviewing external reporting, auditing, internal controls and other related matters. This 
argument presupposes the audit committee actually carries out its responsibilities. 
1-2-4. Disadvantages of Audit Committees 
A review of the literature suggests that the support for audit committees is based upon 
anecdotal information of their effectiveness rather than objective evidence. Archambeault and 
DeZoort (2001) explained that, the existence of an audit committee does not ensure 
monitoring effectiveness. Also, the Treadway Commission (1987), highlighted this problem 
when it noted that the mere existence of an audit committee is not enough. The audit 
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committee must be vigilant, informed, diligent, and probing in fulfilling its oversight 
responsibilities. Wild (1994) stated that security exchanges and government agencies are 
concerned with the lack of uniformity in the specific duties and responsibilities assigned to 
these committees and, therefore, have exhibited a historic reluctance to mandate their 
existence. At the same time, audit committees are under increasing pressure to accept 
additional oversight responsibilities. Sommer (1991) points out that the establishment of an 
audit committee does not necessarily mean that it will be effective in providing the benefits of 
improved financial reporting and auditing, and states that 'there is considerable anecdotal 
evidence that many, if not most, audit committees fall short of doing what are generally 
perceived as being their duties'. Menon and Williams (1994) support this contention with 
findings showing that companies, which had nominally formed an audit committee were often 
reluctant to rely upon it. They concluded that audit committees 'are often created for the 
purposes of appearance rather than to enhance stockholders' control of management'. As 
noted by Rutteman (1993) "many companies already have audit committees, but the quality 
and effectiveness of such committees is variable". One situation in which audit committees 
may be formed, without regard for quality or effectiveness, is in a highly litigious 
environment where the mere existence of an audit committee could be used as evidence that 
directors took due care in performing their duties. Further evidence to suggest that audit 
committees may be ineffective monitoring mechanisms is provided by Beasley (1996) He 
found that the composition of the board itself is more effective than the presence of an audit 
committee in reducing the likelihood of financial statement fraud. Also, along these lines, 
Carcello et al. (2002) argued that in the wake ofEnron and other financial reporting problems, 
it is important to distinguish between audit committees that function only on paper and those 
that effectively oversee financial reporting and controls. 
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1-3. Public Banking Sector in Egypt 
Similar to many emerging market economies, Egypt undertook banking sector reforms in the 
1990s aimed at moving towards a more liberal system. The new policy environment 
necessitated refining the methods used in monitoring risks with the emphasis on prudent bank 
regulation. Banks operating in Egypt can be classified as public sector, private, joint venture, 
or foreign according to ownership. In the public sector, there are four commercial banks 
whose volume of business constitutes a significant share in total bank transactions through 
large branch networks and a close relationship with state-owned companies. They are also 
major participants in the equity capital of most joint-venture banks. Recently, in an attempt to 
reduce market concentration and enhance competition, the authorities outlined plans to 
privatize the four public sector commercial banks (Abdel Shahid 2001 ). 
In Egypt, the Central Bank is the regulator. The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) is responsible 
for regulating and managing the banking and monetary system, and acts as the "bankers' 
bank" dealing with the daily settlements of clearings. The CBE is also the supervisory 
authority for deposit-taking banks, with wide powers vested in it by the banking law. Prior to 
the reforms of the 1990s, the banking sector was heavily regulated through credit controls and 
portfolio restrictions (El-Mikawy and Handoussa 2002). 
On the market transparency front, public disclosure of financial information was generally 
poor. Before the fiscal year of 1998, banks used to publish their financial statements only at 
the end of the fiscal year. Meanwhile, the income statements of the four public banks were 
exceedingly brief with only a couple of lines on revenues and expenditures, which did not 
show the amount of provisions (Sami 2000). The World Bank Report (1994) argued that "the 
adoption of uniform accounting and auditing standards and practices besides sharp 
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improvement in financial disclosure was much needed". Progress on this front was necessary: 
(a) for the regulatory staff to make policy recommendations and address problems on a sound 
basis, and (b) to improve corporate governance in banks. In response, the CBE took a decision 
in 1997 mandating all banks to adopt International Accounting Standards when preparing 
their financial statements to ensure more frequent disclosure and improve the transparency of 
the banking sector. From the fiscal year 1998, the banks are mandated to prepare quarterly 
statements on their financial position as well as profit /loss accounts, and to publish these in 
widely circulated newspapers. The end-of-year statements must include detailed information 
while the statements of the preceding three quarters may be brief. 
The stability of the banking industry cannot be achieved, however, without enterprise reform. 
Loan losses are incurred through the failure of bank borrowers to complete their contracts 
because of bad policies, ineffective management, or weak institutional frameworks (Abdel 
Shahid 2001 ). In this regard, improving the accounting and disclosure systems and the legal 
infrastructure are crucial for information gathering and enforcing debt contracts. The 
availability of reliable and comprehensive information about firms, and the ability of the legal 
system to enforce contracts rapidly, effectively, and transparently will add to the banking 
systems' capacity for financial intermediation. Accounting standards that produce comparable 
corporate financial statements make it easier for banks to assess the creditworthiness of 
borrowing firms and to evaluate their management. 
With the changing landscape of banking services in the emerging free-market economy, 
regulators look to the bank's Board of Directors as being ultimately responsible for the 
control ofthe bank's directions. These changes have caused the role of the audit committee to 
become more diverse. Regulators believe that, as one of the most important board 
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committees, the audit committee can assist in monitoring compliance with board policies and 
applicable laws and regulations, in ensuring comprehensive audit coverage by both internal 
and external auditors, and in overseeing the external financial reporting process. 
1-4. The Objectives of the Study 
This study concentrates on the public banking sector in Egypt. The aim is to measure the 
effectiveness of audit committees in order to have indicators about its oversight responsibities 
in general and in particular its development in Egypt. To achieve this goal, the research has 
the following objectives: 
1. To investigate the differences in audit committee members' perception of their oversight 
responsibilities between the USA, the UK, and Egypt. 
2. To explore in detail and provide measurements of the effectiveness of audit committees 
in the public banking sector in Egypt. 
3. To assess the relationship between the independence of audit committee members and the 
effectiveness of audit committees in the public banking sector in Egypt. 
4. To assess the relationship between the experience of audit committee members and the 
effectiveness of audit committees in the public banking sector in Egypt. 
5. To investigate the obstacles which face the audit committees in the public banking sector 
in Egypt and their effect on audit committee effectiveness. 
1-5. Reasons for Choosing the Topic 
The implementation of an economic reform programme in Egypt has resulted in an active 
effort by people in authority and those who work in accounting and auditing to enhance the 
quality of financial reporting which is considered to be one of the necessary factors to 
underpin the effectiveness of economic performance. Through these efforts, evolved the idea 
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of implementing audit committees in Egyptian firms. Recently, Egypt implemented the audit 
committee concept in the banking sector to enhance the credibility of financial reports and 
strengthen communication among directors, auditors, and management, which, it is hoped, 
will enhance the quality of auditing and financial reporting. In June 2002 the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) issued a statement No.30 to the listed companies in the Cairo & Alexandria 
Stock Exchange (CASE) requiring them to have audit committees. These current 
requirements evidence the expection of the important role for audit committees in improving 
the quality of financial reporting in Egypt. 
The reasons for selecting this topic can be summarized as follows: 
1. The view that western management theories and concepts are as applicable in developing 
countries as they are in the UK and USA has been subject to much critical comment. 
2. The Egyptian environment, especially with regard to board structure, litigation, and 
institutions in general, may well be different from those countries which applied the audit 
committee concept some time ago and designed its oversight responsibilities. 
3. In order to improve the audit committee practices in Egypt, there is a need to examine 
existing effectiveness and investigate any obstacles that may exist in the systems in order 
to suggest ways for improvement. 
1-6. The Research Questions 
The wording of the research questions determines the focus and scope of the study (Denzin 
and Lincoln 1994 ). Thus, to achieve the main research objectives, five research questions 
were formulated as focus for this research. They are as follows: 
1. Is there a difference in audit committee members' perception of their oversight 
responsibilities between the USA, the UK, and Egypt? 
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2. How effective are audit committees in the public banking sector in Egypt, particularly, the 
extent to which audit committee members carry out their oversight responsibilities? 
3. What is the nature of the relationship between the independence of audit committee 
members and the effectiveness of audit committees? 
4. What is the nature of the relationship between the experience of audit committee members 
and the effectiveness of audit committees? 
5. How can the effectiveness of audit committees in Egypt be improved? 
1-7. Methodology 
To achieve the research objectives and answer the consequent questions, old institutional 
economic theory is used to provide the underpinning theoretical framework for this study. It 
was selected on the grounds that it has the ability to offer a better understanding of audit 
committee practices in Egypt in comparison with the USA and the UK. The choice of the 
institutional framework followed a detailed examination of new institutional sociology (NIS), 
new institutional economics (NIE), old institutional economics (OIE), and the socio-economic 
factors surrounding the development and functioning of audit committee practice as a 
corporate governance tool in Egypt. 
Old institutional economics has been used to explain the interplay between institutions and 
actions in the economy, society, and culture which also deals with the issues of the 
transference of western management theories and concepts (eg. audit committees) from 
western countries to developing countries (eg. Egypt). Old institutional economics aims to 
explain that transference between cultures is possible, but the process of transference has to be 
culturally sensitive. The selection of the old institutional economics approach requires a 
detailed examination of the institutional foundations of audit committee practices in Egypt in 
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comparison with the USA and the UK experiences. Thus, corporate governance practices in 
Egypt are explained, as is the social construction of the audit profession and the expectations 
gap. To place these issues in context, a comparison between the legal framework for audit 
committees in the USA, the UK, and Egypt is also explained in detailed. 
Dittenhofer (2001) defined effectiveness as "the achievement of goals and objectives using 
the factor measures provided for determining such achievement" and Stevenson (2002) 
explained that institutional economics is about, in part, problem solving. Problem solving is a 
purposeful activity involving establishing frames for recognition, processes of remediation, 
and objectives for resolution, all of which are value-based undertakings. Therefore, in this 
study, the effectiveness of the audit committees is measured by, particularly, the extent to 
which audit committee members carry out their oversight responsibilities regarding financial 
reporting, external auditing, and internal auditing in order to improve audit committee 
practices in Egypt. 
To collect the above information the study involves both theoretical and empirical analysis. 
The study begins with a review of the available literature concerning all the above matters 
which provides a basis for constructing a framework. Survey and case study scenarios were 
the main instruments for the empirical investigation. The survey was used to gather data from 
the UK and Egyptian audit committee member samples in order to examine audit committee 
oversight responsibilities from the internal perspective of the UK and Egyptian audit 
committee members in comparison with the USA DeZoort (1997) study. A case study 
scenario approach was used to gather data from audit committee members in the public 
banking sector in Egypt in order to measure the effectiveness of audit committees. The effect 
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of audit committee members' independence and experience on audit committee effectiveness 
was examined by using the linear multiple regression model. 
1-8. Organisation of the Thesis 
The second chapter starts by explaining institutional theory and its three broad forms: new 
institutional economics, new institutional sociology, and old institutional economics. Also this 
section explains the social construction of risk. The chapter continues by examining the 
problem of cultural differences in the transference of management theories and concepts such 
as the audit committee from western countries to developing countries such as Egypt. 
Most of the corporate governance and audit committee literature that has grown up over the 
past two decades is concerned with the analysis of control structures designed to advance and 
protect the interest of shareholders under various conditions. It has long been recognized that 
optimal structures depend upon institutional conditions, and the controls may need to change 
as those conditions change. Thus, the third chapter commences by reviewing international 
corporate governance principles including audit committees based on the principles of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 1999), the Business 
Roundtable (BRT 2002), and the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD 2002). 
The chapter concludes by giving an institutional perspective of corporate governance 
practices in Egypt in order to understand the environment which surrounds audit committees 
practice. 
Over the last two decades, the Anglo-Western world has experienced a spate of corporate 
failures, financial scandals and audit failures which have placed the audit expectation gap 
debate firmly on the agenda of the accounting profession, regulators and the public 
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(Humphrey et al. 1993). The fourth chapter commences by explaining and defining the 
expectation gap and the social construction of the audit profession from an institutional 
economics perspective. This chapter continues by explaining the role of audit committees in 
narrowing the expectation gap through monitoring the external auditor's independence, pre-
approving non-audit services, and demanding a high quality audit. 
It is possible that differences in the regulatory environment and the importance assigned to 
corporate governance, as well as other cultural factors, could significantly influence the nature 
of the audit committees' relative effectiveness between countries. The fifth chapter aims to 
explain the legal framework for audit committees in Egypt in comparison with the UK and the 
USA. This chapter commences by illustrating the UK and the USA experience of the audit 
committee and the requirements for improving its role in both countries. The chapter 
continues by explaining the comparative legal framework for audit committees in the UK, the 
USA, and Egypt by over viewing the following factors: audit committee charters, 
independence and experience of audit committee members, audit committee size, audit 
committee meetings, resources and authority of the audit committee, audit committee 
members' training, and audit committee disclosure. That is to say, audit committee 
effectiveness is viewed as the competency with which the audit committee carries out its 
specific oversight responsibilities. Audit committee members must be critically aware of their 
responsibilities; they must also completely understand them. How the responsibilities are 
carried out may vary, but a failure to address them may be of significant detriment to the audit 
committee, the board, and most of all shareholders. Thus, the chapter concludes by explaining 
the legal framework for audit committee oversight responsibilities in the USA, the UK, and in 
Egypt. 
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The sixth chapter is divided into three sections. The first section starts by explaining the 
research objectives and questions. This section concludes by explaining why the research uses 
quantitative methods in the light of an institutional economics framework. The second section 
aims to describe the survey instrument, which is used to examine the audit committee 
oversight responsibilities from the internal perspective of the UK and Egyptian audit 
committee members in comparison with the USA DeZoort (1997) study. This in turn, is used 
as a basis to assess audit committee members' abilities to recognize their assigned objectives 
and explore their perceptions of the committees' oversight responsibilities, which in turn is 
used as a surrogate tool to measure audit committee effectiveness. This section concludes by 
defining the two study populations, samples, their representativeness, and response rates. The 
remaining section starts by explaining the case study scenario as a strategy for the quantitative 
research. This strategy helped the researcher in investigating and understanding the real-life 
situation facing audit committees in this sector. The section concludes by explaining the 
administration of the questionnaire and the banking sector's population and response rate. 
The seventh chapter aims to examine the audit committee oversight responsibility from the 
perspective of audit committee members in the UK and Egypt in comparison with the USA 
where DeZoort (1997) undertook a study to assess audit committee members' abilities to 
recognize their assigned objectives and explore their perceptions of oversight responsibilities. 
To achieve this target the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section aims to 
compare the UK audit committee members' responses with the DeZoort (1997) survey results. 
The second section aims to compare the UK audit committee members' responses with the 
Egyptian audit committee members' responses. The remaining section aims to provide an 
overall comparison of the responses of the USA DeZoort (1997), the UK, and the Egyptian 
surveys. 
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The eighth chapter aims, in particular, to measure audit committee effectiveness in the 
banking sector in Egypt. Based on the results in chapter seven, audit committee oversight 
responsibilities, after modification, are used as a tool to examine effectiveness through the 
extent to which audit committee members carry out their oversight responsibilities. This 
chapter is divided into three sections. The first section aims to explain how the US and the 
UK oversight responsibilities for audit committees are modified and adapted in order to fit the 
Egyptian environment and the nature of the banking sector. The second section aims to 
examine audit committee effectiveness. The questionnaire that was directed to the audit 
committee members contained fifteen case studies. Each case study scenario expressed an 
oversight responsibility by using a case study scenario approach. The case studies provided a 
generalisable and simple set of circumstances for the audit committee members to consider. 
Responses were requested to the questions posed on the scenario identifying their oversight 
responsibilities. 
Since the composition of the audit committee has been the focus of many governance reform 
efforts in the US and the UK, the unanimous view of the proponents of reform is that the audit 
committee should be composed entirely of outside directors who have sufficient experience in 
oversight areas related to accounting and auditing. Therefore, the final section examined the 
effect of audit committee members' independence and experience on audit committee 
effectiveness, which was measured in previous section. 
The final chapter explains the research conclusions, and continues by examining the 
limitations of the research. This chapter concludes with suggested recommendations to the 
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Capital Market Authority (CMA) in Egypt regarding audit committee composition and 
oversight responsibilities in order to improve audit committee effectiveness. 
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Chapter Two: An Institutional Economics Framework 
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Chapter Two: An Institutional Economics Framework 
2-1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the importance of looking at social institutions in 
tracing the development of audit committee practice as a corporate governance tool in Egypt. 
For this purpose, the chapter starts by explaining institutional theory and its three broad 
forms: new institutional economics, new institutional sociology, and old institutional 
economics. The chapter continues by examining the potential impact of cultural differences in 
the transference of Anglo Saxon management theories and concepts such as corporate 
governance including audit committees to developing countries such as Egypt. 
2-2. An Institutional Theory Framework 
There has been an increasing interest in institutional theory in recent years in various areas of 
the social sciences. Rutherford (1994) explained that institutional economics as a field of 
knowledge is concerned with studying an economic phenomenon within its entire surrounding 
environment which includes social, cultural, political, ideological, religious, civilisation, 
technological factors. Also, Martinez and Dacin (1999) explained that an institutional theory 
framework is primarily concerned with an organisation's relationship or "fit" with the 
institutional environment, the effects of social expectations on the organisation and the 
incorporation of these expectations as reflected in organisational characteristics. The main 
focus of institutional theory is that an organization's survival requires it to conform to social 
norms of acceptable behaviour as much as to achieve levels of production efficiency (Hussain 
and Gunasekaran 2002). In particular, institutional theory extends beyond the focus of 
contingency theory in an organisational task environment to focus, instead, on its institutional 
environment. Consequently, it seeks to explain organisation- environment relations from an 
overarching social viewpoint (Ahmed and Scapens 2000). The theory includes three broad 
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forms of institutionalism: new institutional economrcs (NIE), new institutional sociology 
(NIS), and old institutional economics (OIE). Although these theories have different origins 
and intellectual roots, they share a concern for institutions and institutional change (Bums and 
Scapens 2000). Old institutional economics will make the primary contribution to this study. 
2-2-1. New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
The NIE approach focuses on the analysis of markets and hierarchies as alternative modes of 
economic organisation, and its main constituent is transaction cost economics. NIE is a vast 
and relatively new multidisciplinary field that includes aspects of economics, history, 
sociology, political science, business organization and law (North 2000). This new direction 
of economics considers that the cost of transacting - determined by institutions and 
institutional arrangements - is the key to economic performance. It is therefore argued that the 
institutions of a country - such as its legal, political, and social systems - determine its 
economic performance, and it is this, according to Coase (2000), that gives the new 
institutional economics its importance for economists. The purpose of NIE is both to explain 
the determinants of institutions and their evolution over time, and to evaluate their impact on 
economic performance, efficiency, and distribution. There are also two-way causality between 
institutions and economic growth. On the one hand, institutions have a profound influence on 
economic growth, and on the other, economic growth and development often result in a 
change in institutions (Nabli and Nugent, 1989). Along these lines, Heldand and Nutzinger 
(2003) explained that new institutional economics has made a major contribution to the 
renaissance of institutions in mainstream economics. It analyzes the effects on incentives of 
various institutional arrangements, in particular the effects of altered institutional specialists. 
By including institutions' incentives and restrictions, it has made a significant first step 
toward the ongoing development of economics. 
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Martinez and Dacin (1999) argued that, while transaction cost economics is useful for 
explaining organisational actions and outcomes in terms of efficiency maximisation resulting 
from transaction cost minimisation, it cannot explain all organisational actions and outcomes 
because efficiency is not the overriding imperative guiding organisational and individual 
decisions. Also, Ahmed and Scapens (2000) explained that, while this approach seeks to 
broaden the domain of economic analysis by examining transactions and governance 
structures internal to the firm, it does not recognise the impact of the broader economic, 
political and social institutions which can be important in understanding the development of 
accounting practices. Hodgson (2000) argued that, it is clear that the NIE project is an 
attempt to explain the emergence of institutions, such as the firm or the state, by reference to a 
model of rational individual behaviour, tracing out the unintended consequence in terms of 
human interactions. An initial, institution-free, 'state of nature' is assumed. The explanatory 
movement is from individuals to institutions, taking individuals as given. According to Khalil 
(1995) NIE focuses on institutions as constraints, while, in contrast, the main thrust of old 
institutional economics is the modelling of institutions as determinants of the agent's 
cognitive ability. Similarly, Hodgson (2000) has argued that "it is a defining characteristic of 
the NIE that institutions act primarily as constraints upon the behaviour of given individuals". 
2-2-2. New Institutional Sociology (NIS) 
NIS adopts a broader, multi-dimensional approach for focusing on issues of external and 
internal organisational contexts (Hill 1999). It has contributed significantly to the 
understanding of relationships between organisational structures and the wider social 
environment in which organisations are situated (Hussain and Hoque 2002). NIS also focuses 
on the process through which organisations and societal agencies initiate and design 
structures, political and procedural, in order to demonstrate conformity with institutionalised 
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rules. Scott (1995) argued that the NIS approach, however, also explores broader institutions. 
Its focus is the processes through which organizations and societal agencies initiate and 
design structures, policies, and procedures in order to demonstrate conformity with 
institutionalised rules, values, and expectations. NIS explains the success and survival of 
firms in terms of the extent to which they encapsulate social values and expectations in their 
organizational structures and behaviour. 
Along these lines, Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) explained that there is growing need to 
understand how social structure assists or impedes economic performance. In particular, the 
competitive advantage of social forms of organization relative to market-based exchange 
systems, has spawned new conjectures. Central to these conjectures is the 'embeddedness' 
argument, which offers a potential link between sociological and economic accounts of 
business behaviour. Crosby and Stephens (1987) explained that embeddedness refers to the 
process by which social relations shape economic action in ways that some mainstream 
economic schemes overlook or mis-specify when they assume that social ties affect economic 
behaviour only minimally or, in some stringent accounts, reduce the efficiency of the price 
system. Along these lines, Uzzi (1996) argued that although the concept of embeddedness is 
useful for understanding the sociological failings of standard neoclassical schemes, it does not 
explain concretely how social ties affect economic outcomes. Also, Ahmed and Scapens 
(2000) argued that, while this approach focuses on how institutionalised rules, values and 
expectations influence the firm, it does not explore how the firm shapes the institutionalised 
rules, values and expectations. 
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2-2-3. Old Institutional Economics (OIE) 
The OIE approach is the most established and oldest of the institutional approaches and has its 
origins in the work of early American institutionalists. Its main emphasis is on studying 
economic activities and the production and reproduction of life's day-to-day processes as part 
of a holistic ongoing process of change (Ahmed and Scapens 2000). Also, this approach 
makes the 'institution' the unit of economic analysis and provides a potentially useful basis 
for understanding the institutionalised character of organisational routines and rule-based 
behaviours, such as accounting and corporate governance. In this approach, human beings, 
organisations, and the economic system itself are regarded as part of a larger social system 
(Sugiura 1999). Consequently, understanding the structure and meaning of an economic 
activity or a social behaviour, such as audit committee practice, requires among other things 
an understanding of the constituent elements of the social framework. 
The OIE has emphasised the importance of studying the role of social institutions in co-
ordinating economic activity. Olsson (2000) explained that, the old institutionalists claim that 
the individual is a product of his social environment and that "economic man" is not 
necessarily a universal phenomenon. Rather, economic man is an institution that has emerged 
from specific historical and social settings. Dequech (2002) asserted that, old institutionalism 
does not take the individual as given, individuals are affected by their institutional and 
cultural situations. Institutions are structures comprising sets of rules and procedures that give 
consistency and patterns of behaviour (A vgerou 2000). Also, Colander (1996) explained that, 
institutions comprise the organisational routines and ruled-based behaviours which provide 
the standard operating procedures needed to help economic agents take action and to enable 
the economic system as a whole to function. Furthermore, Olsson (2000) defines institutions 
as the rules of human behaviour which act as constraints in economic situations and define 
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our choice sets and North (1991) explained that, institutions are the human constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interaction. These consist of both informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, 
laws, and property rights). Institutions provide the incentive structure of an economy; as that 
structure evolves, it shapes the direction of economic change towards growth, stagnation, or 
decline. In this way, the framework of rules and institutions prevent some actions and 
behaviours, and may make others possible. 
Bums and Scapens (2000) explained that whilst there is no universal definition of an 
institution, as discussed above, within OIE a commonly used definition is: a way of thought 
or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is embedded in the habits of a group or 
the customs of a people. Also, Bums and Scapens argued that institutions can be regarded as 
imposing form and social coherence upon human activity, through the production and 
reproduction of settled habits of thought and actions. However institutions themselves evolve 
through a process of "routinization" of human activity. Thus, there is a duality between 
actions (human activity) and the institutions which structure that activity. This duality is 
essentially the agency-structure relationship which has been widely debated in the social 
sciences in recent years (Archer 2000). Based on previous discussions, habit, routine, and rule 
concepts comprise the main lines of argument in old institutional economics (A vgerou 2000, 
Bums and Scapens 2000, and Dequech 2002) thus, discussing them in more detail may be 
worthwhile. 
Hodgson (1993) defined habits as more or less self-actualizing dispositions or tendencies to 
engage in previously adopted or acquired forms of actions. However, whereas habits are 
personal, routines may encompass groups of individuals. In this sense, routines represent the 
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patterns of thought and action which are habitually adopted by groups of individuals (Burns 
and Scapens 2000). According to Nelson (1995) routines are the processes through which 
organizational characters are transmitted through time. Consequently, organizations are 
typically slow to change as they follow their own routines. 
Burns and Scapens (2000) explained that an emphasis on habits and routines does not deny 
that individuals have reasons for doing things. These reasons will often include following 
established and accepted rules of behaviour. In this sense, rules can be defined as the formally 
recognized way in which 'things should be done'. Hodgson (1998) explained that rules are 
conditional or unconditional patterns of thought or behaviour which can be adopted either 
consciously or unconsciously by agents. As argued by Scapens (1994), rules are necessary to 
co-ordinate and give coherence to the actions of groups of individuals. As such, rule-based 
behaviour may result from an explicit assessment of the available alternatives, and the 
selected rules followed thereafter in order to avoid the difficulties and costs of undertaking 
such assessments on every occasion. However, by repeatedly following rules, behaviour may 
become programmatic and based increasingly on tacit knowledge, which the individual 
acquires through reflexive monitoring of day-to-day behaviour. Such programmatic rule-
based behaviours could be described as routines- as they represent the habits of the group. 
Here, routines can be defined as the way in which 'things are actually done' (Bums and 
Scapens 2000). The limitations of human knowledge and the capacity for decision making 
provide a reason for human reliance on habits and rules (Nau and Steiner 2002). Regarding 
the relationship between habits and cultures, Stevenson (2002) explained that habits formed 
through the shaping and shading effects of cultural forces manifesting through social heritage, 
community sanctioning, and the formal and informal educational processes that mould the 
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awareness and habits of individuals. Thus, culture both reflects and shapes the knowledge of 
the collective of individuals. 
As argued before, NIE and NIS do not recognize the impact of the broader economics, 
political, and social institutions which can be important in understanding audit committee 
practice in Egypt. Also, since this study emphasizes the interplay between institutions and 
actions in the economy, society, and culture which encapsulate the issues involved in the 
transference of Anglo Saxon management and accounting theories and concepts such as audit 
committees to developing countries such as Egypt, these approaches were rejected. 
In short, the grounding of this study in the institutional framework, and in the old institutional 
economics in particular, is mainly because of its suitability and practicality for studying audit 
committees in Egypt within their intricate societal web. The collected data from pre-field and 
field studies support such intricacy, and it is concluded that it would be difficult to study audit 
committee practices within a specific number of institutions, as they are highly influenced and 
framed by societal institutions in general. Also, old institutional economics (OIE) emphasizes 
the interplay between institutions and actions in the economy, society, and culture which 
cover the problem of transference of theories and concepts such as the audit committee from 
Anglo Saxon to developing countries such as Egypt. 
In addition, the selection of an institutional framework has influenced the current and 
subsequent chapters. For example, in conforming with the institutional framework the current 
chapter is dedicated to provide a clear picture of the social constructions of risk, and the role 
of culture differences in the applicability of Anglo Saxon management and accounting 
theories and practices in Egypt. Also, beside the treatment of rules and routines as the carriers 
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of organisational memory, Scapens (1994) reported that they can be regarded as a basis for 
the evolution of organisational behaviour. He also argued that evolution is not the creation of 
optimal behaviour, but merely the production (and possible adaptation) of behaviour through 
time. Regarding audit committees, Green (1994) explained that the role of the audit 
committee is constantly evolving, and as a result of recommendations by the accounting 
profession and regulators and pressure from the financial press, investors, and academics, the 
rules and expectations surrounding the practice of financial reporting are in a constant state of 
flux. Often, these changes are precipitated by a "crisis" such as the collapse of a financial 
institution or the bankruptcy of a large corporation. The resulting changes, then, can be seen 
as an attempt to protect the public from inadequate financial statement disclosure and improve 
audit standards. 
Thus, history, as the background to current practice, is essential within old institutional 
analysis. For this reason, in the next chapter, some aspects of the historical development of 
corporate governance and audit committee practice in light of the transition process from a 
command to a market based economy in Egypt, are discussed in detail. 
As will be seen, the subsequent chapters are also influenced by the institutional framework. 
For example, chapter four aims to explain the social construction of the audit profession, the 
expectations gap, and the role of audit committees in narrowing this gap. Chapter five aims to 
explain the legal framework for audit committees in Egypt in the light of the framework 
adopted in the UK and the USA. The chapter commences by illustrating the UK and USA 
experience of the audit committee and the enforcement practices used for improving its role in 
both countries. Stevenson (2002) explained that institutional economics is about, in part, 
problem solving. Problem solving is a purposeful activity involving establishing frames for 
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recognition, processes of remediation, and objectives for resolution, all of which are value-
based undertakings. Therefore, in chapter eight of this study, the effectiveness of the audit 
committee is measured based on, particularly, the extent to which audit committee members 
carry out their oversight responsibilities regarding financial reporting, external auditing, and 
internal auditing in order to improve the audit committee practices. As old institutional 
economics tends to rely more upon an examination of quantitative empirical information 
rather than on qualitative information (Stanfield 1999), this study uses the quantitative 
approach in its data collection process. Also, an institutional framework is used in analysing 
the differences in results between the USA, the UK, and Egypt. 
2-3. The Social Construction of Risk and Institutional Economics 
Neubourg and Weigand (2000) explained that institutional economics moved from a position 
of drawing eclectically on several other disciplines, to a stance of building its arguments 
almost entirely out of neoclassical materials. Granovetter (1985) argued that, such a stance 
cannot provide a persuasive account of economic institutions, and suggested a broader 
foundation based on classical sociological arguments about the embeddedness of economic 
goals and activities in social oriented goals and structures. Economic institutions do not 
emerge automatically in response to economic needs. Rather, they are constructed by 
individuals whose action is both facilitated and constrained by the structure and resources 
available in the social networks in which they are embedded. Also, Sugiura (1999) explained 
that, modem economics views the market economy as a single corporate being, which also 
serves as a basis for the formulation of laws, power, and social relations, and interactions 
among autonomous individuals. Human beings have a social existence and their collective 
social structure makes up social relations. 
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Social welfare in an economy depends on its ability to satisfy the needs of its members and to 
manage the risks threatening the wellbeing of those people (Neubourg and Weigand 2000). 
The satisfaction of these needs requires some individual and social action. Both the ability to 
act and the possibility of realizing positive results are subject to uncertainty and may be 
threatened by risks. Berry (2000) following Adams (1995), suggested that, we might think of 
four characteristic positions taken towards risk. These are: 
1. Individualists: who are enterprising self-made people, relatively free from control by 
others, and who strive to exert control over their environment and the people in it, the 
risk-taking entrepreneurial leader of popular capitalism. 
2. Hierarchists: who inhabit a world with strong group boundaries and binding prescriptions. 
Social relationships in this world are hierarchical. Leadership is about style or about 
working with contracts and transactions. Leaders act to manage risk by containment, risk 
assessment, insurance and portfolios. 
3. Egalitarians: have strong group loyalties but little respect for externally imposed rules, 
other than those imposed by nature. Group decisions about risks are arrived at 
democratically and leaders rule by force of personality and persuasion. Risk is shared and 
leadership is about both transactions and transformations. 
4. Fatalists: have minimum control over their own lives. They belong to no groups that are 
responsible for the decisions that rule their lives. They are non-unionised, outcasts, on the 
margins. They are resigned to their fate and they see no point in attempting to change it. 
Risk is ignored and leadership here can become self-destructive. 
2-4. The Culture Differences Role 
Sugiura (1999) argued that, institutionalisation of each market society is closely related to its 
corresponding culture. Brown and Humphreys (1996) defined culture as "what provides 
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human beings with a design for living, with a ready-made set of solutions to problems so that 
individuals in each generation do not have to start again from scratch". Humphreys (1996) 
explained that it can be argued that these differences in work-related values are the result of 
an underlying difference in culture. Also, Hofstede (1991) gives a definition derived from the 
world of computing, in line with his title Cultures and Organisations: Software of the Mind, 
he suggests that culture is "the collective programming of the mind which categorise people 
from another". He uses group to mean a number of people in contact with each other and 
"category" to consist of people who, without necessarily having contact, have something in 
common. 
In management literature, culture is seen as an important influence on practice. Humphreys 
(1996) and others describe the degree of influence of culture in general and more specifically 
in the sub-divisions of national, organizational and occupational, as follows: 
National Culture 
Hofstede ( 1991) distinguishes between nations and societies. He suggests that the concept of a 
common culture is more applicable to societies than to nations. However, he recognizes that 
where there are strong forces for integration within nations such as a dominant language, 
common mass media, national education system, national political system, national armed 
forces and national representation in sports events, then nations can be regarded as the "source 
of a considerable amount of common mental programming of their citizens". Along these 
lines, Humphreys (1996) in his study on cultural differences between the UK and Egypt in 
educational institutions, argued that "there is no doubt that there are cultural differences 
arising from differences in common mental programming between the UK and Egypt which 
would certainly account for variations in such as attitude to duty and the slow slog up the 
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hierarchy of single bureaucratic organizations. National culture would seem to be a highly 
significant factor here". 
Organizational Culture 
Organizational culture has seen a plethora of literature in the last 15 years. Heuer (1999) 
defined organizational culture as "the pattern of shared values and beliefs that help individuals 
understand organizational functioning and thus provides them with norms for behaviour in the 
firm". This notion of culture is similar to the view that culture is an organizational trait 
manifested in the shared values and beliefs of its members (Hofstede 1998). An imbalance 
between societal and organizational cultural values may be particularly important for 
organizations in less developed/developing countries. Trompenaars (1993) categorizes 
organizational culture as four main types based on two dimensions: equity-hierarchy and 
person-task orientation. Four organizational cultures emerge and are summarized below. 
1. The Family (a power-oriented culture). This culture is characterized by strong emphasis 
on the hierarchy and an orientation towards the person. Individuals within this 
organizational form are expected to perform their tasks as directed by the leader, who may 
be viewed as the caring parent. Subordinates not only respect the dominant leader or 
father figure but they also seek guidance and approval. 
2. The Eiffel Tower (a role-oriented culture). A strong emphasis on the hierarchy and an 
orientation towards the task characterizes this culture. The "Eiffel Tower" image is 
intended to symbolize the typical bureaucracy- a tall organization, narrow at the top and 
wide at the base where roles and tasks are clearly defined and coordinated from the top. 
Authority is derived from a person's position or role within the organization, not the 
person per se. 
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3. The Guided Missile (a task-oriented culture). Trompenaars' third type of organizational 
culture is characterized by a strong emphasis on equality and an orientation toward the 
task. The motto for this culture type is "getting things done". Organization structure, 
processes and resources are all geared toward achieving the specified task/project goals. 
Power is derived from expertise rather than the formal hierarchy. 
4. The Incubator (a fulfilment-oriented culture). This culture is characterized by a strong 
emphasis on equality as well as an orientation toward the person. Trompenaars states that 
the purpose of the organization in such a culture is to serve as an incubator for the self-
expression and self-fulfilment of its members. 
Trompenaars acknowledges that 'pure types' rarely exist. However, he observed a tendency 
for particular organizational culture forms to dominate in different national cultures. Joiner 
(200 1) explained that, in a climate of increasing globalisation and the concomitant increasing 
competition, there is enormous pressure exerted on organizations to restructure to enable them 
to compete successfully in a borderless world. Progressive local firms in less developed/ 
developing countries may, among a repertoire of restricting strategies, consider changing their 
organizational culture to mimic the culture of successful organizations from the more 
industrialized nations. However, the implementation of an organizational cultural change, 
without reference to the surrounding societal values, may jeopardize the success of that 
change. Humphreys (1996), in his study argued that, there are certainly huge differences 




The notion of an occupational culture would suggest that there are likely to be similarities 
between the values and actions of the members of the same occupation, which would 
transcend the differences in nationality or organization (Humphreys 1996). It has already been 
noted that there are a variety of factors, which contribute to culture differences between 
nationalities such as a dominant language, common mass media, national education system, 
national political system, and national armed forces. 
Hofstede (1980), has suggested four dimensions of difference in culture between nations, and 
clusters these differences according to whether they are high or low within each of these 
dimensions which he labelled "power-distance", "uncertainty avoidance", "individualism", 
and "masculinity". 
1. Power-distance is described as "the extent to which the less powerful persons in a society 
accept inequality in power and consider it normal". 
2. Uncertainty avoidance is described as "the extent to which people in a culture are made 
nervous by situations which they consider as unstructured or unknown situations, and the 
extent to which they try to avoid such situations by adopting strict codes of behaviour and 
a belief in absolute truths". 
3. Individualist as OIE claims that the individual is a product of his social environment, 
individualism pertains to the extent to which individual independence or social cohesion 
dominates. 
4. Masculinity refers to the degree to which social gender roles are clearly distinct. 
Masculine cultures are seen by Hofstede as having vastly different social roles for the 
sexes, whereas in feminine cultures social roles overlap significantly. 
45 
Humphreys (1996) argued that, when using Hofstede's four culture dimensions, differences 
between cultures in the UK and Egypt are clearly apparent. However, numerical differences in 
the above four dimensions are only indicators of the deeper and more complex national 
cultural differences between the UK and Egypt. 
2.5. The Cultural Influence on the Development of Accounting Systems 
Wallace and Gernon (1991) argued that, while a great deal of observation and hierarchy 
building has occurred, a comprehensive theory that explains existing cross-national 
differences in the structure and practice of financial reporting still does not exist. Similarly, 
Gray (1988) states that: 
"While prior research has shown that there are different patterns of accounting 
internationally and that the development of accounting systems tends to be a 
function of environmental factors, it is a matter of some controversy as to the 
identification of the patterns and influential factors involved . . ... The 
influence of culture on accounting would seem to have been largely neglected 
in the development of ideas about international classifications." 
As a solution, Gray proposed a comprehensive model of accounting values linked to 
Hofstede's (1980) societal values. These accounting values, in turn, explain and determine the 
structures and practice of accounting, including the basic tenets of management and disclosure 
which determine financial reporting practices. Gray's model of culture, societal values and the 
accounting subculture began with Hofstede's propositions that societal values have 
institutional consequences in the form of legal, political and economic systems including the 
pattern of corporate ownership and the capital market. Gray then extended Hofstede's model 
by hypothesizing the existence of an accounting subsystem which drew its value system from 
the primary societal value system. As Gray explained: 
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"The value systems of attitudes of accountants may be expected to be related 
to and derived from societal values with special reference to work related 
values. Accounting 'values' in turn impact on accounting systems." 
Gray continued by defining four accounting values- Professionalism, Uniformity, 
Conservation, and Secrecy. These values interact with the other institutional consequences of 
culture such as capital markets to arrive in the final set of accounting systems that include 
financial reporting practices and professional structures. These are as follows: 
1. Professionalism versus Statutory Control: a preference for the exercrse of 
individual professional judgement and the maintenance of professional self-
regulation as opposed to compliance with perspective legal requirements and 
statutory control; 
2. Uniformity versus Flexibility: a preference for the enforcement of uniform 
accounting practices between companies and the consistent use of such practices 
over time as opposed to flexibility in accordance with the perceived 
circumstances of individual companies; 
3. Conservatism versus Optimism: a preference for a cautious approach to 
measurement so as to cope with the uncertainty of future events as opposed to a 
more optimistic, laissez-faire, risk-taking approach; and 
4. Secrecy versus Transparency: a preference for confidentiality and the restriction 
of disclosure of information about the business only to those who are closely 
involved with its management and financing as opposed to a more transparent, 
open and accountable approach. 
Values are, in turn, linked to Hofstede's cultural constructs of Individualism, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, Power Distance and Masculinity, by four hypotheses. These are as follows: 
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1. the higher a country ranks in terms of individualism and the lower it ranks in terms of 
uncertainty avoidance and power distance then the more likely it is to rank highly in 
terms of professionalism; 
2. the higher a country ranks in terms of uncertainty avoidance and power distance and 
the lower it ranks in terms of individualism then the more likely it is to rank highly in 
terms of uniformity; 
3. the higher a country ranks in terms of uncertainty avoidance and the lower it ranks in 
terms of individualism and masculinity then the more likely it is to rank highly in 
terms of conservatism; and 
4. the higher a country ranks in terms of uncertainty avoidance and power distance and 
the lower it ranks in terms of individualism and masculinity then the more likely it is 
to rank highly in terms of secrecy. 
By applying these hypotheses, Gray contends the dimensions of Uncertainty, Avoidance and 
Individualism are the most influential dimensions in relation to the accounting subculture 
dimensions. Salter and Niswander (1995) tested Gray's model, based on data from twenty-
nine countries, they found that while Gray's model has statistically significant explanatory 
power, it is best at explaining actual financial reporting practices and is relatively weak in 
explaining extant professional and regulatory structures from a cultural base. They further 
found that both the development of financial markets and levels of taxation enhance the 
explanations offered by Gray. 
2-6. The Applicability of Anglo Saxon Corporate Governance Principles in Egypt 
Whether western management theories and concepts are as applicable in developing countries 
as they are in the UK and USA has been the subject of much critical comment. Kanter and 
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Corn (1994) asserted that, recent findings regarding the cultural propensities of major 
countries appear robust, replicated in surveys of managers, as well as used to explain 
institutional patterns within countries. Brown and Humphreys (1995) explained that, this is 
not to argue that transference between cultures is impossible or unwise, but rather that the 
process of transference has to be culturally sensitive. The point here is that management 
theories and concepts which have been developed in the western world, may need to be 
modified and adapted in order to fit the cultural beliefs, values and expectations of developing 
nations such as Egypt (Humphreys 1996). 
Today, corporate governance literature is concerned with the convergence of corporate 
governance systems as part of recent corporate trends towards internationalization and 
globalization (Justin and Batten 2001 ). As a result, the introduction of Anglo Sax on system of 
corporate governance has been proposed. Convergence towards this path has primarily been 
supported through the efforts of international organizations (Rubach and Sebora 1998). Thus, 
there is an increased resolve to implement global corporate governance standards. This 
indicates that the convergence of practice is most desirable. Given the signs of convergence 
mentioned above, the concept of global standards is not totally inconceivable. Indeed, Nestor 
and Thompson (1999) observe that "despite different starting points, a trend towards 
convergence of corporate governance regimes has been developing in recent years". However, 
Heuer et al. (1999) identified that a recurring theme in national culture research is that while 
convergence may be seen in practices among managers, these practices do not necessarily 
signal a convergence in the values embedded in national cultures. The difficulty is 
encapsulated in Scott's (1995) comment on the wider nature of governance which brings in 
the social and cultural norms of society as affecting the nature of governance. Thus, cultural 
differences must be considered when implementing Anglo Saxon corporate governance 
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principles. In terms of corporate governance, the difficulty in changing existing systems 
comes from the concept of path-dependency. Rubach and Sebora (1998) find differences in 
corporate governance systems reflect the paths by which each came to exist. Bebchuk and 
Roe (1999) argue that path-dependencies may freeze the institutions of particular countries in 
a noncompetitive pose. Along these lines, regarding audit committees, Turley and Zaman 
(200 1) argued that cultural and structural differences internationally will be likely to influence 
the operation of audit committees. 
From the convergence literature above, it becomes apparent that each country's path to 
corporate governance principles will be different. Indeed, the quest for convergence does not 
mean that corporate governance principles will be implemented identically in each country 
(Justin and Batten 2001). 
2-7. Summary 
Institutional economics as a field of knowledge is concerned with studying an economic 
phenomenon within its entire surrounding environment which includes social, cultural, 
political, ideological, religious, civilisation, technological factors. Thus, this chapter evaluates 
different forms of institutional economics and from this discussion, it is concluded that old 
institutional economics is the most useful framework for this work. It used to explain the 
interplay between the institutions and actions in the economy, society, and culture which 
cover the problem of the transference of Anglo Saxon management theories and concepts (e.g. 
corporate governance including audit committees) to developing countries (e.g. Egypt). Old 
institutional economics aims to explain that the transference between cultures is possible, but 
the process of transference has to be culturally sensitive. 
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Chapter Three: An Institutional Perspective of Corporate 
Governance and Audit Committees in Egypt 
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Chapter Three: An Institutional Perspective of Corporate Governance and 
Audit Committees in Egypt 
3-1. Introduction 
In this chapter, an institutional analysis helps us to understand some aspects of the historical 
development of corporate governance. In particular, the emergence of audit committees 
moving onto focus upon these issues in Egypt. The main emphasis will be on examining how 
social institutions have influenced corporate governance and audit committee practices. The 
chapter commences by explaining the main international corporate governance principles. It 
continues by explaining the importance of corporate governance in transition economies and 
examines the creation of an institutional infrastructure for the transition process. The chapter 
concludes with an analysis of corporate governance practice in Egypt in order to understand 
the environment which surrounds the practice of audit committees. 
3-2. Corporate Governance and the Audit Committee 
R wegasira (2000) argued that corporate governance is concerned with structures within which 
a corporate entity or enterprise receives its basic orientation and direction. According to 
Monks and Minow (1995), corporate governance seeks to deal with systems, mechanisms and 
modalities of exercising power and control over the corporation's direction, behaviour, and 
performance. There are actually many different definitions of corporate governance, but they 
all have as their fundamental meaning the following ideas: (1) systems of controls within the 
company; (2) relationships between the company's board, shareholders and stakeholders; and 
(3) the company being managed in the interests of shareholders and stakeholders (Hussain and 
Mallin 2002). 
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The following definitions of corporate governance illustrate that, whilst there are differences 
in the definitions, the same fundamental ideas are present: 
• "the whole system of controls, both financial and otherwise, by which a company is 
directed and controlled" (Cadbury Committee 1992); 
• "a set of relationships between a company's board, its shareholders and other 
stockholders. It also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined" (OECD 1999); 
• "the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment". (Shleifer and Vishny 1997); and 
• "the process and structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation with the objective of enhancing long-term value for shareholders and the 
financial viability of the business" (Luscombe 1994 ). 
The degree to which corporations observe basic principles of good corporate governance is an 
increasingly important factor for investment decisions (OECD 1999). Corporate governance 
principles and guidelines have been established by several organizations to provide best 
practices or benchmarks against which to assess the appropriateness of the corporate 
governance system. 
In 1999, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published its 
elements of corporate governance. In doing so, it took into account the views of many 
different countries on the subject of what constitutes good corporate governance and then 
published its seven elements of good corporate governance. The OECD states: 
"the primary role for regulation is to shape a corporate governance 
environment compatible with societal values that allows competition and 
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market forces to work so that a corporation can succeed in generating long-
term economic gain. Specific governance structures or practices will not 
necessarily fit all companies at all times". 
The OECD identifies seven key elements of good corporate governance as: (1) rights and 
obligations of the shareholders; (2) equitable treatment of shareholders; (3) role of 
stakeholders and corporate governance; ( 4) transparency, disclosure of information and audit; 
(5) Board of Directors; (6) non-executive members of the board; and (7) executive 
management, compensation and performance. Each of these is dealt with in more detail in 
Table 3-1. 
In 2002, the Business Roundtable (BRT), an association of chief executive officers of leading 
corporations that represents itself as an "authoritative voice" for American business, has 
proposed six guiding principles of corporate governance: 
I. the Board of Directors should select a chief executive officer (CEO) and oversee the 
CEO and other top executive activities; 
2. management is responsible for operating the corporation in an effective and ethical 
manner with the goal of creating shareholder value; 
3. management is responsible for preparing financial statements, under the oversight of 
the Board of Directors and its audit committee, that fairly present the financial 
conditions and results of operations of the corporation; 
4. the Board of Directors and its audit committee should engage an independent 
accounting firm to perform financial statement audits; 
5. the independent accounting firm should maintain its independence in fact and in 
appearance, conduct the audit in accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards (GAAS), inform the board through the audit committee of any concerns 
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Table 3-1 OECD key elements of corporate governance 
I. Rights and obligations of the shareholders: 
• Corporate governance framework should protect shareholders rights. I share, I vote; sufficient and 
relevant information from companies; participate in an Annual General Meeting; vote; share in residual 
profit; protection of monitory rights; and fairness and transparency of company operations. 
• Obligations: use voting rights. 
2. Equitable treatment of shareholders: 
• Corporate governance framework should ensure equitable treatment of all shareholders, including 
minority and foreign shareholders. 
• Same voting rights (within same class of shares, etc.). 
• All shareholders of same class should be treated equally. 
3. Role of stakeholders in corporate governance: 
• Corporate governance framework should ensure rights of stakeholders are protected by law and that 
these rights are respected. 
• Effective redress for voting of rights. 
• Encourage the role of stockholders in the corporation in a manner that enhances the performance of the 
corporation and the market. 
• Provision for disclosure of information relevant to interests of stakeholders. 
4. Transparency, disclosure of information, and audit: 
• Corporate governance framework should ensure the full, timely and detailed disclosure of information 
on all material matters, including its financial situations, performance, ownership structure and 
governance of corporation. 
• Includes establishment of audit committee. 
• Transparency I disclosure includes disclosure of information on: 
financial I operating results; 
ownership structure; 
members of Board of Directors and management; 
quantitative and qualitative matters concerning employees and other stakeholders in the 
corporation; 
governance structures and policies; 
corporate target and prospects; and 
executive of unusual and complex transactions, transactions on derivative products and their 
level of risk. 
5. Board of Directors: 
• Corporate governance should ensure the strategic leadership of the corporation; the efficient monitoring 
of management by the Board of Directors; and accountability of the board to its corporation and 
shareholders. 
• Meetings, for example one a month; process; Chair I CEF (separation of duties and responsibilities) etc. 
6. Non-executive members of board: 
• Should form independent judgement, especially with respect to corporation's strategy, performance, 
asset management, and appointment of management. 
• Non-executive members should be independence from executive members of board (no family relation) 
and have no business relation with the corporation or other commercial involvement that may affect 
their independent judgement. 
• Interlocking directorships (should be avoided). 
6. Executive management, compensation and performance: 
• Good practice that management compensation be tied to corporation's general level of profitability and 
overall performance. 
• Total compensation should be disclosed in financial statements. 
• Procedures for determining compensation be disclosed. 
• Remuneration Committee. 
Source: OECD (1999). 
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regarding the quality and integrity of the financial reporting process; and that 
6. corporations have a responsibility to deal with their employees in a fair and 
equitable manner (BR T 2002). 
Also in 2002, the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) in the USA, an 
independent, not-for-profit organization devoted to improving corporate board performance, 
recommended to Congress a set of core governance principles to improve corporate 
governance in the USA. The core governance principles set forth by the NACD consist of ten 
governance principles and related disclosure requirements for publicly traded companies in 
the USA. These ten governance practices and principles set forth the following expectations 
for boards of directors. The board of directors should: 
1. comprise a substantial majority of "independent" directors; 
2. require establishment of key committees (e.g. audit, compensation, nominating) to be 
composed of independent directors; 
3. ensure that each key committee has a board-approved written charter detailing its 
functions and responsibilities; 
4. formally designate an independent director as chairman or lead director; 
5. regularly and formally evaluate the performance ofthe CEO; 
6. review the adequacy of their company's compliance and reporting systems at least 
annually; 
7. adopt a policy of holding periodic sessions of independent directors; 
8. require their audit committee to meet independently with both the internal and 
independent auditors; 
9. be constructively engaged with management in corporate strategy; and 
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10. provide new directors with a "director orientation" programme to familiarize them 
with their company's business, industry trends, recommended governance practices, 
and then ensure "continuing education" for directors (NACD 2002). 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC 1999) revealed the following three conclusions regarding 
the oversight responsibility of corporate governance including the audit committee: 
1. Quality financial reporting can only be achieved through open and candid 
communication and close working relationships among the corporation's Board of 
Directors, audit committee, management, internal auditors, and external auditors. 
2. Strengthening corporate governance oversight in the financial reporting process of 
publicly traded companies will reduce instances of financial statement fraud. 
3. Integrity, quality, and transparency of financial reports will improve investors' 
confidence in the capital market while incidents of financial statement fraud diminish 
such confidence. 
3-3. Corporate Governance in Transition Economies 
In developed market economies, a system of corporate governance has been built gradually 
through centuries, and today it can be defined as a 'complex mosaic' consisting of laws, 
regulations, politics, public institutions, professional associations and ethics codes. However, 
in transition economy countries a lot of details of the mosaic are still missing (Babic 2001 ). 
Trying to develop a system of good corporate governance in these countries is made difficult 
by problems such as complex corporate ownership structures, vague and confusing 
relationships between the state and financial sectors, weak legal and judicial systems, absent 
or underdeveloped institutions and scarce human resource capabilities (CIPE 2002). 
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The missing element in the context of corporate governance development in transition 
economies is the lack of institutions associated with successful market economies (OECD 
2001 ). In market economies there is a standard set of institutions that have been successful as 
the tools used to control corporations. Institutions are the 'rules of the game' in a society 
(Y eager 1999). They are the rules that the society establishes to reduce the uncertainty of 
human interactions. The institutional framework has three components: formal rules, informal 
rules and enforcement mechanisms. While both the formal legal environment and the informal 
institutional constraints affect corporate governance, institutional theory states that when 
formal institutions are weak, informal constraints play a larger role in shaping firm behaviuor 
(Young et. al. 2002). 
3-4. The Transition Economy in Egypt 
In 1990, the Egyptian government started its economic reform and restructuring programme 
and the Egyptian economy is now labelled as a "transition economy"; it is moving away from 
its attempt at a command economy towards the implementation of an economic system based 
on market forces. El-Issawi et al. (1999) argued that the move towards a free-market economy 
in Egypt has been remarkably swift. Intriligator (1996) explained that, the goal of rapid 
transition to a market economy will probably not be realised in the absence of those 
economic, legal, political, and social institutions that enable such an economy to function. 
Along these lines, El-Mikawy and Handoussa (2002) argued that Egypt in the 1990s provides 
an example of an economic environment in which well-defined economic objectives that were 
accompanied by resolute policy changes have failed to produce the expected good prospects. 
The lesson of the 1990s turns out to be that policy change without institutional reform results 
in only modest economic improvement. This is in line with the expectations of commentators 
in transition economics ( Fogarty 1996). 
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3-5-. Creating an Institutional Infrastructure for the Transition Process 
Even in its early years, transition was recognized as a complex process with political, social, 
and economic dimensions. The first stage of a prospectively successful transition strategy 
would be to establish an institutional infrastructure of new or modified economic, political, 
and legal rules and organizations suitable to a more market and private property-oriented 
society (Elliott 1997). The institutional infrastructure of an economy dominated by a mono-
party system, state ownership and centralized planning is radically discordant with the 
aspirations of capitalist transition. Because new institutions 'cannot be created overnight', the 
supply of necessary rules, organizations and people trained and skilled in administration and 
adjudication under the emerging regime, tend to lag behind the demand for them; this gap can 
be narrowed 'only with the passage of time'. Thus, time is the 'scarcest factor in 
interdependent institution building' in the context of transitions (Winiecki 1993). The most 
important institutions needed for a market economy are a legal system, including both 
business law and property law, a credit system, a system of banks, including both commercial 
and investment banks, an accounting and auditing system, and other social institutions, 
including a sound currency and a social safety net (lntriligator 1996). In the absence of these 
institutions, the enterprises of the Egyptian economy, whether privatised or not, will not have 
the proper incentives to produce and invest (Abdel Shahid 2001). Hence, it is necessary to 
establish the relevant economic, legal, political and social institutions so as to prevent the 
further collapse of the Egyptian economy. The stabilisation, liberalisation, privatisation and 
other aspects of the current economic reform programme alone will not create these 
institutions, the Egyptian government should therefore play a major role in their establishment 
(World Bank Report 2001). Thus, the success of corporate governance and its necessary tools 
are of concern to the Egyptian government in order to support the market economy. It is 
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useful to understand corporate governance practices in Egypt in order to understand those of 
audit committees within an institutional framework. 
3-6. Corporate Governance Practices in Egypt 
Corporate governance guidelines and codes of best practice arise in the context of, and are 
affected by, differing national frameworks of law, regulations and stock exchange listing 
rules, as well as differing societal values. Therefore, to understand one nation's corporate 
governance practices in relation to another's it is necessary to understand not only the "best 
practice" documents but also the underlying legal and enforcement framework (Vinten 2000). 
It should be pointed out that corporate governance in Egypt has gained more importance in 
recent years due to the integration of the Egyptian economy with the global economy, 
internationalisation of capital markets, and the increasingly important role played by the 
private sector in the economy (Ghali 2001). The Egyptian capital market is in general 
compliance with international criteria and basic rules of corporate governance (Abul Ayoun 
2003). The current corporate governance practices in Egypt will now be analysed, in the light 
of the World Bank Report of 2001. These can be grouped under six factors: the stock 
exchange and the legal framework; the rights of shareholders; the equitable treatments of 
shareholders; the role of stakeholders in corporate governance; disclosures and transparency; 
and the responsibilities of the board. 
3-6-1. The Stock Exchange and the Legal Framework 
Egypt's Stock Exchange has two locations: Cairo and Alexandria. The Alexandria Stock 
Exchange (CASE) was officially established in 1888 followed by Cairo in 1903. The two 
exchanges were very active in the 1940s and the Egyptian Stock Exchange ranked fifth in the 
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world. Nevertheless, the central planning and socialist policies adopted in the mid 1950s led 
to a drastic reduction in activity on the Stock Exchange, which remained dormant between 
1961 and 1992 (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman 2003). 
In 1990, the Egyptian government started its programme of economic reform and 
restructuring and the process of deregulation and privatisation has stimulated stock market 
activity. The Capital Market Authority (CMA) played an instrumental role in initiating and 
leading the effort for the revival of the Egyptian stock market. According to law No. 95 of 
1992, the Capital Market Authority is the entity responsible for the implementation of capital 
market law and for developing the market. It regulates and controls market activity, and drafts 
rules and regulations for submission to the Ministry of Economy & Foreign Trade for 
approval. 
The corporate legal framework is primarily French civil law in ongm. Anglo-American 
common law concepts became more prominent in Egyptian corporate law with the drafting of 
the Central Depository Law in 2001 and the Capital Market Law in 2002. There are no 
restrictions on foreign ownership of securities and no taxes are levied on dividends and capital 
gains, thus making the Egyptian market very attractive compared to other markets. Since 
December 1991, the number of listed companies on the Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchange 
(CASE) has grown from 627 companies to 1070 companies in June 2001(World Bank Report 
2001). 
Regarding ownership structure, domestic retail investors represent 51% of the market; 
domestic institutional investors (mainly mutual funds) 22%; and foreigners 27%, with the 
majority of those shares held by UK and USA investors (PCSU 2000). 
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3-6-2. The Rights of Shareholders 
According to Law No. 95, shareholders have the right of access to the company's balance 
sheets, profit and loss statements, and audit reports for the previous three years. Also, 
shareholders have the right to review the directors' report, the balance sheets, the profit and 
loss accounts, and auditors' reports at the company's headquarters during the two weeks prior 
to the Annual General Meeting (AGM). The AGM must meet within six months of the end of 
the previous financial year. Summaries of the financial statements and auditors' report must 
be published in two daily Arabic newspapers within three months of the end of the financial 
year. Shareholders have the right to ask questions at the AGM. The board answers the 
questions to the extent to which they do not cause "harm to the interests of the company or the 
public interest". Egyptian accounting standards require directors and managers to disclose any 
material interest in transactions or other matters affecting the company, irrespective of 
whether such transactions have taken place. Disclosure must be made in the notes to the 
financial statements (World Bank Report 2001 ). 
3-6-3. The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
The legal framework allows for multiple share classes, provided that within a given class 
shareholders are treated equally and have the same rights. There are two main classes of 
shares: ordinary shares and preference shares. Contrary to the majority of capital markets in 
the world, preference shares in Egypt have privileges in terms of voting. They are also entitled 
to earn fixed dividends before other shareholders and have priority during liquidation. 
Preference shares may also have priority in capital increases. Every shareholder has the right 
to file a complaint with the Companies Department of the Capital Market Authority regarding 
violation of law No. 159 of 1981. A shareholder who attends the AGM can register his 
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opposition to a decision in the minutes, and can initiate a case in court within one year of the 
meeting. 
3-6-4: The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
Law No.159 of 1981 grants employees the right to share in profits that amount to the lower of 
1 0% profit or the equivalent of one annual salary each year. This right is only exercised if 
profits are distributed(Abdel Shahid 2001). Nowadays, employee representatives do not 
generally sit on boards. Instead, companies create 'employee committee' or similar bodies to 
deal with all matters related to employees, including salary and other compensation issues. A 
director is assigned the task to liaise with this committee (World Bank Report 2001). Also, the 
Capital Market Law No. 59 of 1992 gives bond holders special protection. They may form a 
bond holders' association and elect a legal representative who acts on their behalf and attends 
the AGM. The association makes recommendations for submission to the AGM or the Board 
of Directors, but does not have the right to vote at the GAM. The unified labor act approved 
in Cabinet in May 2001 prohibits child labor and the environmental law No. 4 of 1994 
protects the environment. 
3-6-5. Disclosures and Transparency 
Any listed company must disclose its financial and operational performance to the CMA and 
the CASE on a quarterly, semi-annual and annual basis. Mandatory information includes hard 
copies of balance sheets, income statements, directors' reports, information on any change in 
board composition, material events that may effect business and/or earnings, as well as the 
external auditor's report. The CMA examines compliance with disclosure requirements and 
requests more information if needed. In case of non-compliance, the CMA will publish its 
observations at the company's expense. Financial statements are to be prepared in compliance 
63 
with the Egyptian Accounting Standards issued by the Ministry of Economy and Foreign 
Trade. These standards are generally in line with International Accounting Standards (IAS), 
except in a few areas (e.g. standard No. 7 regarding cash flow statement). In the absence of an 
Egyptian Accounting Standard for a specific issue, the IAS is applied (Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman 2003). 
Annual and semi-annual financial statements of public companies must be fully audited, while 
quarterly statements are submitted with a limited auditing report. The power of appointing 
and removing auditors is vested with the AGM, which also sets their remuneration. 
Consulting fees do not have to be disclosed at the AGM according to law No.159 of 1981, but 
to ensure independence, the auditor must not become a founder, board member, employee or 
be otherwise associated with the company or board, or elected to the board until three years 
after his auditing function has ceased. The auditor has the right to examine all documents, 
data and other information necessary and can count on the support of the board to fulfil his 
duty, he does not report to the board, only to the AGM, to whom the auditor's report is 
submitted (World Bank Report 2001 ). 
3-6-6. The Responsibilities of the Board 
Companies have one-tier boards comprising of an odd number of directors, with a minimum 
of three. There are no rules governing the composition between executive and non-executive 
directors and the concept of the independence of directors is not well established among listed 
companies (PCSU 2000). In most listed companies, there is no separation between the role of 
the chairman and that of the managing director the same person may hold both posts (Abdel 
Shahid 2001). The board determines each member's compensation. Directors must be 
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shareholders or represent companies who are shareholders. Two directors should be chosen 
who are 'experts in the field'. 
Board functions include making calls on prospective shareholders, investing the company's 
funds and making loans, appointing management and submitting financial statements and 
directors' reports to the AGM. According to the legislative framework, the AGM, board of 
directors, internal and external auditors and government authorities all monitor management. 
In practice, shareholders do not play an important role in this monitoring (Abdel Shahid 
2001 ). The internal audit function barely exists in the majority of listed companies, and where 
it does it has little power. Moreover, boards in general do not include independent directors 
(World Bank Report 200 1 ). 
3-7. Audit Committee Practice in Egypt 
Today, Egypt's economic reform process has developed significantly, and consensus exists 
that sound, uniform accounting and auditing practices must be its backbone (Abdel Shahid 
2001 ). Strict financial reporting and the ability to collect and analyse data are essential to the 
success of any economy because this data forms the basis of decisions regarding whether to 
invest or not. An independent audit committee is a prerequisite for getting listed on the vast 
majority of foreign exchanges. Countries all over the world have been increasingly requiring 
enterprises to set up audit committees within their legal framework (Carson 2002). 
Recently in Egypt, increasing attention has been paid to audit committees by both regulatory 
authorities and academics because the role of such committees is becoming recognized as a 
key element for corporate governance practice. As a result, since 2000, the Central Bank of 
Egypt, which is considered a supervisor for all Egyptian banks, has required public banks to 
establish audit committees as sub-committees of the main board of directors, charged with 
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specific responsibilities relating to monitoring financial reporting, external auditors, and 
internal control including the internal auditing function. 
More recently, in June 2002 the Capital Market Authority (CMA) issued statement No.30, 
article No.7, requiring listed companies to have an audit committee. The Board of Directors 
should appoint the audit committee from its members and it should comprise at least three 
non-executive directors, each of whom should be diligent and have good experience of the 
company's business environment. In addition, if the company does not have sufficient 
appropriate members for the establishment of an audit committee, it should make up the 
committee from external professional members. The audit committee should carry out its 
duties independently from company management and present a monthly report to the board of 
directors including its suggestions and recommendations. The audit committee's main 
responsibilities are to: 
1. Review and analyse the internal control procedures in the company. 
2. Review and analyse applied accounting policies in the company and the significant 
changes in applying new accounting standards. 
3. Review and analyse the procedures, plans, and results of the internal control function. 
4. Review and analyse the periodical management information that is presented to the 
various management levels. 
5. Analyse the procedures which are applied in preparing and reviewing the following: 
A- Periodical and annual financial reporting. 
B- Private and public share placing on the market. 
C- Budgets which include cash flow and income. 
6. Ensure the implementation of control procedures in order to monitor the company's assets 
and carry out periodic evaluations of management procedures in order to write reports 
directed at the board of directors. 
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The audit committee must ensure that the company's management has responded to the 
auditor's and CMA recommendations. It must also direct its monthly reports to the Board of 
Directors which must respond to the recommendations within 15 days. The audit committee 
has a right to notify the CASE if the Board of Directors does not respond. 
3-8. Summary 
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company's management, its 
board, its shareholders and other shareholders. Corporate governance principles and 
guidelines are established by several organizations to provide best practices or benchmarks 
against which to assess the appropriateness of the corporate governance system. Trying to 
develop a system of good corporate governance in transition economies is made difficult by 
problems such as complex corporate ownership structures, vague and confusing relationships 
between the state and financial sectors, weak legal and judicial systems, absent or 
underdeveloped institutions and scarce human resource capabilities (CIPE 2002). 
It is expected that the transition economy in Egypt, which is undergoing major economic, 
regulatory, and political reforms, as well as western market acculturation, will exhibit 
differences in corporate governance systems. Such differences may be associated with 
significant differences in attitudes, beliefs and cultural values. These in turn are expected to 
impact on managerial behaviour, firms' objectives and the market for corporate control 
(Humphreys 1996 and Dockery and Herbert 2000). 
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Chapter Four: Expectations Gap and Audit Committees 
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Chapter Four: The Expectations Gap and Audit Committees 
4-1. Introduction 
Investors and financial statement users may have differing beliefs about the responsibility of 
an independent accounting firm performing an audit of a client's financial statements. 
Concerns about the existence of an expectations gap has led to shareholders having a 
significant interest in the audit committee's oversight responsibilities. This chapter begins by 
explaining and defining the expectations gap. It continues by explaining the social 
construction of the audit profession from an institutional economics perspective. The chapter 
concludes by explaining the potential role of audit committees in narrowing the expectations 
gap. 
4-2. The Expectations Gap 
Over the last two decades, the Anglo Saxon world has experienced a spate of corporate 
failures, financial scandals and audit failures which have placed the audit expectations gap 
debate firmly on the agenda of the accounting profession, regulators and the public (Dewing 
and Russell 2002). There is widespread concern regarding the existence of an "expectations 
gap" between the auditing profession and the public (Lower 1994 and Koh and Woo 1998). 
Prior research on the expectations problem is substantial. This is not surprising given that the 
expectations gap between auditors and financial statement users has existed for the past 1 00 
years although the term has been introduced to the auditing scene only during the last 20 years 
or so (Humphrey et al. 1993). The expectations gap exists when auditors and the public hold 
different beliefs about the auditor's duties and responsibilities and the messages conveyed by 
audit reports (Wolf et al. 1999, Koh and Woo 1998 and Frank et al. 2001). According to 
Gods ell ( 1992) "there is a widespread belief that a person who has any interest in a company 
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(shareholders, potential investors, take-over bidders, creditors etc.) should be able to rely on 
its audited accounts as a guarantee of its solvency, propriety and business viability. Hence, if 
it transpires, without any warning that the company is in serious financial difficulty, it is 
widely felt that somebody should be made accountable for these financial disasters, and this 
somebody is always perceived to be the auditors". These misperceptions of the public feed the 
legal liability crisis facing the accounting profession (Maccarrone 1993). The accounting 
profession argues that one cause of the expectations gap is the public's failure to appreciate 
the nature and limitations of an audit (Frank et al. 2001). That is, the public in general has 
come to view audits as guarantees of the integrity of financial statements and as an insurance 
policy against fraud and illegal acts (Epstein and Geiger 1994). Also, Kaplan (1987) 
explained that the expectations gap has been most conspicuous in legal decisions. Judicial 
litigants often appear to apply, as a standard, the concept that an audit is a comprehensive 
check on a corporation's financial activities. A business failure is often interpreted to be an 
audit failure, regardless of the level of procedures and tests performed by the auditor. 
Auditors can perform their audits in strict accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards and still be found negligent in not preventing risks to financial statement users 
(Almer and Brody 2002). 
Empirical studies on the expectations gap have confirmed that an expectations gap exists, 
specifically in areas such as the nature of audit function, the perceived performance of 
auditors, the auditor's duties and role, the independence of auditors, and the non-audit 
services. For example, Epstein and Geiger (1994), conducted a survey of investors to gather 
information on various aspects of financial reporting issues, in particular on the level of 
assurance they believed auditors should provide with respect to error and fraud. The survey 
results suggested that investors seek very high levels of financial statement assurance and 
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there exists an expectations gap between auditors and investors on the level of assurance an 
audit provides. 
In the UK, Humphrey et al. (1993) examined the expectations gap by ascertaining the 
perceptions of individuals of audit issues through the use of a questionnaire survey 
comprising a series of mini-cases. The respondents included chartered accountants in public 
practice, corporate finance directors, investment analysts, bank lending officers and financial 
journalists. The survey revealed a significant difference between auditors and respondents 
(representing some of the main participants in the company financial reporting process) in 
their views on the nature of auditing. The results confirmed that an audit expectations gap 
exists, specifically in areas such as the nature of the audit function and the perceived 
performance of auditors. 
Schelluch (1996) found that the expectations gap detected in prior research studies dealing 
with auditor responsibilities appeared to be reduced over time with the introduction of the 
long-form audit report. Differences in beliefs between auditors and users (company 
secretaries and shareholders) appeared to be reduced in areas specifically addressed in the 
wording of the expanded report. However, the expectations gap continued to exist after the 
introduction of the long-form audit report in relation to financial statement reliability. This 
finding appears to indicate continued difficulties being experienced by users in understanding 
audited financial statements. The study also appeared to indicate that users were generally 
unhappy with the role played by the auditing profession particularly with respect to auditor 
independence and the level of value (i.e. credibility) added to the financial statements from 
the auditing process. 
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4-3. Definition of the Expectations Gap 
The definition of the expectations gap varies among researchers. The expectations gap can be 
defined as "the difference between what the public and financial statement users believe 
auditors are responsible for and what auditors themselves believe their responsibilities are" 
(AICPA 1993). Monroe and Woodliff (1993) defined the audit expectations gap as the 
difference in beliefs between auditors and the public about the duties and responsibilities 
assumed by auditors and the messages conveyed by audit reports. Jennings et al. (1993), in 
their study on the use of audit decision aids to improve auditor adherence to a "standard", are 
of the opinion that the audit expectations gap is the difference between what the public 
expects from the auditing profession and what the profession actually provides. Porter (1993) 
did an empirical study of the audit expectation-performance gap and defined the expectations 
gap as the gap between society's expectations of auditors and auditors' performance, as 
perceived by society. It is seen to comprise two components: 
A- reasonableness gap (i.e. the gap between what society expects auditors to 
achieve and what the auditors can reasonably be expected to accomplish); and 
B- performance gap (i.e. the gap between what society can reasonably expect 
auditors to accomplish and what auditors are perceived to achieve). 
The performance gap is further subdivided into "deficient standards", i.e. the gap between the 
duties which can reasonably be expected of auditors and auditors' existing duties as defined 
by the law and professional promulgation, and "deficient performance", i.e. the gap between 
the expected standard of performance of auditors' existing duties and auditors' performance, 
as expected and perceived by society. Porter (1993) conducted an empirical study in New 
Zealand to test the postulated structure of the audit expectation-performance gap and to 
establish the composition and extent of the gap and its constituent parts. Using a mail survey, 
Porter ascertained the opinions of interested groups (auditors, officers of public companies, 
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financial analysts, auditing academics, lawyers, financial journalists and members of the 
general public) regarding auditors' existing duties, the standard of performance of these 
duties, and the duties that auditors should perform. The findings from the survey revealed that 
50 per cent of the gap is attributable to deficient standards, 34 per cent from society holding 
unreasonable expectations of auditors, and 16 per cent from perceived sub-standard 
performance by auditors. 
Humphrey ( 1997) provides an accessible introduction to the expectations gap literature and 
provides a general definition. He defined the expectations gap as "a representation of the 
feeling that auditors are performing in a manner at variance with the beliefs and desires of 
those for whose benefit the audit is carried out". He also notes that the expectations gap can 
be defined more narrowly as a "role-perception gap", that is, the expectations of users are 
capable of comparison with a predetermined notion of what is reasonable to expect auditors to 
provide. In turn this leads to the idea of an "ignorance gap", that is, the expectations gap can 
be closed (or at least narrowed) by the education of users. Conversely, Humphrey notes that 
the definition can be broadened to embrace wider issues such as the adequacy of auditing 
standards and the quality of audit delivery. 
4-4. The Social Construction of the Audit Profession and the Expectations Gap 
Corporate auditing has been characterized recently as a function facing a crisis critical to its 
long-term survival as a professionalized activity (Public Oversight Board 1993, and Lee 
1994). The focus of this crisis concerns the quality of reported accounting information, the 
role of the auditor vis-a-vis that quality, and the litigious risks and economic costs associated 
with such a role. In particular, the crisis is strongly connected to the generic phenomenon of 
the expectations gap, i.e. to familiar dichotomies between what appears to be promised and 
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what is delivered by the auditor (Humphrey et al. 1992 and Gay et al. 1998). Such a gap is 
typically associated with perceived business and audit failures (Lee 1994). 
According to Freidson (1986), a profession can be characterized as an institutionally-based 
occupation which uses various explicit characteristics, traits and situations as strategic 
resources to advance its claim to self-regulate its activities and exercise market control over 
its services. Of particular strategic concern to a profession in this process is the need to 
demonstrate publicly the existence of a credible body of knowledge underlying its members' 
practices, but without revealing sufficient detail to permit access to it by non-members. An 
example of this strategy is given by Hines (1989) in relation to conceptual framework 
projects. These studies create perceptions of an objective body of theoretical knowledge 
supporting prescribed accounting standards. But their written content is sufficiently vague and 
ambiguous to prevent detailed scrutiny. Power (1993) provides a compatible auditing example 
in the form of practice guidance documentation issued by auditors as a response to regulatory 
concerns. Such guidance typically uses a form of words which is acceptable to regulators but 
prevents external definition of key concepts, thus maintaining a "zone of discretion" for 
auditors. 
Gay et al. (1998) explained that the Anglo Saxon accounting profession's responses to the 
expectations gap may be described as either defensive or constructive. The defensive 
responses include emphasising the need to educate the public and reassure them about the 
exaggerated public outcries over isolated audit failure; codifying existing practices to 
legitimize them, and attempting to control the audit expectations gap debate by repeatedly 
propounding the views of the profession. The constructive responses include emphasizing an 
awareness and readiness to extend the scope of the audit. However, such extensions have been 
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criticized for resulting in auditing being viewed as a package of services or a commodity for 
management's benefit, and as a means of legitimizing limited assurance engagements as audit 
related services (Humphrey et al. 1992). While some commentators argue that the recent 
change to expand the wording of the review and audit reports represents socially-orientated 
concessions on the part of the audit profession, others argue that it is a self-serving retreat 
from responsibility (Neebes and Roost 1987). 
Green (1994) explained that financial reporting is constantly evolving as a result of 
recommendations by the accounting profession and regulators, and pressure from the financial 
press, investors, and academics, and as a result the rules and expectations surrounding the 
practice of financial reporting are in a constant state of flux. Often, these changes are 
precipitated by a "crisis" such as the collapse of a financial institution or the bankruptcy of a 
large corporation. The resulting changes, then, can be seen as an attempt to protect the public 
from inadequate financial statement disclosure and improve audit standards, or as a 
mechanism to reduce the auditors' potential legal liability for company failures. For capital 
markets to continue to function effectively, financial reporting must be seen to be credible by 
the stakeholders that are affected. This, in turn, depends upon the continuing "existence of a 
consensus within society" which supports the standards, corporations legislation, regulations, 
and rules of professional conduct currently constraining the parties to the process. Society has 
certain expectations of the financial reporting process. When these expectations are not met 
and an "expectations gap" (real or perceived) exists, the profession, the regulators, and the 
legislatures feel pressure to introduce new standards and legislation. Society's expectations 
cover not only the standards and legislative rules but also the enforcement of those 
requirements (Green 1994). In Canada, the Macdonald Commission Report (1988), 
Commission to Study the Public's Expectations of Audits, referred to a "standards gap" and a 
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"performance gap". This report aimed "to strengthen the recognition on the part of the 
directors and auditors of their mutual self-interest in good financial reporting for the company 
by reinforcing the role of the audit committee. Audit committees can play an important role in 
preventing and detecting fraudulent financial reporting (Treadway Commission 1987). 
The audit expectations gap debate consistently centres around a number of perennial issues 
(Humphrey et al. 1992, Lee 1994, and Jenkins and Krawczyk 2001): 
A- the auditors independence and; 
B- the provision of non-audit services and; 
C- the quality of the audit function. 
At the same time, concerns about the existence of an expectations gap leads to significant 
interest on the part of shareholders in the audit committees' oversight responsibilities. Thus, 
in the next section, the audit committee role in narrowing the expectations gap is examined. 
4-5. Auditor Independence, the Expectations Gap, and the Audit Committee 
In current auditing praxis, few concepts are as important as auditor independence. This and 
the role auditors play in corporate financial reporting have to be viewed from the right 
perspective, that is in the overall context of the broader issue of corporate governance. Wolf et 
al. (1999) argued that the product of an audit is neither the auditor's report nor the 
investigation itself, but rather the increased credibility attached to the audited financial 
statements. The key factor in enhanced credibility is the perception of external stakeholders 
that the external auditor "judge" is impartial and without conflicts of interest. Without this 
perceived independence, an audit report may be viewed as nothing more than a company 
advertisement. The auditing profession itself recognizes this and it emphasises its 
independence in appearance as well as in fact. Independence in fact is the unbiased mental 
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attitude of the auditor, and independence in appearance, is the perception by a reasonable 
observer that the auditor has no relationship with an audit client which would suggest a 
conflict of interest (AICPA, 1993). 
In the USA, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has dealt with 
the delicate issue of auditor independence on several occasions. Over the years independence 
has become the cornerstone of the auditing profession. In 1994, the AICPA's Professional 
Ethics Division published a proposed interpretation of the profession's Code of Professional 
Conduct to sharpen the distinction between client advocacy and client service (AICPA, 
1994a). Firms and individual CPAs should exercise professional independence before 
committing to client positions on accounting or financial reporting issues. The AICP A Audit 
Standards and the Code. of Professional Ethics both emphasize independence as a 
precondition in expressing an opinion on financial statements. The AICP A Code of 
Professional Ethics states that a CP A "shall not express an opinion on financial statements of 
an enterprise unless he and his firm are independent with respect to such enterprise". An 
opinion on the fairness of the presentation of financial statements should be issued only if he 
or she is independent of the client both in fact and appearance. In other words, independence 
must be perceived by third parties. On 16 March 1994, the Public Oversight Board (POB) 
announced the formation of a "special panel" to enquire into matters relating to auditor 
objectivity and independence. The panel recommended appropriate steps to bolster the 
professionalism of the independent auditor, and to assess the working relationships among the 
profession, the SEC, and the F ASB (AICP A, 1995). 
On 13 September 1994, the Public Oversight Board (POB) appointed an advisory panel on 
auditor independence. The major recommendations of this panel addresses corporate 
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governance issues and specifically responsibilities of the board of director's audit committee. 
The panel states "the board must recognize the primacy of its accountability to shareholders". 
Additionally, "the auditor must look to the board of directors as the client" (Public Oversight 
Board of the SEC Practice Section, AICP A, 1994b ). 
In 1997, the AICP A further responded to expectations gap perceptions by mandating a more 
aggressive stance by auditors with respect to fraud. This proposal resulted in Statement on 
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82, Considerations of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, as 
well as amendments to two existing standards. The new standard provides detailed risk factors 
that auditors should consider related to internal control and its impact on fraud detection and 
prevention. In 1998 in the USA, the SEC and the accounting profession (AICP A) formed the 
Independent Standards Board (ISB). The ISB was officially designated as having authority to 
issue rules intended to prevent audit firms from taking actions that threaten auditor 
independence unless and until the rules are rejected by the SEC. The ISB was established in 
response to the perceived challenges to exercising independence resulting from audit firm 
mergers, auditors entering riew service areas, and the increasing complexity of business and 
professional relationships. The ISB issued a number of standards and a Discussion 
Memorandum in February 2000 on A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence. The 
SEC incorporated much of the work of the ISB into its new auditor independence rules after 
conducting public hearings on proposed rules affecting auditor independence in 2000. This 
culminated in rule changes effective from February 2001 on governing independence. 
The standards of independence in the UK are similar to those in the USA, though one major 
difference is that, in the UK, independent auditors are allowed to perform certain book-
keeping functions for private companies (Vanasco et el. 1997). The UK amended the 
Companies Act of 1985 to implement the European Community's Eighth Directive. This lays 
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down minimum approval requirements for company auditors, including their education and 
training. It obliges member states to ensure that company audits are performed with integrity 
and that there are appropriate safeguards to protect auditor independence (Anderson and 
Keenan 1990). For over 100 years, the accountancy profession in the UK has built its 
reputation on the foundation of objectivity, integrity, and competence which include all that is 
required for auditor independence. Green (1994) has called for greater auditor independence 
and an in-depth review of the auditing profession in the UK. He argues that such a system 
would restore the auditor as watchdog and release non-executive directors to a more 
constructive role. 
Regulatory factors concern both accounting and auditing. It is argued that independence is 
most threatened where all auditors do not agree on the preferred accounting treatment, due to 
the flexibility of accounting standards (Magee and Tseng 1990). Key aspects of audit 
regulation which one can argue promote independence are: the existence of unlimited legal 
liability for auditors (Farmer et al. 1987), the strong enforcement of standards, the effective 
discipline of companies and auditors, the control over the appointment and remuneration of 
auditors being taken from directors (POB 1994), and the existence of an audit committee 
(Tread way Commission 1987, Cad bury Committee 1992, BRC 1999). Audit committees are 
probably the most widely adopted means of strengthening auditors' independence (Porter et 
al. 2003). 
In January 1999, the Independence Standards Board (ISB) adopted its first standard, 
Independence Discussions with Audit Committees. The standard applies to any auditor 
intending to be considered as independent auditor within the meaning of the Federal 
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Securities Acts administered by the SEC. The standard requires that at least annually, an 
auditor shall: 
• disclose to the audit committee of the company (or the board of directors, if there is no 
audit committee), in writing, all relationships between the auditor (and its related 
entities) and the company (and its related entities) that, in the auditor's professional 
judgment, may reasonably be thought to bear on independence; 
• confirm in the letter that, in the auditor's professional judgment, it is independent of 
the company within the meaning ofthe acts; and 
• discuss the auditor's independence with the audit committee. 
In the UK, the Cadbury Committee (1992) argued that higher standards of corporate 
governance can be achieved through improvements in the quality of financial reporting which 
will facilitate an increased level of auditor independence. The Cadbury solution is to boost 
auditor independence by a greater presence on company boards of independent non-executive 
directors and by the establishment of audit committees as sub-committees of the main board 
charged with specific responsibilities relating to financial reporting, audit, and internal control 
issues. Spira (1999) explained that "the activities of the audit committee offer a further 
reassurance that the account of the company's activities may be relied upon, and that the 
auditors have, as a result of the protection of the audit committee, been able to report 
independently, free of any pressure from the management of the company". 
4-6. Non-audit Services, the Expectations Gap, and the Audit Committee 
The provision of non-audit services by incumbent auditors is the factor which in recent years 
has been debated most intensively by policy-makers, the accountancy profession, 
practitioners, and academics (Beattie et al. 1999). There are many opinions about whether 
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offering non-audit services may or may not impair the independence of the auditor in different 
situations and circumstances (Sabri 1993). 
Auditors have provided their clients with many types of service since the time when external 
auditing began in the nineteenth century up to the present day (Previts 1985). The reason why 
accountants and auditors provide services that complement their principal task is connected, 
now and in the past, with the considerable economies of scope, or joint production (meaning 
cost savings obtained when both types of service are provided by the same person or firm). 
Arrumada ( 1999) explained that a distinction should be made within these economies of scope 
between those that originate in the "transformation" process directed toward the production of 
information and knowledge, often known in accounting literature as "knowledge spillovers", 
and those arising from making better use of assets or advantages of a "contractual" nature. 
Productive economies usually arise from the fact that both types of service need to use the 
same set of information and/or the same professional qualifications (Houghton and Jubb 
1999). For example, the information required to evaluate an internal control system is largely 
identical to the one needed to improve it. Auditors are therefore in the best possible position 
to advise on renewing such systems. The existence of economies of a contractual nature is 
connected with the fact that the exchange of professional services involves high transaction 
costs due to the informational asymmetry existing between supplier of and client for such 
services. Therefore, it becomes worthwhile to make use of the safeguards (brand-name, 
reputation, conduct rules, control systems among professionals, and client confidence) already 
developed when contracting and ensuring quality in auditing, thereby reducing the total cost 
of providing such services. For this reason, the ability to use the same contractual resources is 
particularly valuable in safeguarding or protecting the provision of a variety of services, even 
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in the absence of economies of scope of a technological or productive nature in the strict 
sense. 
Along these lines, there are studies indicating that the provision of non-audit services has no 
effect on perceptions of auditor independence. For example, Kinney (1999) reviewed 20 years 
of empirical research and found no substantial evidence that investors are concerned about 
non-audit services. Wallman (1996) also encountered little empirical evidence that the 
performance of non-audit services impairs the external auditor's independence in fact. 
On the other hand, Jenkins and Krawczyk (2001) found that an expectations gap may exist 
between the general public and the accounting profession with respect to how they view the 
impact of non-audit services on auditor independence. Also, Wines (1994), using pooled, 
cross-sectional, time-series data for Australian listed companies, finds a negative association 
between non-audit services and qualified opinions and concludes that there is a potential 
independence problem in the presence of non-audit services. Although a series of ethical 
standards has been adopted by the profession relative to management advisory services, critics 
continue to argue that this mix of services is inappropriate (Briloff 1994 and Wallman 1996). 
This concern is shared somewhat by the public accounting profession itself. The Public 
Oversight Board's Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence ( 1994) noted that the increased 
reliance on services other than auditing could potentially compromise the external auditor's 
objectivity. In addition, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' (AICPA) 
Special Committee on Financial Reporting (1994) stated that users of financial statements are 
concerned that competitive pressures could erode the external auditor's independence. 
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Section 202 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) requires that audit committees pre-approve all 
audit and non-audit services provided by the company's audit firm. The new rule adds a 
subsection to Regulation S-X that states that an accountant is not independent in respect of the 
company unless the accountant's engagement for audit or non-audit tasks is pre-approved by 
the audit committee. The pre-approval may occur in one of two ways - actual pre-approval by 
the audit committee or pursuant to pre-approval policies and procedures established by the 
committee. The committee may directly approve a permitted service before the auditor is 
engaged for the project. In all cases this approval must occur before the auditor is engaged. 
Engaging the auditor prior to receipt of audit committee approval would cause the auditor not 
to be independent of the company. A company may engage the auditor for a permitted service 
project pursuant to policies and procedures adopted by the audit committee. Companies 
employing the policies and procedures approach will need to disclose these procedures in 
their annual filings. To engage an audit firm to provide a permitted service based on policies 
and procedures established by the audit committee, the policies and procedures must be 
detailed as to the particular service and the audit committee must be informed of the service. 
The SEC expects that audit committees will indicate the maximum period in advance of the 
activity that approval may be granted. In addition, the company's policies and procedures 
must not be so expansive as to represent a delegation of the audit committee's responsibilities 
to management. 
In connection with the implementation of auditor independence requirements under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC recently adopted final rules requiring audit committees 
of issuers to pre-approve all "permissible" non-audit services provided to the issuer by the 
auditor. These final rules will apply to the provision of non-audit services by the auditor 
beginning on May 6, 2003. The rules specify "that before the accountant is engaged by the 
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issuer to render non-audit services, the engagement must be (1) approved by the issuer's audit 
committee or (2) entered into pursuant to the audit committee's established policies and 
procedures for pre-approval, provided the policies and procedures are detailed as to the 
particular service and designed to safeguard the continued independence of the accountant". 
4-7. Audit Quality, the Expectations Gap, and the Audit Committee 
Audit quality is crucial to financial statement quality, but is intangible and hence difficult to 
measure. A widely used definition of audit quality is provided by DeAngelo (1981) "the 
consumers' perception of the joint probability that an auditor (a) discovers a breach in the 
client's accounting system and (b) reports that breach, the former depending upon audit 
procedures and the latter on the auditor's independence from a given client". The ability of 
auditors to uncover failures in the accounting system will dependent on the auditor being free 
to determine the appropriate audit techniques and the extent of their application (Collier and 
Gregory 1996). 
The link between audit committees and the quality of external audit work has long been 
recognized in the literature. For example, Jack (1993) in discussing the relationship between 
audit committees and external auditors, emphasized the important role of the audit committee 
in assessing the level of fees and ensuring that the audit fee is not so low that audit quality is 
compromised. Abbott and Parker (200a) argued that independent and active audit committees 
can take two actions related to the external auditor to ensure a higher level of audit quality. 
First, they can ensure that management selects a high-quality external auditor. Second, the 
audit committee could take actions to ensure that the quality of audit effort by the external 
auditor is increased. 
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In terms of the audit committee's ability to influence the level of audit effort, DeZoort (1997) 
notes that audit committee members generally believe the review of the external auditor's 
work to be a primary audit committee duty. Abbott and Parker (2000a) posit that outside, 
independent audit committee directors possess a two-factor audit quality demand function. 
The first factor is reputation capital enhancement/preservation. More specifically, outside 
audit committee directors may view becoming part of the directorate as a means of enhancing 
their reputations as experts in decision control (Fama and Jensen 1983). Although audit 
committee service increases the reputation capital of these outside directors, it may also 
exacerbate the reputation damage should a financial misstatement occur. The second audit 
quality demand factor unique to independent audit committee directors concerns director 
liability. In cases of financial misstatement, outside non-audit committee directors can 
potentially subrogate their director liability to audit committee members by asserting reliance 
on the audit committee for issues such as the adequacy of the firm's financial reporting and 
relationship with its external auditor (Reinstein and Weirich 1996). Recent research supports 
the notion that audit committees undertake actions designed to mitigate audit committee 
director reputation and litigation-related losses. For example, Abbott and Parker (2000b) find 
that audit committees comprised entirely of independent directors that meet at least twice 
annually are more likely to employ an industry specialist auditor. In a related stream of 
research, Carcello and Neal (2000a) find that financially distressed firms with independent 
audit committees are more likely to receive a going concern qualification. Carcello and Neal 
(2000b) find external auditors who issue initial going concern audit reports are less likely to 
be terminated when the audit committee is comprised entirely of independent directors. Both 




The audit expectations gap, and how it might be narrowed, has been of interest to audit 
regulators, accounting academics, and accountancy bodies in all the world. At the same time, 
concerns about the existences of an expectations gap led to significant shareholders interest in 
the audit committee oversight responsibilities. The presence of the audit committee enhances 
the perception of auditors independence. By interposing a committee of non-executive 
directors between operating management and the external auditors, both sides are given a 
forum to discuss matters considered to be significant to the corporation on a normal and 
regular basis. It also provides a mechanism which reduces the possibility of aggressive 
management being over dominating in its relationship with auditors (Vinten and Lee 1993 and 
Deli and Gillan 2000). 
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5-l. Introduction 
Audit committee guidelines and codes of best practice, like corporate governance, arise in the 
context of, and are affected by, differing national frameworks of law, regulations, and stock 
exchange listing rules and differing societal values. Therefore, to understand one nation's 
audit committee practice in relation to another it is necessary to understand not only the best 
practice documents but also the underlying legal framework. This chapter commences by 
illustrating the UK and USA experience of audit committees and the enforcement for 
improving their role in the both countries. The chapter continues by explaining the legal 
frameworks for audit committees in the UK, USA, and Egypt through a comparative overview 
of the following factors: the audit committee charter, the independence and experience of 
committee members, the size, meetings, resources and authority of the audit committee, audit 
committee members training, and the audit committee's report. Audit committee effectiveness 
is viewed as the competency with which the committee carries out its specific oversight 
responsibilities which is the final sections of the comparison. This sections included Table 
summarized the legal frameworks for audit committees in the UK, USA, and Egypt. 
5-2: The Nature of the Legal Framework of Audit Committees: a Comparison between 
the UK, USA, and Egypt 
Corporate governance has spawned an increasing amount of interest from academics, 
practitioners, and national and multilateral government bodies. Much of this attention has 
focused on the way USA and UK companies are governed (Vinten 2000). The USA corporate 
governance system has been generally characterised as marker-or short-term shareholders-
oriented. This characterisation also applies to the UK corporate governance system, given the 
close economic ties between the UK and the USA both with respect to the degree of market 
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integration and the organisation of transactions and in relation to other socio-cultural respects 
including underlying Anglo Saxon accounting frameworks (Dockery and Herbert 2000, and 
Gray 1988). It is expected that the transition economy process in Egypt will exhibit 
differences in its corporate governance systems. These may be associated with the significant 
differences in attitudes, beliefs, cultural values, and the rate of progress in introducing 
appropriate frameworks. They, in turn, are expected to impact on managerial behaviour, firm 
objectives and market corporate control (Humphreys 1996 and Dockery and Herbert 2000). 
Committees, commissions, and regulatory authorities in the USA and the UK have identified 
the corporate audit committee as a key component of effective corporate governance (Lee and 
Stone 1997). Consequently, it is possible that differences in the regulatory environment and 
the importance assigned to corporate governance, as well as other cultural factors, could 
significantly influence the nature of the audit committees' legal framework in the USA, UK, 
and Egypt. 
S-3. The UK Experience of Audit Committees 
The UK is the only major country, within the European Union, where the majority of listed 
companies have formed audit committees composed of non-executive directors to monitor, 
financial reporting, the external auditors, and internal control strength (Collier and Gregory 
1996). The adoption of the audit committee in the UK did not begin until the late 1980s. In 
1987, stimulated by the large and increasing size and incidence of corporate fraud, the Bank 
of England, the Confederation of British Industry, and other financial institutions urged public 
companies to adopt audit committees (Vanasco 1994). 
In December 1992, audit committees in the UK received a boost from the Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, known as the Cadbury Committee. The Cadbury 
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Committee issued a report that significantly expanded the role of audit committees m 
maintaining financial reporting standards for firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. The 
committee defined the financial aspects of corporate governance as "the way in which boards 
set financial policy and oversee its implementations, including the use of financial controls, 
and the process whereby they repost on the activities and progress of the company to the 
shareholders" (Sec. 2.6). Also, the Cadbury Committee argued that higher standards of 
corporate governance could be achieved through improvements in the quality of financial 
reporting which would facilitate an increased level of auditor independence. The Cadbury 
solution boosts auditor independence by there being a greater presence on company boards of 
independent non-executive directors and by the establishment of audit committees. The 
Cadbury Committee put forward their recommendations on audit committees and the London 
Stock Exchange promulgated this as the Combined Code in June 1998. 
In 1999, the Internal Control Committee of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
published the Internal Control Guidance for Directors of Listed Companies Incorporated in 
the UK (Turnbull 1999). This guidance is commonly referred to as the Turnbull Report. The 
report marks an explicit move towards an enhanced role for audit committees regarding 
internal control system. 
Recently, in 2003, following the corporate failures in the USA, the Financial Review Council 
(FRC) was asked to set up an independent group to clarify the role and responsibilities of 
audit committees and develop a Combined Code of guidance. The group, under the 
chairmanship of Sir Robert Smith, published its report in January 2003. The report proposes 
significant changes to the Combined Code for audit committee's oversight responsibilities 
related to the financial reporting process, auditing, and internal control. It also suggests that 
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audit committee activities should be reported to shareholders in a separate section within the 
directors' report in the annual financial statements. The provisions of the Smith Report apply 
to accounting periods starting on or after 1 July 2003. 
5-4. The USA Experience of Audit Committees 
The exact origin of the audit committee in the USA is unknown, but is largely attributed to 
the aftermath of the Mckesson & Robbins, Inc. fraud in 1938. The New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Accounting Series Release 
No. 19 of 1940, subsequently recommended that the auditor should be selected by a special 
committee composed of non-officer board members (Collier 1996). 
The audit committee movement gathered steam in the late 1960s and 1970s, acqumng 
widespread acceptance in the USA as the proper vehicle for exercising financial oversight by 
1980. Until 1967 the concept of the audit committee received very little support, and the 
functions of this committee remained undefined. In July 1967 the Executive Committee of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICP A) recommended that publicly held 
corporations establish audit committees of members outside the board of directors, because 
"the auditors should communicate with the audit committee whenever any significant 
question having material bearing on the company's financial statements has not been 
satisfactorily resolved at the management level" (Braiotta et al. 1999). 
In March 1972, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recommended that all 
publicly held companies have audit committees composed of outside directors. Accordingly, 
no members of management would be involved in the review of certain matters, which were 
once solely the prerogative of management. In the same year, the SEC required that 
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corporations disclose to shareholders whether or not they had an audit committee (Vanasco 
1994 ), in addition, it recommended but did not require listed companies to have an audit 
committee. In 1976, Congress debated a law that would have required public companies to 
form audit committees composed of independent directors. Despite failing to pass this bill, 
Congress encouraged the voluntary formation of these committees by enacting the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act. (FCPA). Among other reforms, the FCPA required internal accounting 
controls designed to detect illegal payments and report such payments to the Board of 
Directors. In 1987, following on the heels of congressional action, the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) required all listed firms to have an audit committee. 
In 1985, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the Treadway 
Commission) was established to address fraudulent financial reporting. In 1987, the 
Commission issued its report, recommending that all public companies form audit committees 
composed entirely of outside directors. The primary objective was to identify causal factors 
that can lead to fraudulent financial reporting and to develop recommendations to reduce its 
incidence. Also, the Commission identified the audit committee as an essential part of any 
system designed to prevent fraudulent financial reporting. Several recommendations were 
offered regarding audit committees, including mandatory committee formation for all public 
companies, and severe penalties for directors involved in fraudulent financial reporting. Audit 
and management practitioners view these recommendations as having important implications 
for audit practice and the financial reporting process. 
The debate increased in 1998, when SEC chairman, Arthur Levitt, highlighted his concerns 
regarding financial reporting by public companies. With his speech "The Number Game," 
Chairman Levitt initiated a new focus on deceptive accounting practices, in response to the 
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market's increasing focus on corporate earnmgs. He focused on "earning management," 
which he believed had the potential to undercut investor confidence in U.S. capital markets by 
destroying financial reporting transparency and reliability. Among the initiatives he 
announced was a call to strengthen the audit committee. In response, the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) sponsored the 
formation of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committees (BRC). The committee made ten recommendations to the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC), the securities markets, the accounting profession, Boards of Directors, 
external auditors, internal auditors, managers, and audit committees, regarding the 
enhancement of financial reporting and the oversight of that process. The report is designed to 
advance awareness and implementation of measures to promote the concept of "quality" 
financial reporting. 
Recently, Congress passed and the President signed into law on July 30, 2002, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. This Act mandates sweeping corporate disclosure and financial reporting reform 
to improve the responsibility of public companies for their financial disclosures. It requires 
the SEC to direct the national exchanges and associations to prohibit the listing of any 
company not in compliance with the Commission's requirements for audit committees. 
5-5. The Legal Framework for Audit Committees: A Comparative Overview 
Since the middle of 1978, USA companies seeking a listing are required to have an audit 
committee. In the UK, although audit committees are not mandatory, there is effectively a 
requirement for listed companies to have them because the London Stock Exchange requires 
UK listed companies to prepare a statement in their annual report of compliance with the 
Cadbury Committee (1992) requirements and to give details of any non-compliance. In Egypt, 
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since 2002, companies listed on the Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE) are required 
to have an audit committee. 
5-5-1. Audit Committee Charter 
To enhance their effectiveness in carrying out their responsibilities for oversight of the 
financial reporting process on behalf of the Board of Directors, audit committees should have 
written charters that set forth their duties and responsibilities (Treadway Commission 1987). 
The audit committee charter provides a framework of the committee's organisation, 
responsibilities, duties, and relationships with management, external and internal auditors. 
Often a charter of the audit committee is included in the bylaws of a corporation, and such a 
charter is approved by the Board of Directors (Vanasco 1994 and Sweeney and Vallario 
2002). 
In the UK, the Cadbury Committee (1992) recommends that "audit committees should be 
formally constituted to ensure that they have a clear relationship with the boards to whom 
they are answerable and to whom they should report regularly. They should be given written 
terms of reference which deal adequately with their membership, authority and duties". Also, 
the Smith Report (2003) recommends that "the board should provide written terms of 
reference for the audit committee. The terms of reference should be tailored to the particular 
circumstances of the company. The audit committee should review annually its terms of 
reference and its own effectiveness and recommend any necessary changes to the board". 
In the USA, the Treadway Commission (1987) recommends that "all public companies should 
develop a written charter setting forth the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee. 
The Board of Directors should approve the charter, review it periodically, and modify it as 
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necessary". The BRC (1999) recommends that the NYSE and NASD reqmre the audit 
committee of each listed company to: (1) adopt a formal written charter that is approved by 
the full Board ofDirectors and that specifies the scope ofthe committee's responsibilities, and 
how it carries out those responsibilities, including structure, process, and membership 
requirements, and (2) review and reassess the adequacy of the audit committee charter on an 
annual basis. The committee also recommends that the SEC promulgate rules that require the 
audit committee for each reporting company to disclose in the company's proxy statement for 
its annual meeting of shareholders whether the audit committee has adopted a formal written 
charter, and, if so, whether the audit committee satisfied its responsibilities during the prior 
year in compliance with its charter, which charter shall be disclosed at least triennially in the 
annual report to shareholders or proxy statement and in the next annual report to shareholders 
or proxy statement after any significant amendment to that charter. 
In comparison, in Egypt the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in its statement No.30 in 2002 
makes no requirements of companies listed on the Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchange 
(CASE) to adopt a formal written charters for their audit committees. 
5-5-2. Audit Committee Member Independence 
Both the business and academic press have recently focused on audit committee composition 
as an important determinant of financial reporting quality (Vafeas 2001 ). In particular, there is 
widespread support for the notion that audit committees should consist of non-executive 
directors, who are more likely to be independent of management's influence and are thus 
better suited to oversee the financial reporting process (Beasley 1996). Numerous studies (e.g. 
McMullen and Raghunandan 1996, Beasley 1996, and Archambeault and DeZoort 2001) 
highlight that the director's ability to control decisions within the organization is 
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compromised when independence is lacking because such directors are less likely to 
challenge management's decisions. Independent directors, on the other hand, have an 
incentive to challenge questionable management decisions because they seek to develop and 
protect their status in the marketplace (Archambeault and DeZoort 2001 ). In this spirit, the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC 2003) states that: 
"an audit committee comprised of independent directors is better situated to assess 
objectively the quality of the issuer's financial disclosure and the adequacy of internal 
controls than a committee that is affiliated with management. Management may face 
market pressures for short-term performance and corresponding pressures to satisfy 
market expectations. These pressures could be exacerbated by the use of compensation 
or other incentives focused on short-term stock appreciation, which can promote self-
interest rather than the promotion of long-term shareholder interest. An independent 
audit committee with adequate resources helps to overcome this problem and to align 
corporate interests with those of shareholders" 
Arens and Loebbecke (2000) explained that the audit committee's independence from 
management and their knowledge of financial reporting issues are considered important 
determinants of their ability to effectively evaluate internal controls and financial statements 
prepared by management. The empirical literature supports such concerns regarding the 
independence of audit committee members. Beasley (1996) found that the percentage of 
outside directors was significantly lower for firms with fraudulent activity than for firms 
without fraudulent activity, and that fraudulent firms had audit committees with a 
significantly lower percentage of outsiders than non-fraudulent firms. McMullen and 
Raghunandan (1996) found that companies without reporting problems were more likely to . 
have an audit committee composed solely of outside directors than companies with reporting 
problems. Wright (1996) found a direct relationship between the quality of an entity's 
financial reporting and the percentage of outside directors on the audit committee. Abbott and 
Parker (2000b) found that firms with audit committees that do not include employees and that 
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meet at least twice per year are more likely to use an industry-specialist auditor. Also, 
DeZoort and Salterio (2001) found that independent directors' experience was positively 
related to audit committee member support for a 'substance over from' position in an auditor-
client dispute. Inside members may have increased incentive to seek outcomes desired by 
management, which may be contrary to those in the best interest of shareholders 
(Archambeault and DeZoort 2001). 
In the UK, the Cadbury Committee (1992) states that "membership should be confined to the 
non-executive directors of the company and a majority of the non-executives serving on the 
committee should be independent ". Also, the Smith Report (2003) recommends that "audit 
committees should include at least three members, who should all be independent non-
executive directors". In this respect, the Higgs Report (2003) defined "independent" as 
follows: a non-executive director is considered independent when the board determines that 
the director is independent in character and judgement and there are no relationships or 
circumstances which could affect, or appear to affect, the director's judgement. Such 
relationships or circumstances would include where the director: 
A- is a former employee of the company or group until five years after employment (or 
any other material connection) has ended; 
B- has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the 
company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a 
body that has such a relationship with the company; 
C- has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from a 
director's fee, participates in the company's share option or a performance-related pay 
scheme, or is a member of the company's pension scheme; 
D- has close family ties with any of the company's advisers, directors or senior 
employees; 
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E- holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through 
involvement in other companies or bodies; 
F- represents a significant shareholder; or 
G- has served on the board for more than ten years. 
The board should identify in its annual report the non-executive directors it determines to be 
independent. The board should state its reasons if a director is considered to be independent 
notwithstanding the existence of relationships or circumstances which may appear relevant to 
its determination. 
In the USA, since 1978, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has required "each listing 
domestic corporation to have an audit committee made up wholly of 'independent' directors. 
The audit committee must be independent of management and free from any relation that, in 
the opinion of its Board of Directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent 
judgement as a committee member". The Treadway Commission (1987) recommends that 
"the Board of Directors of all public companies should be required by SEC rules to establish 
audit committees composed solely of independent directors". The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) Improvement Act of 1991 has a similar requirement for large domestic 
banks. The American Law Institute and the Business Roundtable (BRT 2002) advocate audit 
and compensation committees comprised solely of directors independent from management. 
The BRC (1999) recommends that both the NYSE and NASD adopt the following definition 
of independence for purposes of service on the audit committee for listed companies with a 
market capitalization above $200 million (or a more appropriate measures for identifying 
smaller-sized companies as determined jointly by the NYSE and the NASD): members of the 
audit committee shall be considered independent if they have no relationship to the 
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corporation that may interfere with the exercise of their independence from management and 
the corporation. Examples of such relationships include: 
A. a director being employed by the corporation or any of its affiliates for the 
current year or any of the past five years; 
B. a director accepting any compensation from the corporation or any of its 
affiliates other than compensation for board service or benefits under a tax-
qualified retirement plan; 
C. a director being a member of the immediate family of an individual who is, or 
has been in any of the past five years, employed by the corporation or any of its 
affiliates as an executive officer; 
D. a director being a partner in, or a controlling shareholders or an executive officer 
of, any for-profit business organization to which the corporation made, or from 
which the corporation received, payments that are or have been significant to the 
corporation or business organization in any of the past five years; or 
E. a director being employed as an executive of another company where any of the 
corporation's executives serves on that company's compensation committee. 
A director who has one or more of these relationships may be appointed to the audit 
committee, if the board, under exceptional and limited circumstances, determines that 
membership on the committee by the individual is required in the best interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders, and the board discloses, in the next annual proxy statement 
subsequent to such determination, the nature of the relationship and the reasons for that 
determination. The Committee recommends that in addition to adopting and complying the 
definition of independence set forth above for the purpose of service on the audit committee, 
the NYSE and the NASD require that listed companies with a market capitalization above 
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$200 million (or a more appropriate measures for identifying smaller-sized companies as 
determined jointly by the NYSE and the NASD) have an audit committee comprised solely of 
independent directors. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Of 2002, Sec. 301, also establishes an independence definition for 
audit committee members thus: "independent is defined as not receiving, other than for 
service on the board, any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee from the issuer, and 
as not being an affiliated person of the issuer, or any subsidiary thereof'. Along these lines, 
the SEC (2003), under the proposed rule, requires that "each member of the audit committee 
would need to be an independent member of the Board of Directors. In order for a director to 
be considered independent, audit committee members cannot accept, directly or indirectly, 
any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee from the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer, 
other than in his or her capacity as a member of the Board of Directors and any board 
committee" 
In Egypt, the requirement for independent audit committee members appeared in the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA) statement No.30. The CMA states that" the audit committee should 
comprise at least three non-executive directors". But the CMA does not define the 
"independence" requirements for audit committee members. The World Bank Report (200 I) 
argued that the concept of non-executive or independent director is not well established in 
Egypt. 
5-5-3. Experience of the Audit Committee Member 
Lee and Stone (1997) explained that despite the presumed independence of audit committees 
comprised of non-executive directors, they appear unable to monitor adequately such 
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technical matters as fraud, accounting, auditing, and internal controls. This suggests a need for 
at least certain audit committee members to have technical skills which relate to accounting, 
auditing, and control issues. DeZoort (1998) argued that audit committee members' 
experience is regarded as an important dimension of audit committee effectiveness. Such 
experience refers to the amount of time spent working in areas related to assigned corporate 
oversight responsibilities. The Institute of Internal Auditors and Price Waterhouse (1993) 
articulated a need for audit committees to contain sufficient relevant experience to discharge 
their responsibilities effectively. Other individuals and bodies have stated similar concerns 
(e.g. Sommer 1991, Lee and Stone 1997, DeZoort 1997, and the Public Oversight Board 
1993). Each of these studies identified either audit committee member experience or 
awareness of technical issues as a necessary ingredient for effective monitoring. 
There are a number of studies which highlight the importance of relevant audit committee 
member experience as a component of overall committee effectiveness. For example, 
McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) found that the companies with no reporting problems 
were more likely to have a CP A on the audit committee than companies that had experienced 
reporting problems. DeZoort (1998) found that member experience in the areas of auditing 
and internal control had a positive effect on member performance on internal control 
evaluation tasks. Moreover, experience is important for audit committee members because, 
many oversight judgements are subjective and lack clear "right" or "wrong" answers. 
Therefore, in the absence of objective criteria, members lacking experience are more likely to 
make suboptimal decisions in primary oversight domains (e.g. accounting, auditing, and 
business environment) because they may lack the technical knowledge needed. 
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In the UK, the Smith Report (2003) recommends that "at least one member of the audit 
committee should have significant, recent and relevant financial experience, for example as an 
auditor or a finance director of a listed company. It is highly desirable for this member to have 
a professional qualification from one of the professional accountancy bodies. The need for a 
degree of financial literacy among the other members will vary according to the nature of the 
company, but experience of corporate financial matters will normally be required. The 
availability of appropriate financial expertise will be particularly important where the 
company's activities involve specialised financial activities". 
In the USA, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 1991 requires bank 
audit committees to have some members with banking and related financial management 
experience. The Institute of Internal Auditors (USA) recently recommended that, in addition 
to a majority of members with business experience, the audit committees should have at least 
one member with a background in financial reporting, accounting, or auditing. In 1999, the 
NYSE and NASD listing standards required each audit committee member to be financially 
literate or become so within a reasonable period of time after his or her appointment. Also, 
both required at least one member of the audit committee to have accounting or related 
financial management expertise. The BRC (1999) recommends that "the NYSE and the 
NASD require listed companies with a market capitalization above $200 million (or more 
appropriate measures for identifying smaller-sized companies as determined jointly by the 
NYSE and the NASD) to have an audit committee comprised of a minimum of three 
directors, each of whom is financially literate or becomes financial literate within a reasonable 
period of time after his or her appointment to the audit committee, and further that at least one 
member of the audit committee has accounting or related financial management expertise". 
The Committee defined "expertise" as: 
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(1) significant past employee experience in finance or accounting; 
(2) a requisite professional certification in accounting; or 
(3) any other comparable experience or background which results in the individual's 
financial sophistication, including being or having been a CEO or other senior 
officer with financial oversight responsibilities. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act. of 2002, Sec. 407, recommends the SEC to require disclosure of 
whether or not the audit committee has at least one financial expert. If an audit committee 
does not have a financial expert, the reason for this must be disclosed. The SEC (2003) 
defines 'financial expert' by considering the following elements: 
(1) being a public accountant, auditor, CFO, controller, CAO or similar of an 
ISSUer; 
(2) having an understanding of GAAP and financial statements; 
(3) having experience in (a) preparation or auditing of financial statements of 
similar issuers (b) accounting for estimates, accruals and reserves (c) internal 
controls; or 
( 4) having an understanding of audit committee functions. 
In Egypt, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) has considered the importance of audit 
committee member experience. Hence, the CMA states that "the audit committee should 
comprise at least three non-executive directors, each of whom should be diligent and have a 
good experience in the company business environment". However, this statement does not 
specify the requirement for financial experience of the audit committee member. The CMA 
does require that the audit committee review and analyse the applied accounting policies of 
the company and the significant changes in applying the new accounting standards. This 
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responsibility for audit committees reqmres good financial, accounting, and auditing 
experience among the members. 
5-5-4. Audit Committee Size 
The audit committee composition may vary from company to company. The number of 
members is determined by the size of the board of directors and the size of the organisation 
(Vanasco 1994). However, the size of each committee should be appropriate for the 
company's circumstances and will depend on the extent of the committee's responsibilities. 
Importantly, an audit committee should be large enough to represent a balance of views and 
experience, yet small enough to operate efficiently. From a control perspective, the 
accounting, auditing, and fraud literature (e.g., Archambeault and DeZoort 2001 and Klein 
1998) indicates that increasing the number of people involved in an activity substantially 
decreases the opportunity for wrongdoing because collusion becomes more difficult. To this 
end, concern about audit committee size has lead to a number of recommendations about the 
number of members needed to help ensure that committees are large enough to provide 
adequate oversight. 
In the UK, the Cadbury Committee (1992) recommended that "the board should establish an 
audit committee of at least 3 non-executive directors". Similarly, the Smith Report (2003) 
recommends that " audit committees should include at least three members, who should all be 
independent non-executive directors. The chairman of the company should not be an audit 
committee member". 
In the USA, the Treadway Commission (1987) recommends that "an audit committee 
normally should consist of not fewer than three independent directors. The maximum size 
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may vary, but the committee should be small enough so that each member is an active 
participant". The NACD (2000) recommends that audit committees have between three and 
six members. Similarly, the BRC (1999) recommended that " the NYSE and NASD require 
listed companies with a market capitalisation above $ 200 million to have an audit committee 
comprised of a minimum of three directors". 
In Egypt also, the CMA in its statement No.30 (2002), states that " the audit committee should 
comprise at least three non-executive directors". 
5-5-5. Audit Committee Meetings 
Audit committee activity is an important dimension of overall effectiveness because activity 
signals monitoring. As a result, the number of audit committee meetings held during the year 
is a common proxy for committee activity (Menon and Williams 1994, McMullen and 
Raghunandan 1996, Beasley 1996, and Carcello and Neal 1998). An audit committee that 
reports high levels of activity is assumed to take its duties seriously and perform more 
effectively than a committee that reports low levels of activity (Archambeault and DeZoort 
2001 ). To be effective, an audit committee must meet regularly and must carefully plan its 
timetable, agendas, and participations. The number of meetings the committee holds is 
influenced by the objectives established and the scope of activities (Price Waterhouse 1999). 
Also, the Smith Report (2003) states that " formal meetings of the audit committee are the 
heart of its work". Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) argued that, it is not enough that audit 
committees be independent, they must also be active. An independent audit committee that 
never meets is of little consequence. This suggests that in the examining effectiveness of the 
audit committee it is important to consider the level of audit committee activity. Menon and 
Williams 1994, and Deli and Gillan 2000, use the number of audit committee meetings as a 
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proxy for the level of audit committee activity. But, they note that the number of audit 
committee meetings is only a rough proxy for activity because, "it does not provide any 
indication of the work accomplished during these meetings". They also note, however, that 
audit committees that do not meet, or meet only a small number of times, are unlikely to be 
effective. The Smith Report (2003) states that, sufficient time should be allowed to enable the 
audit committee to undertake as full a discussion as may be required. A sufficient interval 
should be allowed between audit committee meetings and main board meetings to allow any 
work arising from the audit committee meeting to be carried out and reported to the board as 
appropriate. Also, Pomeranz (1997) argued that, the audit committee chairperson should set 
an agenda including a timetable, the names of any presenters, and the names of operating 
executives expected to be present. The agenda should also include a preparation section which 
specifies the homework to be done prior to the meeting. In this spirit, Olson (1999) explained 
that, meeting schedules and meeting agendas should be planned in advance by the audit 
committee chair and corporate financial officers to be certain that the important "big picture" 
issues are not neglected as the number of formal and procedural duties increases. 
In the UK, the Smith Report (2003), Sec. 3.5 and 3.6, recommends that "it is for the audit 
committee chairman, in consulting with the company secretary, to decide the frequency and 
timing of its meetings. There should be as many meetings as the audit committee's role and 
responsibilities require. It is recommended there should be not fewer than three meetings 
during the year, held to coincide with key dates within the financial reporting and audit cycle. 
However, most audit committee chairman will wish to call more frequent meetings. Also, no 
one other than the audit committee's chairman and members is entitled to be present at a 
meeting of the audit committee. It is for the audit committee to decide if non-members should 
attend for a particular meeting or a particular agenda item. It is to be expected that the 
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external audit lead partner will be invited regularly to attend meetings as well as the finance 
director. Others may be invited to attend". 
In the USA, the Treadway Commission (1987) recommends that "The committee should meet 
on a regular basis and special meetings should be called as circumstances require. The 
committee should meet privately with the internal auditor and the independent public 
accountant". Also, the NYSE recommends that, audit committees must meet on at least a 
quarterly basis, and they must meet privately with the independent auditor. 
In Egypt, despite the important role of audit committee meetings which are commonly 
considered as a proxy for committee activity, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in its 
statement No.30 in 2002 does not specify any recommendations related to audit committee 
meetings. However, the CMA does require audit committee members to direct their monthly 
reports to the Board of Directors, and this is taken as a proxy for committee activity. 
5-5-6. Resources and Authority of the Audit Committee 
As a prerequisite to the effective performance of the audit committee, the board of directors 
should formulate a clear definition of the committee's responsibilities and authority. 
Moreover, the board should either pass a formal resolution or amend the bylaws of the 
corporation in order to document the establishment of the committee (Braiotta et al 1999). 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) explained that audit committees are established through 
delegations of responsibility from corporate Boards of Directors, who themselves are charged 
with ultimate accountability for corporate management. Although the exercise of this charge 
may be reviewed by the board, audit committees hold an important decision-making 
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authority. These decisions can have the effect of bestowing rewards and punishments to other 
parties such as corporate officers, and internal and external auditors, which can be seen as a 
"sanctionary" power. The Treadway Committee (1987) states that, audit committee must have 
resources commensurate with the duties and responsibilities assigned to them by their Boards 
of Directors. Public companies should give audit committees these necessary resources, 
including in-house staff and administrative support. Also, audit committees should have the 
discretion to institute investigations of improprieties or suspected improprieties, including the 
standing authority to retain special counsel or experts. In this respect, the SEC (2003) argued 
that, to be effective, an audit committee must have the necessary resources and authority to 
fulfil its function. The audit committee is likely not to be equipped to self-advise on all 
accounting, financial reporting or legal matters. To perform its role effectively, therefore, an 
audit committee may need the authority to engage its such outside advisors, including experts 
in particular areas of accounting, as it determines necessary apart from counsel or advisors 
hired by management, especially when potential conflicts of interest with management may 
be apparent. The advice of outside advisors may be necessary to identify potential conflicts of 
interest and assess the company's disclosure and other compliance obligations with an 
independent and critical eye. 
In the UK, the Cadbury Committee (1992) recommends that "the audit committee should 
have explicit authority to investigate any matters within its terms of reference, the resources 
which it needs to do so, and full access to information. The committee should be able to 
obtain external professional advice and to invite outsiders with relevant experience to attend if 
necessary". Along these lines, the Smith Report (2003) recommends that "the audit 
committee, should be provided with sufficient recourses to undertake its duties. The audit 
committee should have access to the services of the company secretary and staff on all audit 
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committee matters including: assisting the chairman in planning the audit committee's work, 
drawing up meeting agendas, maintenance of minutes, drafting of material about its activities 
for the annual report, collection and distribution of information and provision of any 
necessary practical support. The board should make funds available to the audit committee to 
enable it to take independent legal, accounting or other advice when the audit committee 
reasonably believes it necessary to do so". 
In the USA, the Treadway Commission (1987) recommends that "audit committees should 
have adequate resources and authority to discharge their responsibilities". Also, "the 
committee should meet regularly with the company's general counsel, and outside counsel 
when appropriate, to discuss legal matters that may have a significant impact on the 
company's financial statements. In a number of companies the general council and/or outside 
counsel attend meetings". The NYSE also, states that, audit committees shall have authority 
and funding to engage independent counsel and outside advisors as appropriate without 
seeking the approval of the Board of Directors. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act. of 2002, Sec. 301, 
requires that "audit committees have the authority to counsel with and retain legal, accounting 
and other experts in appropriate circumstances". Also, the SEC (2003) recommends that 
"each audit committee must have the authority to engage independent counsel and other 
advisors, as it determines necessary to carry out its duties and each issuer must provide 
appropriate funding for the audit committee". 
In Egypt, despite the important role of audit committee resources and its authority to assign 
the committee members to fulfil their duties and responsibilities, the Capital Market Authority 
(CMA) in its statement No.30 in 2002 does not specify any recommendations related to the 
audit committee's resources and authority. 
109 
5-5-7. Audit Committee Members Training: 
The National Office of Financial Institutions (200 1) states that, it may be beneficial to 
develop an audit committee training manual to educate new members about the institution, its 
financial matters and the audit committee requirements and charter. Also, the Institute of 
Internal Auditors (1993) identified the following as its single most important finding, and the 
key to audit committee effectiveness: "audit committee members must be provided with niore 
background information and training to enable them to be more effective. Audit committee 
members can be effective only if they thoroughly understand their responsibilities and how to 
meet them effectively. Management, internal auditors, and independent accountants are 
identified as sources of this information". In this respect, the Smith Report (2003) states that, 
training should be provided to members of the audit committee on an ongoing and timely 
basis and should include an understanding of the principles of and developments in financial 
reporting and related company law. In appropriate cases, it may also include, for example, 
understanding financial statements, applicable accounting standards and recommended 
practice, the regulatory framework for the company's business, and the role of internal and 
external auditing and risk management. 
In the UK, the Smith Report (2003) recommends that "the company should provide an 
induction programme for new audit committee members. This should cover the role of the 
audit committee, including its terms of reference and expected time commitment by members, 
and an overview of the company's business, identifying the main business and financial 
dynamics and risks. It could also include meeting some of the company staff'. 
110 
In the USA, the Treadway Commission (1987) recommends that "a systematic and continuing 
learning process for audit committee members will increase their effectiveness. One way is to 
review various financial aspects of the company on a planned basis". 
In Egypt, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in its statement No.30 in 2002 does not 
specify any recommendations related to audit committee members training. 
5-5-8. Audit Committee Disclosure 
A variety of interest groups have recommended that companies should include an audit 
committee report in their annual report to shareholders to highlight the importance of, and 
perhaps improve the effectiveness of, the oversight mechanism (Tread way Commission 1987, 
Public Oversight Board 1993, Price Waterhouse 1993, Lee and Stone 1997, Turpin and 
DeZoort 1998, BRC 1999, SEC 1999, Carcello et al. 2002, and Smith Report 2003). The 
Treadway Commission (1987) stated that "the role of the audit committee is largely hidden 
from the investing public, it should be more visible and more effectively communicated. 
Moreover, users of financial statements should be better informed about the roles 
management and the audit committee play in the company's financial reporting process. The 
Commission also recommends a letter from the chairman of the audit committee that 
describes the committee's activities, Both of these communications should appear in the 
annual report to stockholders". Price Waterhouse (1993), in a study with the Institute of 
Internal Auditors, also noted that requiring audit committee reports would clarify the role and 
responsibilities of the committee in each company and would help ensure that the committee 
is meeting its responsibilities by focusing the committee's attention on those responsibilities. 
Also, Lee and Stone (1997) argued that, public disclosures of audit committee responsibilities 
and member experience backgrounds allow shareholders and others to determine the potential 
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for a mismatch of responsibilities and backgrounds, and any consequential ineffectiveness. 
Carcello et al. (2002) studied the extent of disclosure audit committee charters and reports by 
examining a random sample of 150 annual reports in 2001 in the USA, they found that what 
audit committees say they are doing in their reports differs from what their charters say they 
should be doing. 
In the UK, the Smith Report (2003) recommends that" the directors' report should contain a 
separate section that describes the role and responsibilities of the audit committee and the 
actions taken by the audit committee to discharge those responsibilities. The audit committee 
section should include, inter alia: (1) a summary of the role of the audit committee; (2) the 
names and qualifications of all members of the audit committee during the period; (3) the 
number of audit committee meetings and attendance by each member; and (4) a report on the 
way the audit committee has discharged its responsibilities. The chairman of the audit 
committee should be present at the GAM to answer questions, through the chairman of the 
board, on the report on the audit committee's activities and matters within the scope of audit 
committee's responsibilities". 
In the USA, the Treadway Commission (1987) recommends that "all public companies should 
be required by a SEC rule to include in their annual reports to shareholders a letter signed by 
the chairman of the audit committee describing the committee's responsibilities and activities 
during the year". In 1993, the Public Oversight Board (POB) of the SEC Practice Section of 
the AICP A issued a report, In the Public Interest: Issues Confronting the Accounting 
Profession. In this report, the POB recommended that the SEC require registrants to include 
in their annual reports a statement by the audit committee that describes its responsibilities 
and how they were discharged. The POB expressed the view that mandating registrants to 
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include such a statement will make audit committee members more cognizant of their 
responsibilities. The POB recommended that the statement address, in particular, whether the 
audit committee: 
(1) reviewed the annual financial statements; 
(2) conferred with management and the external auditors about the financial 
statements; 
(3) received from the external auditors all information that the auditors are required 
to communicate under generally accepted auditing standards; 
( 4) .believe that the financial statements are complete and consistent with information 
known to them; and 
(5) believe that the financial statements reflect appropriate accounting principles. 
Also, the BRC (1999) recommends that, the SEC require all reporting companies to include a 
letter from the audit committee in the company's annual report to shareholders and Form 10-
K Annual Report disclosing whether or not, with respect to the prior fiscal year: 
(1) management has reviewed the audited financial statements with the audit 
committee, including a discussion of the quality of the accounting principles as 
applied and significant judgements affecting the company's financial statements; 
(2) the outside auditors have discussed with the audit committee the outside auditors' 
judgements of the quality of those principles as applied and judgments referenced 
in (1) above under the circumstances; 
(3) the members of the audit committee have discussed among themselves, without 
management or the outside auditors present, the information disclosed to the audit 
committee described in (1) and (2) above; and 
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(4) the audit committee, in reliance on the review and discussions conducted with 
management and the outside auditors pursuant to (1) and (2) above, believes that 
the company's financial statements are fairly presented in conformity with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in all material respects. 
The SEC now requires compames to include an audit committee report m their proxy 
statement to communicate whether the committee has fulfilled its responsibilities (SEC 1999). 
According to the SEC, such enhanced audit committee disclosure should: (1) improve the 
transparency of the committee's oversight of the ·financial reporting-reporting process, (2) 
provide additional motivation for committee members to effectively discharge their duties, 
and (3) promote investor confidence. 
In Egypt, however, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in its statement No.30 in 2002 does 
not specify any recommendations related to audit committee disclosure. 
5-5-9. The Audit Committee's Oversight Responsibilities for Financial Reporting 
The Board of Directors and corporate management are jointly responsible for overseeing the 
company' financial reporting process (Wild 1996, and DeZoort and Salterio 2001 ). 
Accordingly, certain corporate governance structures are installed to monitor the financial 
reporting process, and increasingly these include an audit committee of the Board of Directors 
(Wild 1996, Klein 2002, and Braiotta 2002). Recently, in light of public concern over 
business failures and the related criticism of incomplete or fraudulent accounting information 
reporting prior to such failures, the critical role of the audit committee in the financial 
reporting processes has been highlighted (Reghunandan et al. 1998, and McDaniel et al. 
2002). Regulators and the accounting profession have touted the role of audit committees in 
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protecting investors, and accounting research suggests that market participants see audit 
committees as providing a meaningful oversight of financial reporting process (Mcmullen 
1996, Wild 1996, and KPMG 2002). According to the Blue Ribbon Committee, (BRC 1999) 
the audit committee is the "the ultimate monitor" of the financial accounting system. Audit 
committees are responsible for overseeing corporate factors that impact on the financial 
reporting process and ultimately the quality of the financial information disclosed in financial 
statements and press releases (DeZoort 1998). Factors such as the review of all financial 
statements, the review of all existing accounting policies, the review of systems of internal 
control, and the evaluation of exposure to fraud will significantly impact on the financial 
reporting process and the financial information disclosed, all these factors are included in the 
audit committee's oversight responsibilities for financial reporting. 
5-5-9-1. The Review of all Financial Statements, Whether Interim or Annual 
One of the inherent responsibilities of the audit committee has always been its consideration 
of the annual report and other major financial information issued by the company, including 
the usefulness and transparency of these documents (Wild 1996). The primary role of the 
audit committee is to ensure that financial statements and external filings fairly represent the 
financial results of the company and to enable independent verification of the systems and 
controls (Atkins 2002). The audit committee must meet with management and the 
independent auditors to review audited annual and quarterly financial statements (Sweeney 
and Vallario 2002). The Treadway Commission (1987) in the USA states that the audit 
committee's oversight responsibilities undertaken on behalf of the Board of Directors extend 
to the quarterly reporting process. The audit committee should review the controls that 
management has established to protect the integrity of the quarterly reporting process. This 
review should be ongoing, and timely communication between the Board of Directors or the 
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audit committee and senior management, the chief of internal auditors, and the independent 
public accountant is an important element of this ongoing process. Such discussions should 
normally take place during regular meetings of the audit committee or the Board of Directors. 
In the UK, the Cadbury Committee (1992) recommended that audit committee members 
review the half-year and annual financial statements before submission to the Board of 
Directors. Also, the Smith Report (2003, Sec. 5.1) recommended that "the audit committee 
should review the significant financial reporting issues and judgements made in connection 
with the preparation of the company's financial statements, interim reports, preliminary 
announcements and related formal statements. The audit committee should also review the 
clarity and completeness of disclosures in the financial statements". 
In the USA, the Treadway Commission (1987) recommends that "audit committees should 
oversee the quarterly reporting process". The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC 
2003) enacted a requirement that a "report to shareholders" be included in the annual proxy 
statement and contain an audit committee report stating whether the committee had reviewed 
and discussed the audited financial statements with management and external auditors. Also, 
the BRC (1999) recommendation No.1 0 requires that audit committee members undertake 
timely reviews of quarterly financial results and discussions of review-related issues with the 
auditors. 
In Egypt, The Capital Market Authority (CMA), statement No. 30 article No. 7 (2002), 
requires audit committee members to analyse the procedures which are applied in preparing 
the periodical and annual financial statements. 
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5-5-9-2. Review of all Existing Accounting Policies 
As a part of understanding the company's financial reporting process, the audit committee 
should understand the significant accounting policies used by the company (Emst & Young 
2002). Involvement of the audit committee in this area is a natural extension of their normal 
responsibilities (Vinten and Lee 1993). The Smith Report (2003, Sec. 5.2) states that " it is 
management's, not the audit committee's responsibility to prepare complete and accurate 
financial statements and disclosures in accordance with financial reporting standards and 
applicable rules and regulations. However, the audit committee should consider significant 
estimates and judgements". Also, in the USA, the Treadway Commission (1987) explained 
that a difference of opinion over a significant financial reporting issue between a company 
and its independent public accountant may prompt management to seek an opinion from a 
second public accounting firm. On the one hand, the decision to do so may be management's 
legitimate attempt to obtain a technically correct opinion. On the other hand, it may be an 
attempt to obtain an opinion that coincides with management's interest in presenting the 
results in the most favourable light. Management has, and should have, the prerogative to seek 
second opinion. When such an opinion has been sought on a significant accounting issue, 
management should discuss the issue with the audit committee and explain why that particular 
accounting treatment was chosen. 
In the UK, the Smith Report (2003) recommended that "the management should inform the 
audit committee of the methods used to account for significant or unusual transactions where 
the accounting treatment is open to a different approach. Taking into account the external 
auditor's view, the audit committee should consider whether the company has adopted 
appropriate accounting policies". 
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In the USA, the Treadway Commission (1987) recommends that " management should advise 
the audit committee when it seeks a second opinion on a significant accounting issue". The 
NYSE recommended that audit committee must review major issues regarding accounting 
principles and financial statement presentations, including any significant changes in the 
·company's selection or application of the accounting principles. Also, section 204 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires that the registered public accounting firm shall make 
timely reports to the audit committee of: (1) all critical accounting policies and practices to be 
used, (2) GAAP alternatives discussed with management and the alternative preferred by the 
audit firm. Along the same lines, the BRC (1999) recommends that "the General Accepted 
Auditing Standards (GAAS) require that a company's outside auditor discuss with the audit 
committee the auditor's judgements about the quality, not just the acceptability, of the 
company's accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting; the discussion should 
include such issues as the clarity of the company's financial disclosures and degree of 
aggressiveness or conservatism of the company's accounting principles and underlying 
estimates and other significant decisions made by management in preparing the financial 
disclosure and reviewed by the outside auditors. This requirement should be written in a way 
to encourage open, frank discussion and to avoid boilerplate". 
In Egypt, the CMA has considered the role of the audit committee regarding financial 
reporting. The CMA in its statement (2002) states that "the audit committee's main 
responsibilities are to review and analyse applied accounting policies in the company and any 
significant change in applying the new accounting standards and also to analyse the 
procedures which are applied in preparing the periodical and annual financial reporting". 
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5-5-9-3. The Review of Systems of Internal Control 
The Turnbull Report (1999) in the UK, when defining the system of internal control, states 
that an internal system comprises all those policies and procedures that, taken together, 
support a company's effective and efficient operations and enable it to respond to significant 
business, operational, financial, compliance and other risks. Also, the report by the Committee 
of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO 1992), in the USA, 
defined internal control as a "process, effected by an entity's Board of Directors, management 
and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
objectives in the following categories: (1) effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) 
reliability of financial reporting, and (3) compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
The Security Exchange Commission (SEC 2003) requires all companies to devise and 
maintain a system of internal accounting control sufficient to provide resonable assurance that 
(1) transactions are authorized by management, (2) transactions are recorded as necessary to 
permit preparation of the financial statements and to maintain accountability for assets, (3) 
access to assets is permitted only with management's authorization, and (4) existing assets are 
compared with recorded accountability, and appropriate action is taken with respect to any 
differences. The Treadway Commission (1987) states that controls that affect financial 
reporting directly include more than internal accounting controls. They also include elements 
not generally considered part of such controls, such as the internal audit function and the audit 
committee of the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors usually delegates oversight of 
the company's internal control over financial reporting to the audit committee, thereby 
assigning responsibility for financial reporting risks and controls (Frank et al. 2001 ). One of 
the responsibilities of the audit committee is to ensure that management has designed and 
implemented an effective internal control system (Raghunandan et al. 1998). The review of 
the internal control systems allows audit committee members to obtain an independent 
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opinion on the strength of the internal controls in the organization and makes the executive 
accountable for implementing control recommendations (Collier 1993). To fulfil this 
responsibility, audit committees must ensure that they broadly review the internal audit 
program to ensure that its scope is adequate. In addition, they need to review the results of the 
internal audits as they are related to financial reporting and internal controls (Raghunandan et 
al. 1998). 
In the UK, the Cadbury Committee (1992) requires audit committee members to review the 
company's statement on internal control systems prior to endorsement by the board. Also, the 
Smith Report (2003, Sec. 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7) recommended that "the audit committee should 
monitor the integrity of the company's internal financial controls. The audit committee, in the 
absence of other arrangements, eg. a risk committee, should assess the scope and 
effectiveness of the systems established by management to identify, assess, manage and 
monitor financial and non financial risks. Also, the audit committee should receive reports 
from management on the effectiveness of the internal control systems they have established 
and the results of any testing carried out by internal and external auditors". 
In the USA, the role of internal control in preventing and detecting fraud, has been well 
recognized in practice for many years and was recognized in federal legislation in 1977. Thus, 
the NYSE requires the audit committee to review major issues as to the adequacy of the 
company's internal controls and any special audit steps adopted in light of material control 
deficiencies. The Treadway Commission (1987) recommends that "the committee should 
review with the chief internal auditor and the independent public accountant their annual audit 
plans, including the degree of coordination of the respective plans. The committee should 
inquire as to the extent to which the planned audit scope can be relied upon to detect fraud or 
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weaknesses in internal controls". Also, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Sec. 302, requires 
signing officers to state that they have disclosed significant deficiencies and material 
weaknesses in internal controls to the audit committee. 
In Egypt, the CMA has considered the important role of the audit committee regarding 
internal control, and its statement No. 30 (2002), states that "the audit committee's main 
responsibility is to review and analyse the internal control procedures in the company. Also to 
ensure the implementing of the internal control procedures in order to monitor company assets 
and evaluate management procedures and to write reports including the results of their 
evaluations to the Board of Directors". 
5-5-9-4. The Evaluation of Exposure to Fraud 
The audit committee is not responsible for detecting fraud, but it can play an important role in 
identifying warning signs regarding potential fraudulent financial reporting (Bishop et al. 
2000, and Zacharias 2000). Prior studies examined the relation between the presence of an 
audit committee and the incidence of aggressive or fraudulent financial reporting. For 
example, McMullen (1996) found an association between the presence of audit committee and 
financial reporting quality, as measured by the absence of five factors (shareholder litigation 
alleging fraud, corrections of reported earnings, SEC enforcement actions, illegal acts, or 
auditor turnover involving disagreements between client and the auditor). Also, Abbott and 
Parker (2000a) found that the presence of an audit committee which meets minimum 
thresholds of activity and independence will be associated with a decreased likelihood of both 
fraud and non-fraudulent misstatement. 
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In the UK, according to the Smith Report (2003) the audit committee should review 
arrangements by which staff of the company may, in confidence, raise concerns about 
possible improprieties in matters of financial reporting, financial control, or any other matters. 
The audit committee's objective should be to ensure that arrangements are in place for the 
proportionate and independent investigation of such matters and for appropriate follow-up 
action, and that any matters relevant to its own responsibilities are brought to its attention. 
In the USA, the Treadway Commission (1987) states that " the audit committee should review 
the company's process of assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting and the program 
that management establishes to monitor compliance with the code of corporate conduct". 
In Egypt, the CMA has not considered the important role of the audit committee regarding the 
evaluation of exposure to fraud. Therefore, in its statement No. 30 (2002), it does not specify 
any requirement for audit committee members regarding their responsibility to review the 
company's process of assessing the risk offraudulent financial reporting. 
5-5-10. The Audit Committee's Oversight Responsibilities for External Auditing 
Braiotta et al. ( 1999) state that, external auditing is the process not only of examining 
financial statements but also of testing the underlying accounting records of the company. The 
examination is conducted by the independent auditors, who express an objective opinion 
regarding the fairness of the presentation of financial statements. Thus, there is a special 
relationship between the audit committee and the external auditors. Both share common 
objectives and their contributions reinforce one another's role in the strengthening of 
corporate accountability (Vinten and Lee 1993). A primary responsibility of the audit 
committee is to oversee the financial reporting process (Raghunandan et al. 1998). Through 
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their involvement with the audited financial statements, the independent auditors are in a 
position to provide an objective assessment of the financial reporting process. For this reason, 
the audit committee should inquire about the proposed audit scope and approach, any 
recommendations management receives from the independent auditors regarding the financial 
reporting process and related matters (Braiotta 2002). 
5-5-10-1. Recommendation for the Appointment of External Auditors 
In theory, it is shareholders through the Annual General Meeting who select, appoint, and fix 
the remuneration of the auditors. However, as Collier and Gregory (1996) point out, in 
practice it is the company management who undertake such tasks. Consequently, management 
may prefer to select an accommodating, compliant auditor who will allow management 
enough flexibility to attain earnings goals, while having sufficient credibility to allow 
management to appear to be a good steward of the shareholders' investment (Abbot and 
Parker 2000b ). The selection of the independent audit firm is an important responsibility the 
audit committee should perform in conjunction with management. Goddard and Masters 
(2000) argued that audit committees can ensure that management selects high-quality external 
auditors and may require additional work performed to satisfy their own requirements. Also, 
Bishop et al. (2000) explained that one of the audit committee's most important functions is 
recommendation or nomination of outside auditors. The committee may also recommend 
termination of the auditor if appropriate. In either instance, the recommendation is usually 
subject to ratification by the entire board. Alternatively, the committee can be vested with 
authority to select the auditors on behalf of the company. Also, in the USA, the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC 2003) states that " the auditing process may be compromised 
when a company's outside auditors view their main responsibility as serving the company's 
management rather than its full Board of Directors or its audit committee. This may occur if 
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the auditor views management as its employer with hiring, firing, and compensatory powers. 
Under these conditions, the auditor may not have the appropriate incentive to raise concerns 
and conduct an objective review. One way to help promote auditor independence, then, is for 
the auditor to be hired, evaluated and, if necessary, terminated by the audit committee". Also, 
the SEC noted that the proposed requirement that the audit committee appoint an external 
auditor does not conflict with, and would not be affected by, any requirement under a 
company's governing law or documents or other home country requirements that may require 
shareholders to elect, approve or ratify the selection of the issuer's auditor. In such an 
instance, however, if the issuer provides a recommendation or nomination of an auditor to its 
shareholders, the audit committee of the issuer would need to be responsible for making the 
recommendation or nomination. 
In the UK, the Cadbury Committee (1992) reqmres audit committee members to make 
recommendations to the Board on the appointment of the external auditor and any questions 
of resignation or dismissal. Also, the Smith Report (2003, Sec. 5.15) recommends that "the 
audit committee should have primary responsibility for making a recommendation on the 
appointment, reappointment and removal of the external auditors. This recommendation 
should be made to the board, and thence to shareholders for their approval in the general 
meeting if the board does not accept the audit committee's recommendation, it shall include in 
the directors' report a statement from the audit committee explaining its recommendation and 
shall set out reasones why the board has taken a different position". 
In the USA, the BRC ( 1999) recommends that audit committee charters specify that "the 
outside auditor is ultimately accountable to the Board of Directors and the audit committee, 
which have the ultimate authority and responsibility to select, evaluate, and, where 
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appropriate, replace the outside auditor". In this respect, the NYSE requires audit committee 
members to retain and terminate the independent auditor. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in 
sec. 301, recommends that "the audit committee is directly responsible for the appointment of 
the external auditors". Also, The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC 2003) states that 
"the audit committee of each listed issuer, in its capacity as a committee of the Board of 
Directors, must be directly responsible for the appointment of any registered public 
accounting firm engaged for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or performing 
other audits, review or attest services for the listed issuer". 
In Egypt, article ( 1 03) of law No. 159 of 1981 which was enacted to govern the work of 
private auditors, requires each corporation to have at least one auditor who is to be appointed 
by the general assembly in General Annual Meeting, but in practice it is the company 
management who undertake such tasks. Consequently, the selection process may be distorted 
by management. For public companies this selection problem does not apply, because "The 
Central Auditing Organization" appoints the external public auditors for these entities which 
means that neither management nor directors have the right to select. Consequently, the role 
of management in selecting external auditors is limited to private entities only. But, the 
change from a command economy to a free market economy, accompanied by a movement 
from public to private entities, is likely to increase concern regarding the auditor selection 
dilemma. At the same time, the CMA in its statement, does not specify any requirements 
regarding audit committee members making recommendations for the appointment, 
reappointment or removal of external auditors. 
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5-5-10-2. Involvement in the Audit Fee Negotiation Process 
Ab bott and Parker (2000b) argue that the product of the audit process is often viewed as a 
homogenous, pricing of this product (i.e. the audit fee) that is actually subject to negotiation 
between the client and the auditor. As in the case of any negotiation process, the outcome of 
this process, or audit fee, is contingent upon the relative power of the negotiating parties. The 
existence of competing audit firms who are ready to replace the incumbent auditor provides a 
major source of client negotiating power. In particular, the threat, supported by the ability to 
replace auditors with a competitor, provides management with an advantage when negotiating 
audit fees (Collier and Gregory 1996). Audit committees should keep under review the overall 
financial relationship between the company and its auditors to ensure a balance between the 
maintenance of objectivity and value for money (Vinten 1998). The link between audit 
committees and, the quality of external audit work and the audit fee has long been recognized 
in the literature. For example, Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) identified the "sanctionary power" 
of audit committees which was defined as "the audit committee's responsibility to determine 
the scope and compensation of external auditors". Collier and Gregory (1996) find that, audit 
committees are at least partially effective in preventing reduction in the audit fee to levels 
where the quality of the audit may be compromised. Also, Carcello and Neal (2000b) 
postulate that, the existence of an independent and active audit committee could impact on the 
audit fee negotiation process, specifically, by reducing the overall threat of the auditor's 
dismissal and by strengthening the auditor's relative bargaining position during audit fee 
negotiations. 
In the UK, the Smith Report (2003, Sec. 5.21) requires that "the audit committee should 
satisfy itself that the level of fee payable in respect of the audit services provided is 
appropriate and that an effective audit can be conducted for such a fee. 
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In the USA, the BRC (1999) reqmres the audit committee to review all auditor-client 
economic relationships to determine their impact on the objectivity of the auditor's work. 
Consequently, an audit committee could influence management to lessen audit fee pressures 
to ensure greater auditor vigilance during negotiations concerning financial reporting matters. 
In Egypt, regarding the public auditor's situation in the audit fee negotiation problem, the 
negotiation of audit fees between entities and public auditors does not exist because "The 
Central Auditing Organization" which helps the People's Assembly perform its controlling 
function, does not receive fees from the entities whose financial statements it audits. 
Consequently, the role of the audit committee in supporting the auditors in the audit fee 
negotiations with company management is limited to the private auditors only. However 
recent changes have increased the demand for establishing audit committees in Egypt to 
support the external auditors in negotiating audit fees which will have an effect on the audit 
quality. At the same time, the CMA in its statement, does not specify any requirements for 
audit committee members to keep under review the overall financial relationship between the 
company and its auditors to ensure a balance between audit quality and value for money, and 
support the auditors in the audit fee negotiations with company management . 
5-5-10-2. Ensure the Independence of the External Auditor 
Concern about standards of financial reporting has in part focused on the need to guarantee 
auditor independence, protecting auditors from management pressure to confirm biased or 
fraudulent reports (Spira 1999). This reflects the widespread assumption that auditor 
independence is fundamental to the integrity of financial reporting: if auditors are not 
independent, their reports may not be objective and this may undermine the public perception 
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of the value of their attestation (Power 1997). The presence of the audit committee enhances 
the visibility of the auditors' independence. By interposing a committee of non-executive 
directors between operating management and the external auditors, both sides are given a 
forum to discuss matters considered to be significant to the company on a normal and regular 
basis. It also provides a mechanism which reduces the possibility of aggressive management 
being over dominating in its relationship with auditors (Vinten and Lee 1993). Deli and Gillan 
(2000) argue that, an independent audit committee reinforces the independence of the 
corporation's external auditor, and thereby helps assure that the auditor will have free rein in 
the audit process. 
In this respect, in the UK, the Smith Report (2003, Sec. 5.22) recommends that " the audit 
committee should have procedures to ensure the independence and objectivity of the external 
auditor annually, taking into consideration relevant UK professional and regulatory 
requirements". 
Along these lines, in the USA, the Treadway Commission (1987) recommends that "the audit 
committee should review management's evaluation of factors related to the independence of 
the company's public accountant. Both the audit committee and management should assist the 
public accountant in preserving his independence". The Independence Standards Board (ISB 
1999), which sets independence rules for public entities, has approved its first standard. This 
standard requires independent auditors to discuss with, and disclose to, the audit committee 
any relationships with public audit clients that in the auditor's professional judgement may 
reasonably be thought to bear on their independence. The BRC (1999) recommends that, the 
listing rules for both the NYSE and the NASD require that the audit committee charter for 
every listed company specify that the audit committee is responsible for ensuring its receipt 
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from the outside auditors of a formal written statement delineating all relationships between 
the auditor and the company. Also, the SEC has required that companies provide in their 
annual reports a report from the audit committee to shareholders that disclose that the audit 
committee has reviewed these issues with the external auditor. 
In Egypt, article (1 04) of law No. 159 of 1981 which was enacted to govern the work of 
private auditors and article (1) of law No.l44 of 1988 which was enacted to govern the work 
of public auditors, were intended to ensure the auditors' independence by prohibiting them 
from participating in the formation of corporations, being members of their Boards of 
Directors, or permanently performing any technical, administrative, or consulting duties. 
Despite this concern about the importance of auditors' independence in Egypt, the CMA in its 
statement, does not specify any requirements for audit committee members to have 
procedures to ensure the independence and objectivity of the external auditor. 
5-5-10-4. Information on Auditor-Management Disputes 
DeZoort et al (2001) explained that, Any auditor-client negotiation of the client's financial 
statements affects the flow of accounting information to investors and other information users. 
Audit committees provide critical oversight of financial reporting and auditing processes 
(BRC 1999, NACD 2000, and DeZoort et al. 2001). Within this oversight context, matters 
reported to audit committees are frequently technical in nature and can reflect disagreements 
between auditors and management. Audit committees play an important role in mediating 
these disputes (SAS No. 61, SAS No. 89, and DeZoort et al.2001). Carcello and Neal (2000b) 
argue that, audit committees with external auditor engagement rights can effectively shield the 
external auditor from dismissal threats arising from disagreements with management. So that, 
the audit committee must regularly review with the external auditor any difficulties 
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encountered in the course of the audit, including any restrictions on the scope of the auditor's 
activities or access to requested information or any significant disagreement with management 
(Sweeney and Vallario 2002). 
Survey research and published cases suggest that auditors are reporting and consulting with at 
least some audit committees in auditor-management disagreements (DeZoort and Salterio 
2001 ). However, the evidence regarding perceived audit committee usefulness in solving such 
disputes indicates great diversity in practice. For example, as reported by Reinstein and 
Weirich ( 1996), audit committee members tend to support the auditors rather than 
management in audit disputes. Such support appears to strengthen the auditor's independence 
when dealing with company management. Beattie et al. (2000) surveyed audit partners and 
CFOs of large publicly traded UK companies and found a tendency for firms with audit 
committees to enter into fewer negotiations but more informal discussions about accounting 
policy disputes than did firms without audit committees. Gib bins et al. (200 1) surveyed 
Canadian audit partners and found they, on average, rated the audit committee as only 
moderately important in auditor-client negotiations over accounting policy disputes. DeZoort 
and Salterio (2001) found that, greater independent director experience and greater audit 
knowledge was associated with higher audit committee member support for an auditor in 
disputes with client management. 
In the UK, the Smith Report (2003, Sec. 3.8 and 5.18) requires that "the audit committee 
should, at least annually, meet the external auditor, without management, to discuss issues 
arising from the audit. ........... if the external auditor resigns, the audit committee should 
investigate the issues giving rise to such resignation and consider whether any action is 
required". Along these lines, in the USA, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Sec. 301, requires 
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that, the audit committee be responsible for resolution of disagreements between management 
and the auditor regarding financial reporting. In Egypt, law No. 159 of 1981 which was 
enacted to govern the work of private auditors, and No.144 of 1988 which was enacted to 
govern the work of public auditors, do not specify how to solve disputes which can exist 
between auditors and management related to the auditing process and accounting policy. 
Also, the CMA in its statement, does not specify any requirements for audit committee 
members to have a role in auditor-management disputes. 
5-5-10-5. The Nature and Magnitude of Non-Audit Services 
While the audit committee focuses primarily on the effectiveness of the audit, it also should 
be aware of the other services the audit firm can provide (Price Waterhouse 1999). Non-audit 
services may include tax planning, consultancy on information technology strategy, system 
design, executive recruitment and staff training, and pension plan advice (Vinten and Lee 
1993). Management may engage the auditing firm for a variety ofspecial services because it 
is cost-effective, and often audit quality is enhanced by the increased knowledge the auditors 
gain from performing these services (Price Water House 1999). In this respect, the Treadway 
Commission (1987) explained that, one issue concerning public accountant's independence 
(the possible adverse effect of management advisory services performed for audit clients) has 
been debated continually over the past decade. Strong opinions have been expressed on both 
sides of the issue. First, some argue that the independent public accountant's performance of 
management advisory services improves the quality of audits. They claim that in the process 
of advising management the independent public accountant acquires a deeper understanding 
of the client's business. Many in the public accounting profession also maintain that benefits 
accrue to the audit process when the independent public accountant is already familiar with 
the company's operations. Second, others believe that some management advisory services 
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place independent public accountants in the role of management, add commercial pressures to 
the audit examination and, as a result, impair independence. These individuals also argue that, 
at the very least, the public accountant's performance of management advisory services raises 
the perception of impaired independence. As a result, the Commission ended by requiring 
audit committees to weigh carefully the possible advantages of such use against the possible 
effects it may have on the public accountant's independence. 
In the UK, the Smith Report (2003 Sec. 5.26) requires that "the audit committee should 
develop and recommend to the board the company's policy in relation to the provision of non-
audit services by the auditor. The audit committee's objective should be to ensure that the 
provision of such services does not impair the external auditor's independence or objectivity. 
In this context, the audit committee should consider: 
(1) whether or not the skills and experience of the audit firm make it a suitable 
supplier of non audit service; 
(2) whether or not there are safeguards in place to ensure that there is no threat to 
objectivity and independence in the conduct of the audit resulting from the 
provision of such services by external auditors; 
(3) the nature of the non-audit services, the related fee levels and the fee levels 
individually, and in aggregate relative to the audit fee; and 
(4) criteria which govern the compensation of the individuals performing the audit". 
Along these lines, in the USA, the Treadway Commission (1987) recommends that "before 
the beginning of each year, the audit committee should review management's plans for 
engaging the company's independent public accountant to perform management advisory 
services during the coming year, considering both the types of services that may be rendered 
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and the projected fees". Also, the NYSE requires the audit committee to have sole authority to 
approve all significant non-audit engagements with the independent auditor. Also, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, Sec. 202, requires that, the audit committee must pre-approve all 
non-audit services provided by the external auditor, and the company must disclose the audit 
committee's approval of any non-audit services in periodic reports filed with the SEC. 
In Egypt, despite the above requirements for audit committee members to review the nature 
and magnitude of non-audit services in the UK and the USA, the CMA in its statement does 
not recommend any requirements for audit committee related to this issue. 
5-5-11. Audit Committee Oversight Responsibilities for Internal Auditing 
As part of the monitoring component of the entity's system of internal control, the scope of 
the internal audit effort extends to several types of audits: financial, operational, compliance, 
ethics and fraud, systems and risk audits (Braiotta 2002). Audit committees should review the 
internal audit plan as well as the organizational structure and composition of the internal audit 
group (Vinten and Lee 1993 and Scarbrough et al. 1998). The Institute of Internal Auditors 
(IIA 1993) states that, internal auditing can play an important role in preventing errors and 
fraud, and is a useful mechanism in the checks and balances of effective corporate 
governance. Thus, the goals of audit committees and internal auditing are closely intertwined, 
and the ability of the audit committee and internal auditing to work together significantly 
impacts on the effectiveness of the audit committee in fulfilling its responsibility to the Board 
of Directors, shareholders, and other outside parties. Also, the Treadway Commission (1987) 
states that, the effectiveness of a company's internal audit function depends a great deal on 
the objectivity of the chief internal auditor and his staff. Public companies should ensure that 
their internal auditors are free to perform their functions in an objective manner, without 
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interference and able to report findings to the appropriate parties for corrective action. Three 
principal factors contribute to independence and objectivity: the organizational positioning of 
the function, the corporate stature of the chief internal auditor, and the reporting relationship 
of the chief internal auditor to the audit committee. Consequently, an important role in the 
corporate governance and control process is the interaction between audit committees and 
internal auditing (Scarbrough et al. 1998). Corporate audit committees have assumed a 
significant role in the financial reporting process (Collier 1993). In fulfilling their expanded 
oversight responsibilities, audit committees must rely on internal auditors for much of their 
information concerning corporate activities. In this respect, the Treadway Commission (1987) 
states that "internal auditors also provide services to the organization broader than those 
relating to financial auditing. Operational auditing, acquisition reviews, and special 
investigations are a few examples. These services benefit the company substantially and give 
the internal auditor in-depth knowledge of many different aspects of the company's 
operations. This unique perspective enables internal auditors to be highly effective in 
detecting fraudulent financial reporting, practically if internal auditors systematically consider 
the results and potential impact of the non-financial audits on the financial statements". 
Bishop et al. (2000) explained that, when audit committees have only independent directors, 
there are potential information asymmetries between the independent directors and 
management. Internal auditing is a valuable resource that can provide the information needed 
for audit committees to meet their governance mandate (Scarbrough et al. 1998). Internal 
auditing can play an important role in preventing errors and fraud, and is a useful mechanism 
in the checks and balances of effective corporate governance. Thus, the goals of audit 
committees and internal auditing are closely intertwined, and the ability of the audit 
committee and internal auditing to work together significantly impacts upon the effectiveness 
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of the audit committee in fulfilling its responsibilities to the Board of Directors, shareholders, 
and other outside parties (Scarbrough et al. 1998 and Atkins 2002). 
In the UK, the Cadbury Committee (1992) argued, "where an internal audit function exists, 
the audit committee must ensure that it is adequately resourced and has appropriate standing 
within the company. Also, an internal audit function is well placed to undertake investigations 
on behalf of the audit committee and to follow up any suspicion of fraud. It is essential that 
heads of internal audits should have unrestricted access to the chairman of the audit 
committee in order to ensure the independence of their position". 
Along these lines, the Smith Report (2003, Sec. 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12) recommends that the 
audit committee should: 
(1) monitor and review the internal audit activities. Where there is no internal audit 
function, the audit committee should consider annually where there is a need for 
an internal audit function and make recommendations to the board; 
(2) review and approve the internal audit function's remit, having regard to the 
complementary roles of the internal and external audit functions. The audit 
committee should ensure that the function has the necessary resources and access 
to information to enable it to fulfil its mandate; and 
(3) approve the appointment or termination of appointment of the head of the 
internal audit. 
In the USA, the Treadway Commission (1987) recommends that "management and the audit 
committee should ensure that the internal auditors' involvement in the audit of the entire 
financial reporting process is appropriate and properly coordinated with the independent 
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public accountant". The NYSE requires the audit committee to discuss the work plan of the 
internal audit department to be certain it addresses the company's significant risks and it is 
relevant to the financial reporting process. Also, the budget, staffing and reporting lines of this 
function warrant consideration by the audit committee. The BRC (1999) encourages the audit 
committee to have mechanisms in place to facilitate confidential exchanges and independent 
communication and information flow between the audit committee and the internal auditor to 
improve the effectiveness ofboth. 
In Egypt, despite the CMA having considered the important role of the audit committee 
regarding internal control, it does not specify any requirement for audit committee members 
to review the internal auditing function or any interaction between the audit committee and 
internal auditing. 
In summary, it is possible that differences in the regulatory environment and the importance 
assigned to corporate governance, as well as other cultural factors, could significantly 
influence the nature of the audit committees' legal framework in the USA, the UK, and Egypt. 
Table 5-1 shows a comparison of the legal frameworks for audit committees in the three 
countries This Table shows that the oversight responsibilities for audit committees in the 
USA and UK are very similar but in Egypt there are a number of audit committee oversight 
responsibilities which are not specified. This finding is consistent with Babic (200 1) who 
argued that in developed market economies, a system of corporate governance has been built 
gradually through centuries, and today it can be defined as a "complex mosaic" consisting of 
laws, regulations, politics, public institutions, professional associations and ethics codes. 
However, in transition economy countries a lot of details of the mosaic are still missing. 
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Table 5-l Comparison of audit committees' legal frameworks in the USA, UK, and Egypt 
USA UK Egypt 
Recommended by: Recommended by: Recommended by: 
Audit committee charter Treadway Commission Cadbury Committee Not available (1987), and BRC (1999) ( 1992), and Smith Report 
(2003) 
Audit committee member NYSE (1978), Treadway Cadbury Committee Capital Market 
independence Commission (1987), BRT (1992), and Smith Report Authority (2002) 
(2002), BRC (1999), (2003) 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. (2002), 
and SEC (2003) 
Audit committee member Institute of Internal Smith Report (2003) Capital Market 
experience Auditors (1993), BRC Authority (2002) 
(1999), and Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. (2002) 
Audit committee size Treadway Commission Cadbury Committee Capital Market 
( 1987), NASD (2000), and (1992), and Smith Report Authority (2002) 
BRC (1999) (2003) 
Audit committee meetings Treadway Commission Smith Report (2003) Not available 
(1987) 
Resources and authority of Treadway Commission Cadbury Committee Not available 
the audit committee (1987), Sarbanes-Oxley Act. ( 1992), and Smith Report 
(2002), and SEC (2003) (2003) 
Audit committee members Institute of Internal Smith Report (2003) Not available 
training Auditors (1993), and 
Treadway Commission 
(1987) 
Audit committee report Treadway Commission Smith Report (2003) Not available 
( 1987), Public Oversight 
Board (1993), and BRC 
(1992) 
Audit committee's oversight 
responsibilities for financial 
reporting: 
Treadway Commission Cadbury Committee 1992), Capital Market review all financial statements, 
whether interim or annual. (1987), BRC (1999), and Combined Code (1999), Authority (2002) SEC (2003) and Smith Report (2003) 
review all existing accounting Treadway Commission Smith Report (2003) Capital Market 
policies. (1987), BRC (1999),and Authority (2002) 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
review systems of internal Tread way Commission Cadbury Committee (1992) Capital Market 
control. (1987), Sarbanes-Oxley ,Turnbull Report (1999 ), Authority (2002) 
Act (2002), and SEC (2003) Combined Code (1999), 
and Smith Report (2003) 
evaluate exposure to fraud. Treadway Commission Smith Report (2003) Not available 
(1987 and SAS No. 82 
Audit committee's oversight 
responsibilities for external 
auditing: 
Treadway Commission Cad bury Committee 1992), 
recommend ofthe appointment Not available 
of external auditors. (1987), BRC ( 1999) Combined Code ( 1999), Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), and Smith Report (2003) 
and SEC (2003) 
involvement in the audit fee BRC (1999) Smith Report (2003) Not available 
negotiation process 
137 
ensure the independence of Treadway Commission Combined Code ( 1999), Not available 
external auditor (1987), BRC ( 1999), and Smith Report (2003) 
Independent Standards Board 
(1999),Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002), and SEC (2003) 
Information on auditor- NYSE ( 1999), and Sarbanes- Smith Report (2003) Not available 
management dispute Oxley Act (2002) 
the nature and magnitude of Treadway Commission Combined Code ( 1999), Not available 
non-audit services. (1987), NYSE ( 1999), and and Smith Report (2003) 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
Audit committee's oversight Treadway Commission Cadbury Committee Not available 
responsibilities for internal (1987), and BRC (1992) (1992), and Smith Report 
auditing: (2003) 
5-6. Summary 
It is possible that differences in the regulatory environment and the importance assigned to 
corporate governance, as well as other cultural factors, could significantly influence the nature 
of the legal framework of audit committees in the USA, the UK, and Egypt. This chapter has 
been concerned with explaining the legal framework for audit committees in Egypt in the 
light of the legal framework in the UK and the USA in order to understand the differences 
between the three countries. 
The audit committee concept is still a new phenomenon in Egypt. The legal framework for 
audit committees in Egypt is weak in many areas: (1) the Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
does not require the listed companies on Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE) to 
adopt a formal written charter for their audit committees, (2) the requirement for independent 
audit committee members appears in the Capital Market Authority statement, but, 
"independence" requirements for audit committee members, are not defined, (3) also, despite 
the CMA considering the importance of audit committee member experience, its decision 
does not specify any requirements for financial expertise of audit committee members, (4) the 
CMA does not specify any recommendations related to the annual number of the audit 
committee meetings, {5) the CMA does not specify any recommendations related to the audit 
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committee's resources and authority, (6) also, the CMA does not specify any 
recommendations to the listed companies regarding audit committee members' training, (7) 
and finally, the CMA does not require companies to disclose the audit committee report in 
their annual reports. 
Audit committee effectiveness is viewed as the competency with which the audit committee 
carries out its specific oversight responsibilities. Therefore, audit committee members must be 
critically aware of their responsibilities; they must also completely understand them. How the 
responsibilities are carried out may vary, but a failure to address them may be a significant 
detriment to the audit committee, the board, and most of all the shareholders. Thus, this 
chapter also aims to provide an insight into the legal framework for the oversight 
responsibilities of audit committees in the UK, USA, and Egypt. 
The researcher found that, in general because the close economic ties between the UK and the 
USA with respect to the degree of market integration and the organisation of transactions and 
in relation to other socio-cultural respects, the oversight responsibilities for audit committees 
in the USA and UK are very similar. However, in Egypt there are a number of audit 
committee oversight responsibilities which are not specified in the CMA statement: (1) 
evaluation of exposure to fraud, (2) the appointment, reappointment and removal of the 
external auditors, (3) involvement in the audit fee negotiation process, (4) ensuring the 
independence of the external auditor, (5) requesting to be informed in auditor-management 
disputes, ( 6) the review of the nature and magnitude of non-audit services, and (7) the review 
of the internal auditing function or any interaction between audit committee and internal 
auditing. The remaining oversight responsibilities (the review of all financial statements, 
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whether interim or annual, all existing accounting policies, and all systems of internal 
control) in Egypt are similar to the USA and UK legal framework. 
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Chapter Six: Research Methodology 
6-1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter the literature of institutional economics, the legal framework for audit 
committees in the USA, the UK, and Egypt, and audit committee effectiveness, helps to shape 
the theoretical framework for this research and contributes to the selection of its methodology. 
The objectives of the study, reasons for choosing the topic, and the research questions were 
explained in chapter 1, and this chapter commences by defining the research methodology. It 
continues by documenting the research populations, and the response rates. The chapter 
concludes by describing the research pilot study. 
6-2. Methodology of the Study 
The methodology usually investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin 1994). 
The research may be categorised into two distinct types: qualitative and quantitative based on 
the research nature, including the objectives and the questions of the research and the type of 
the empirical data. 
Qualitative research, broadly defined, means any kind of research that produces findings not 
arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification (Hyde 2000). 
One the other hand the quantitative researcher seeks causal determination, prediction, and 
generalization of findings (Amaratunga et al. 2002). Quantitative research uses methods 
adopted from the physical sciences that are designed to ensure objectivity, generalizability 
and reliability. These techniques cover the ways research participants are selected randomly 
from the study population in an unbiased manner, the standardized questionnaire they receive 
and the statistical methods used to test predetermined hypotheses regarding the relationships 
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between specific variables. The researcher is considered external to the actual research, and 
results are expected to be replicable no matter who conducts the research (Weerd-Nederhof 
2001). The strengths of the quantitative paradigm are that its methods produce quantifiable, 
reliable data that are usually generalizable to some larger population (Hyde 2000). 
In this study the quantitative approach view is appropriate because: firstly, the researcher 
needs to understand audit committees' oversight responsibilities from the internal perspective 
of the UK and Egyptian audit committee members in comparison with the DeZoort (1997) 
study in the USA, and secondly, the researcher needs to conduct the study through intense 
contact with field or life situations in order to examine the audit committees effectiveness in 
the public banking sector in Egypt and discover the obstacles which face them. Finally, the 
researcher needs to generalize this study's findings from public banking sector to the wider 
business environment in Egypt. 
6-3. The Research Strategy 
According to Yin ( 1994 ), research strategy should be chosen as a function of the research 
situation. Although each strategy has its own characteristics, there are overlapping areas, 
which bring complexity to the process of strategy selection. And in order to avoid gross 
misfits between the desired outcome and the chosen strategy, Yin stresses that the type of 
question posed; the control over actual behavioural elements; and the degree of focus on 
historical or contemporary events; are the conditions which should provide the grounds for 
strategy choice. Table 6-1 depicts the outcome of the intersection between most common 
research strategies and the three conditions identified above. It may be clear from the table 
that a case study research strategy is consider to have a distinct advantage when a "how" or 
"why" (or exploratory "what") question is being asked about a contemporary set of events 
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over which the investigator has little or no control (Weerd-Nederhof2001). The key feature of 
the case study approach is not method or data but the emphasis on understanding processes as 
they occur in their context (Amaratunga et al. 2002). 
Table 6-1. Research strategies versus characteristics 
Strategy Form of research Requires control over Focus in contemporary 
Question behavioural events? events? 
Experiment How, Why Yes Yes 
Survey Who, What, Where, How No Yes 
many, How much 
Archival analysis How, Why No Yes/No 
History How, Why No No 
Case study How, Why No Yes 
Source: Yin (1994) 
This study used survey and case study scenario strategies. Survey strategy to investigate the 
differences in audit committee members' perception of their oversight responsibilities 
between the USA, the UK, and Egypt. Case study scenario strategy to measure the 
effectiveness of audit committees m the public banking sector in Egypt and assess the 
relationship between independence and experience of audit committee's members and the 
effectiveness of the audit committees. 
6-3-1. Survey Strategy 
This study used the survey strategy m order to examme audit committee oversight 
responsibilities from the internal perspective of the UK and Egyptian audit committee 
members in comparison with the DeZoort (1997) study in the USA. The survey used 
Wolinzer's (1995) list of seventeen prescribed audit committee objectives, which DeZoort 
had used for audit committee members in the USA. The survey related to accounting and 
reporting, auditors and auditing, and corporate governance in general. This was used as a 
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basis to assess audit committee members' abilities to recognize their assigned objectives and 
explore their perceptions of the key tasks. 
Wolinzer's (1995) set of seventeen audit committee objectives provided a basis for measuring 
audit committee members' responses, which DeZoort (1997) used in the USA survey of audit 
committee members see Table 6-2. The respondents were asked three questions related to 
their assigned responsibilities: ( 1) is the objective assigned formally to your committee? (2) is 
the objective performed, but not assigned to your committee? (3) is the objective appropriate 
for audit committees? (See appendix C). 
Table 6-2: Wolinzer' s list of seventeen prescribed audit committee' oversight responsibilities 
Financial Reporting: 
(OBJI) Review all financial statements, whether interim or annual. 
(OBJ2) Review all existing accounting policies. 
(OBJ3) Review systems of internal control. 
(OBJ4) Evaluate exposure to fraud. 
(OBJS) Review all significant transactions. 
(OBJ6) Appraise key management estimates, judgments and valuations. 
Auditing: 
(OBJ7) Recommend the appointment of and fee for the external auditors. 
(OBJ8) Review the plans for, and the effectiveness of, the internal and external auditors. 
(OBJ9) Review the arrangements for coordinating the work done by internal and external auditors. 
(OBJI 0) Review the external auditor's management letter. 
(OBJll) Determine that auditors are free from undue influence and management interference. 
(OBJ12) Request to be informed if there is a dispute between auditors and managers. 
(OBJ13) Monitor the resources allocated to the internal auditing function. 
(OBJ14) Review the nature and magnitude offees paid to the auditors for non-audit services. 
Other Corporate Governance: 
(OBJIS) Facilitate communication between the external auditors and the board of directors. 
(OBJ16) Review corporate policies and practices in light of ethical considerations. 
(OBJ17) Monitor compliance with the company's code of conduct. 
The first question provides a basis for assessing the association between audit committee 
members' perceptions of their assigned oversight objectives and assigned responsibilities, 
which are identified in the annual reports of the sample companies. 
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The second question addresses the possibility that audit committee members may perform 
oversight objectives that are not assigned formally. 
The third question provides an opportunity for audit committee members to make normative 
statements about the list of proposed oversight responsibilities. This feedback could provide a 
useful insight into how audit committee members feel about recommendations to expand the 
audit committee oversight role in corporate governance (DeZoort 1997). 
6-3-1-l.The UK Study Population and Sample 
The UK sample consisted of 200 audit committee members randomly selected from the top 
250 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange in the Financial Times 1,000 for the 
year 2002. The Financial Times 1,000 is an annual listing of the largest U.K. companies and 
provides a mix of organisations, that are significant in the British economy. This is a popular 
starting point for study populations in finance, auditing, accounting and management research 
(Collier 1993). The population is limited to the Times top 250 because such companies are 
likely to be the most responsive to public pressures for the acceptance of a broader range of 
oversight responsibilities for their audit committee members. 
The top 250 companies were firstly checked to ensure that each company was still trading and 
not the subsidiary of another member of the study population. Therefore, two companies 
which were defunct, had been taken over by or were subsidiaries of companies already on the 
list, were identified and excluded (London Merchant Securities Dfd and P Z Cussons A). 
Secondly, based on the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC 1999) recommendation that the NYSE 
and NASD in the USA require listed companies with market capitalization above $200 
million to have audit committees, the top 250 were checked to ensure that each company had 
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market capitalisation above $200 million or the equivalent in English pounds. Therefore, one 
company, which had market capitalisation of under $200 million or equivalent in English 
pounds, was identified and excluded (London Merchant Securities Dfd, this company had 
already been excluded under the first criterion). This reduced the population to 248 companies 
(See Appendix A for a detailed listing supporting the above analysis). 
Each audit committee member received an introductory letter, a copy of the research 
instrument and a self-addressed stamped return envelope. All individuals were informed that 
their responses would remain confidential. In addition, all respondents were offered a 
summary of the results upon request. Also, in order to maximize the response rate, surveys 
were directed to the audit committee member's home addresses, which were traced using the 
FAME database. 
Data Collection and Response Rate 
As is shown in Table 6-3, responses were received from 110 audit committee members giving 
a usable response rate of 55% (the response rate in the DeZoort survey in the USA was 35%). 
Table 6-3 shows an alternative classification approach through a comparison of FTSE 
industrial grouping of respondents and non-respondents. There is some variation among the 
response rates of different industrial groups especially the 'other' category, which 
summarised all industrial groups with less than five audit committee members in the sample. 
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Table 6-3: Analysis of the UK sample and responses by FTSE industrial group 
FTSE Industrial Group Sample of ACMs in U.K No. %Responses 
Listed Companies Of responses Rate 
Oil & Gas 11 7 63 
Media & Photography 15 8 53 
Support service 5 3 60 
Speciality & Other finance 9 6 66 
Mining 4 2 50 
Information technology 5 3 60 
hardware 6 4 66 
Transport 
Food production & processors 5 3 60 
Pharmaceuticals 10 5 50 
Software & Computer service 
Life assurance 14 7 50 
Utilities other 10 5 50 
Aerospace & Defence 10 6 60 
Constructions & Building 5 3 60 
materials 13 7 54 
Chemicals 6 3 50 
Engineering & Machinery 6 4 66 
Banks 9 5 55 
Insurance 5 3 60 
Tobacco 5 3 60 
Real estate 10 5 50 
Investment companies 5 3 60 
General retailers 14 8 57 
Others 18 7 38 
Total 200 110 55 
6-3-1-2: Egyptian study Population and Sample 
The Egyptian sample consisted of 65 audit committee members randomly selected from the 
top 100 companies listed on the Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE), for the year 
2002, based on their market capitalization. The top 100 companies were first checked to 
ensure that each company was still trading and not the subsidiary of another member of the 
study population. Secondly, the top 100 were also checked to ensure that each company had a 
market capitalisation above $200 million or the equivalent in Egyptian pounds. This reduced 
the population to 34 companies (See Appendix B for a detailed listing supporting the above 
analysis). 
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Data Collection and Response Rate: 
As is shown in Table 6-4, responses were received from 41 audit committee members giving 
a usable response rate of 63%. Table 6-4 shows an alternative approach through a comparison 
of CASE industrial grouping of respondents and non-respondents. The response rate for the 
financial services group was 78%, this response rate is through to be high in comparisons with 
the other groups because the financial services were the first sector to establish audit 
committees in Egypt following the Central Bank of Egypt Chairman's decision in 2000. 
Table 6-4: Analysis of Egypt sample and responses by CASE industrial group 
No. Sample of ACMs in No. %Responses 
CASE Industrial Group Of Companies CASE Listed Of responses Rate 
Companies 
Financial Services 9 23 18 78% 
Building Material & 
Constrictions 7 16 8 50% 
Utilities 3 5 2 40% 
Mining& Gas 3 7 3 43% 
Entertainment 3 5 3 60% 
Food & Beverage 3 4 2 50% 
Holding Companies 2 4 2 50% 
Housing & Real Estate 2 3 1 33% 
Others 2 3 2 66% 
Total 34 65 41 63% 
Benke and Street (1992) explained that "when conducting survey research, the researcher 
must show that selection bias and I or non-response bias is not important to the results of the 
survey. The popular approach to non-response bias is to argue that bias does not exist. 
Normally this is done by comparing early responses to late responses. The researcher 
compares the two groups and if no differences are found in their responses, judges the results 
as unbiased and, therefore, reliable". In this study, an analysis of 'early' and 'late' responses 
for the UK and Egyptian samples was undertaken. In particular, early responses were defined 
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as those received within 20 days after the surveys were sent and late responses as those 
received after 20 days from when the surveys were sent (Coram et al. 2001). Thus, in the UK 
sample, there were 62 early respondents and 48 late respondents and in the Egyptian sample 
there were 26 early respondents and 15 late respondents. The results in Table 6-4 were based 
on the Mann-Whitney U test (MWU) and the power-efficiency is close to 95% for moderately 
large samples (Siegel and Castellan 1988). The results revealed no evidence of a non-response 
bias for any of the selected parameters (P > .05). 
Table 6-5: Descriptive statistics comparing early and late response in the UK and Egypt 
samples 
Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon W z Asymp. Sig. 
u (2- tailed) 
UK SamQle: 
Q1 1050.5 3396.5 -2.367 .799 
Q2 1410.0 2313.0 -,112 .911 
Q3 1421.0 2324.0 -,044 .965 
Egy:Qt SamQle: 
Q1 194.5 314.5 -.014 .989 
Q2 170.0 521.0 -.689 .491 
Q3 171.0 522.5 -.650 .519 
6-3-2. Case Study Scenario Strategy 
Yin (1994) defines the case study as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context and where the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident". In this study, case study scenario approach was used to 
measure the effectiveness of audit committees in the public banking sector in Egypt and 
assess the relationship between the independence and experience of audit committee members 
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and effectiveness of the audit committees. The use of a case study scenario approach in 
measuring effectiveness is reasonably widespread in the audit literature, for example: 
Joyce and Biddle (1981) used the case study scenario approach when conducting a series of 
experiments to test for the presence of anchoring in audit judgments. The first experiment 
asked auditors to assess the likelihood of significant management fraud among clients audited 
by the Big Eight firms. In the second experiment, subjects were required to plan the extent of 
substantive testing. Two final experiments required auditors to assess the likely success of a 
new product introduction needed by the client to remain a going concern, followed by a 
decision on the nature of the appropriate opinion. Joyce and Biddle found that anchoring was 
present in the first set of experiments, which assessed management fraud, but was not clearly 
exhibited in the other. 
Wright (1988) used the case study scenario approach when examining the level of reliance on 
prior working papers and how such reliance affects: (1) auditor adaptability, (2) audit 
efficiency, (3) the planned detection of perpetuating errors, and (4) overall effectiveness of 
audit programmes. Practising auditors were asked to design a substantive audit programme for 
a case where changes in the client's environment dictated additional procedures. Wright found 
that the effectiveness and efficiency of an audit largely rests with the nature of the evidence 
gathered. 
Grasso and Kaplan (1998) used the same approach when examining the extent to which 
educational background and demographic factors are associated with students' personal 
standards regarding ethical issues involving tax professionals. Students were given ten brief 
scenarios focusing on the ethical and professional responsibilities of CP As with tax practices. 
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For each scenario, the students were asked whether they believed the opinion and whether the 
situation described was considered appropriate under existing professional standards, and 
whether they personally believed the opinion or situation described was appropriate. They 
were also asked whether or not they believed that evading taxes is immoral. The results 
indicated that female students had higher personal ethical standards regarding issues involving 
tax professionals than did male students. Also, students aspiring to be tax professionals had 
higher ethical standards regarding issues involving tax than those that did not. 
Lord and DeZoort (200 1) used the same approach in an experiment which examined the 
influence of social pressures within the accounting firm and their affect on auditors' 
willingness to sign-off on financial statements that are materially misstated. The case scenario 
instructed the study participants to portray a senior accountant that recently had been assigned 
to a new client. The participants were told they were replacing another senior that had served 
the client for several years but who had been assigned other responsibilities. The results 
indicate that obedience pressure significantly increased auditors' willingness to sign-off on an 
account balance that was materially misstated. 
Coram et al. (200 1) used this approach when examining the effects of time budget pressure, 
risk associated with task, and audit test in reduced audit quality. They defined reduced audit 
quality as intentional action taken by an auditor during an engagement which reduces 
evidence-gathering effectiveness inappropriately: The scenario approach was used to 
formulate two situations depending on whether the audit had 'high time budget pressure' or 
'low time budget pressure'. In the high time budget pressure scenario, the auditor received a 
complaint from the client that the budget was too high. In the low time budget pressure 
scenario, the audit budget had usually been met without too much difficulty. It was found that 
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work performed by auditors is not always of an appropriate standard, primarily because of 
time budget pressure. 
Makkawi and Schick (2003) used the scenario approach when investigating how.auditors alter 
their audit programme decisions in response to an increased likelihood of fraud risk. A total of 
48 auditors from one big 5 CP A firm were surveyed regarding the type of audit procedures 
they would use in response to an increased likelihood of material misstatements caused by 
fraud. The auditors were provided with a scenario that reflected changes in economic and 
industry factors that increase audit risk and typically require a re-evaluation of the audit 
programme. They were asked to make choices as to which tests of detailed balances, and 
analytical procedures to perform. Makkawi and Schick found that auditors emphasize 
effectiveness over efficiency with respect to the performance of audit procedures. 
In this study, the researcher used the case study scenario approach as a strategy for measuring 
audit committee effectiveness in the public banking sector in Egypt. This strategy helped the 
researcher in investigating and understanding the real-life practice situations facing such audit 
committees which are considered a contemporary phenomenon. Moreover, the case study 
scenario approach helped the researcher in discovering the obstacles that impede the audit 
committees from being more effective and to try to suggest ways for improvement. 
Effectiveness is measured by the extent to which audit committee members carry out their 
oversight responsibilities related to the functions of financial reporting, external auditing, and 
internal control including the internal auditing function. This objective was tested in the light 
of the survey results related to the oversight responsibilities for audit committees, after 
modification for the Egyptian environment. The case study scenario questionnaires that were 
directed to the audit committee members consisted of two sections. 
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The first section contained personal questions m order to indirectly measure the audit 
committee member's independence (questions from 1 to 5) and experience (questions from 6 
to 7) by using the linear multiple regression model. 
The second section contained fifteen scenarios linked to the survey results and modified in 
order to measure extent to which audit committee members carry out their oversight 
responsibilities related to the following: 
1. Financial reporting (cases from 1-1 to 1-5); 
2. The external auditing function (cases from 2-1 to 2-5); and 
3. The internal control including the internal auditing function (cases from 3-1 to 3-5). 
A separate scenario is expressed for each responsibility by using the case study scenario 
approach (See appendix D). The fifteen scenarios were drawn from issues regarding the 
oversight responsibilities of audit committees addressed by: (1) literature (2) CP A 
professional examinations (3) current recommendations in the USA, and the UK (e.g. BRC 
1999, Sarbanes-Oxely Act. of 2002 in USA, and the Cadbury Committee 1992, in UK) (4) 
current issues which faced the public banking sector in Egypt. In each of the fifteen scenarios, 
two questions were asked. The first question asked the participants to recommend the most 
likely course of action for the issue described in the case study and the second question asked 
the participants to suggest the party which can solve this issue. This was similar to Margheim 
and Pany (1986) and Coram et al. (200 1) who used this approach to reduce the participant's 
sensitivity to the questions being asked and thus reduce the probability of misleading 
responses. The management psychology literature (e.g. Everett and Stening 1983) also uses 
this approach to elicit greater honesty in responses by obtaining information about the same 
construct from different angles. The results in chapter eight of this study reported only the 
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second question responses because the main purpose of the first question was to elicit honesty 
and provide a benchmark for the second question (the analyses of both types of responses 
yield the same inferences). 
Population, Sample. and Response Rate 
For measuring audit committee effectiveness, the population is the audit committee members 
in the public banking sector in Egypt. The researcher selected this sector because it is 
considered to be the first and oldest sector in Egypt that mandated the establishment of audit 
committees, although the other sectors have recently followed suit. The public banking sector 
in Egypt contains four banks: Alexandria Bank, Bank Misr, Cairo Bank, and the Egyptian 
National Bank. Every bank's audit committee includes four members. Therefore, this 
population contained sixteen audit committee members. Sixteen questionnaires were directed 
to the audit committee members (full sample) and fourteen responses were received, I.e. 
almost all of the audit committee members participants (an 87% response rate). 
In this study, efforts were made to achieve high rates of response. This included firstly, a 
covering letter recounting the questionnaire explanatory notes and the importance of the 
study. Secondly, making the questionnaire words and scenarios simple and understandable. 
Thirdly, the researcher established a strong social network with the audit committee members 
-who have an externally busy schedule because of the nature of working conditions in Egypt-
in order to complete the questionnaires in a timely manner. 
6-4. The Pilot Study 
The survey and scenario questionnaires were extensively pre-tested. Drafts of the survey and 
the questionnaire were prepared and tested in small-scale pilot studies, so that maximum 
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accuracy could be ensured. For the survey instrument, nine audit committee members were 
selected from outside the selected UK sample and asked to determine any problems in the 
survey. For the questionnaire instrument, three members of the academic staff of Alexandria 
University (who are concerned with auditing practice in Egypt), and two audit committee 
members (selected from outside the selected samples) were asked to identify any problems 
such as inappropriate terms, confusing words, missing possibilities, or inappropriate 
sequencing of items. After piloting the questionnaire, some scenarios were identified as 
ambiguous and were rephrased and redesigned, or, in exceptional cases, dropped. The 
researcher was involved with the audit committee members and noted that they didn't appear 
to have a clear vision of audit committee responsibilities and duties. 
6-5. Summary 
in this chapter, the quantitative approach has been used through the survey and case study 
scenario methods. This study used survey strategy and case study scenario approach. Survey 
strategy to investigate the differences in audit committee members' perception of their 
oversight responsibilities between the USA, the UK, and Egypt. A case study scenario 
approach was used to measure the effectiveness of audit committees in the public banking 
sector in Egypt. Moreover, the case study scenario strategy helped the researcher in 
discovering the obstacles that impede the audit committees from being more effective. The 
linear multiple regression model was used to assess the relationship between the 
independence and experience of audit committee members and effectiveness of the audit 
committees. 
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Chapter Seven: Audit Committee Oversight Responsibilities 
A Comparison between the USA, the UK, and Egypt 
7-1. Introduction 
It is to be expected that the transitional economic process m Egypt, undergoing major 
economic, regulatory, and political reforms, as well as Anglo Saxon market acculturation, will 
exhibit differences in corporate governance systems and their tools. Such differences may be 
associated with significant differences in attitudes, beliefs and cultural values. These in turn, 
are expected to impact on managerial behaviour, firm's objectives and the market for 
corporate control (Humphreys 1996, Dockery and Herbert 2000). This chapter aims to 
examine the audit committee's oversight responsibility from the internal perspective of the 
UK and Egyptian audit committee members and by comparison with the DeZoort (1997) 
study in the USA. These will be taken as a basis to assess audit committee members' abilities 
to recognize their assigned objectives and explore their perceptions of the committee's 
oversight responsibilities. To achieve this target, the chapter is divided into three sections. 
The first section aims to compare the UK audit committee member's responses with the 
DeZoort (1997) survey results. The second section aims to compare the audit committee 
member's responses between the UK and Egypt. The remaining section aims to compare the 
DeZoort (1997) survey results with the UK and Egyptian audit committee member' responses. 
7-2. A Comparison between the USA and the UK 
Audit committees have received much attention over the past few years in the USA and UK. 
In particular, concerns persist regarding the scope of the audit committee's oversight 
responsibilities. Latest developments indicate that the audit committee's oversight 
responsibilities are constantly evolving and expanding. Therefore, the tasks of defining and 
understanding the audit committee's oversight responsibilities are critical to improving the 
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credibility of the corporate audit committee as a corporate governance mechanism. Also, 
future efforts to improve audit committee performance will depend in part on understanding 
what audit committees are currently doing (Carcello et al. 2002). Thus, this section 
contributes to a better understanding of audit committee oversight by evaluating the UK audit 
committee members' perceptions of their assigned responsibilities in comparison with the 
DeZoort (1997) survey results for audit committee members in the USA. Although audit 
committees are not mandatory in the UK, there is effectively a requirement for listed 
companies to have them. The London Stock Exchange requires UK listed companies to 
prepare a statement in their annual report in compliance with the Cadbury Committee (1992) 
recommendations and to give details of any non-compliance. It should be acknowledged that 
there is a gap in time between DeZoort's study of USA audit committee members (1997) and 
this study of UK audit committee members. Recommendations which have been adopted after 
DeZoort study ( e.g. BRC 1999 and Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 recommendations) are 
intended to strengthen the requirements for audit committees' oversight responsibilities which 
Wolinzer identified its in 1995. 
As explained in the previous chapter, the UK sample consisted of 200 audit committee 
members randomly selected from the top 250 companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange in the Financial Times 1,000 for the year 2002. Responses were received from 110 
audit committee members giving a usable response rate of 55% (the response rate in the 
DeZoort survey was 35%). Twenty-two of the fifty-five companies represented had more than 
one respondent. To address the possibility of company policy response bias, an analysis was 
conducted comparing the results from the 110 respondents to results from only twenty-two 
respondents (one from each company). Table 7-1 shows that the results of the T-test 
comparisons revealed significant differences (p < ,05) for any ofthe questions evaluated. 
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Table 7-1: T-test result for the UK sample 
One-Sample Test 
Test Value= 110 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Mean Difference 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Difference Lower Upper 
Q1 
-375.968 109 .000 -81.9091 -82.3409 -81.4773 
Q2 -176.704 109 .000 -79.9545 -80.8513 -79.0578 
Q3 
-388.614 109 .000 -89.4364 -89.8925 -88.9802 
In order to facilitate comparison between USA audit committee members' responses and the 
UK audit committee members' responses, the same two methods of analysis, which DeZoort 
used in analysing the first question "is the objective assigned formally to your committee?" 
were used in this study. First, a Chi-square test for homogeneity tested for differences 
between the assigned audit committee objectives listed in the annual reports and the assigned 
audit committee objectives recognized by audit committee members. Second, a Phi coefficient 
was calculated to test the strength of association between source (i.e., annual report or audit 
committee member) and assignment (i.e., yes or no). The Phi coefficient is appropriate when 
both variables are nominal dichotomous variables (DeZoort 1997). The Phi coefficient 
calculated by dividing the Chi-squared statistics by N and then take the square root as 
following (Ronald and Julstrom 1982): 
. Phi~ J? 
2 





E = Expected frequency 
0 = Observed frequency 
N = Sample size 
The overall Chi-square results in Table 7-2 for the UK sample indicate significant differences 
between what audit committee members perceive as their assigned responsibilities and their 
actual assigned responsibilities listed in annual reports (Chi-square = 498.8, P-value < .001). 
The results are in line with DeZoort (1997) survey results in the USA. The Phi coefficient of 
.378 (P-value < .00 I) indicates that the annual reports tended to list responsibilities and the 
audit committee members tended not to recognize these as assigned responsibilities. 
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Table 7-2 Comparison of oversight duties listed m annual reports and respondents' 
perceptions of duties assigned in the USA and the UK: 
Objective DeZoort (1997) survey in U.S.A U.K sample 
Proxy AC mbr Proxy AC mbr 
Assigned Assigned Chi- p- Phi Assigned Assigned Chi- p- Phi 
(Yes/No) (Yes/No) square value coeff (Yes/No) (Yes/No) square value coeff 
Financial reporting 
OBJI 83/29 48/64 22.52 .001 .317 106/4 103/7 .282 .595 .051 
OBJ2 73/39 44/68 15.05 .001 .259 100110 69/41 73.64 .001 .481 
OBJ3 87/25 80/32 1.15 .283 .072 108/2 101/9 .182 .670 .041 
OBJ4 58/54 0/112 78.27 .001 .591 53/57 8/102 52.38 .001 .154 
OBJ5 56/56 2/110 67.84 .001 .550 32/78 15/95 19.23 .001 .154 
OBJ6 38/74 0/112 45.76 .001 .452 48/62 4/106 94.58 .001 .730 
Auditing 
OBJ7 98/14 80/32 8.86 .001 .199 10119 36/74 .387 .534 .059 
OBJ8 89/23 87/25 0.11 .745 .022 107/3 75/35 14.54 .001 .146 
OBJ9 59153 12/100 45.55 .001 .451 86/24 25/85 32.72 .001 .184 
OBJIO 91121 62/50 17.34 .001 .278 102/8 22/88 39.60 .001 .199 
OBJI1 75/37 13199 71.95 .001 .567 88/22 45/65 113.25 .001 .502 
OBJ12 49/63 4/108 50.05 .001 .473 87/23 12/98 67.23 .001 .480 
OBJI3 61/51 0/112 83.83 .001 .612 81/29 9/101 24.58 .001 .278 
OBJI4 85/27 18/94 80.68 .001 .600 103/7 59/51 83.78 .001 .446 
Other corporate governance 
OBJI5 68/44 12/100 60.98 .001 .522 67/43 33177 17.60 .001 .418 
OBJI6 60/52 7/105 59.82 .001 .517 38172 12/98 67.23 .001 .583 
OBJI7 53159 17/95 26.93 .001 .347 36/74 22/88 39.60 .001 .391 
Overall 1125/667 486/1306 460.4 .001 .358 1343/527 650/1220 498.8 .001 .378 
This finding is consistent with Rittenberg and Nair (1993) and DeZoort (1997), who found 
that aud.it committee members believe they need to better understand their assigned duties and 
responsibility to improve audit committee effectiveness. Furthermore, the results in Table 7-2 
for the UK audit committee members sample indicate that, of the audit committee members 
responsibilities formally assigned, they recognized only three of the seventeen objectives 
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presented. In particular, (OBJl) which relates to the review of all financial statements, 
whether interim or annual (Chi-square .282, P-value >.05, and Phi coefficient .051), (OBJ3) 
which relates to the review of systems of internal control (Chi-square .182, P-value > .05, and 
Phi coefficient .041 ), and (OBJ7) which relates to recommendations for the appointment of 
and fee for the external auditors (Chi-square .387, P-value >.05, and Phi coefficient .059). 
DeZoort found only two objectives were recognized by respondents in his study of USA audit 
committee members, (OBJ3) which relates to the review of systems of internal control and 
(OBJ8) which relates to the review of plans for, and the effectiveness of, the internal and 
external auditors. The results of both countries, indicate it is evident that the review of 
systems of internal control is considered the most important audit committee oversight area. 
This finding is consistent with the importance placed on internal control evaluation put 
forward by numerous bodies and researchers (e.g. Cadbury Committee 1992; Kalbers and 
Fogarty 1993; Vinten and Lee 1993; Lee and Stone 1997; DeZoort 1997; Spira 1998; Braiotta 
2002; BRC 1999; Turnbull Report 1999; Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002; and Smith Report 2003). 
The results of the chi-square tests on the individual objectives for the UK audit committee 
members sample reveal that (OBJl) and (OBJ7) were recognized as formally assigned to the 
audit committees, but audit committee members in the USA did not. On the other hand, audit 
committee members in the USA survey recognized objective (OBJ8), but audit committee 
members in the UK sample did not recognize it. 
These findings highlight the important role of disclosures in audit committee charters and 
reports of oversight responsibilities. Table 7-3 presents disclosure information regarding audit 
committees oversight responsibilities in the annual reports of USA and UK sample 
companies. For the USA sample companies, this Table shows that (OBJ3) and (OBJ8), which 
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were recognized by audit committee members, are disclosed in a high percentage of the 
annual reports of the sample companies (78% and 79%). At the same time, (OBJ4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 
13, 16, and 17), which were not recognized by audit committee members, are disclosed in a 
low percentage of the annual reports (52%, 50%, 40%, 53%, 44%, 54%, 54%, and 47% 
respectively). Similar percentages were found in the UK sample companies, Table 7-3 shows 
that (OBJl, 3, and 7), which were recognized by audit committee members, are disclosed in a 
high percentage of the annual reports of the sample companies (96%, 98%, and 92% ). At the 
same time, (OBJ4, 5, 6, 16, and 17), which were not recognized by audit committee members, 
are disclosed in a low percentage of the annual reports (29%, 44%, 35%, and 33%). Porter 
and Gendall (1998) support this contention with findings showing that the effectiveness of 
audit committees could be increased by having their objective and responsibilities clearly 
defined in a written statement, and by disclosing their existence, membership and objectives 
in corporate annual reports. 
In the USA, the SEC requires that publicly traded companies adopt formal written charters for 
their audit committee describing their responsibilities, composition, qualification, and 
functions. The charter should be approved by the Board of Directors and disclosed at least 
triennially in the annual report to shareholders. Publicly traded companies listed on organized 
stock exchanges (NYSE and NASD) are required to include the audit committee charter in 
their annual report at least once every three years (SEC 1999). 
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Table 7-3 Disclosure of oversight responsibilities of audit committees in the USA and the UK 
samples 
Objective DeZoort survey in the USA UK sample 




(OBJl) 83/29 74 106/4 
OBJ2) 73/39 65 100/10 
(OBJ3) 87/25 78 108/2 
(OBJ4) 58/54 52 53/57 
(OBJ5) 56156 50 32/78 
(OBJ6) 38/74 40 48/62 
Auditing 
(OBJ7) 98/14 88 101/9 
(OBJ8) 89/23 79 107/3 
(OBJ9) 59153 53 86/24 
(OBJlO) 91/21 81 102/8 
(OBJ11) 75/37 67 88/22 
(OBJ12) 49/63 44 87/23 
(OBJ13) 61/51 54 81129 
(OBJ14) 85/27 76 103/7 
Other corporate governance 
(OBJ15) 68/44 61 67/43 
(OBJ16) 60/52 54 38/72 
(OBJ17) 53/59 47 36/74 
Also, in the UK the Smith Report (2003) recommends that 
"the board should provide written terms of reference for the audit 
committee. The terms of reference should be tailored to the particular 
circumstances of the company. The audit committee should review 
annually its terms of reference and its own effectiveness and recommend 



















The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA 1993), also noted that requiring audit committee 
reports would clarify the role and responsibilities of the committee in each company and 
would help ensure that the · committee is meeting its responsibilities by focusing the 
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committee's attention on those responsibilities. In particular, Turpin and DeZoort (1998) 
found that in USA firms, annual report disclosure of audit committee oversight typically 
comes as part of the management report lacking the emphasis provided by a separate report 
highlighting the audit committee and signed by the audit committee chair. Similarly in UK 
firms, disclosure of audit committee oversight typically comes as part of the corporate 
governance section in their annual report. 
Table 7-3 shows that other oversight responsibilities (e.g. OBJ14) are disclosed in the annual 
reports of the USA and the UK companies samples at relatively high percentage (76% in USA 
and 94% in UK), but audit committee members did not recognize the responsibility as theirs. 
This finding indicate a limited involvement of audit committee members in the practice of this 
oversight responsibility. Turley and Zamman (2003) in the UK, support this contention with 
findings showing that audit committee members had relatively limited involvement in 
approving and monitoring the dimensions of the relationship between the external auditor and 
the company. 
In both countries, Table 7-3 shows that disclosures related to financial reporting and audit 
functions were much more common than disclosures related to other corporate governance 
functions such as reviewing corporate policies and practices in light of ethical considerations 
(OBJ16), and monitoring compliance with the company's code of conduct (OBJ17). Table 7-3 
shows that both objectives are disclosed in a low percentage of the annual reports of the 
sample companies in the USA and the UK (54%, 47%, and 35%, 33%). 
The second question produced responses related to the performance of oversight 
responsibilities not formally assigned to audit committees. In particular, the results in Table 7-
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4 for the UK audit committee members sample indicate that evaluation of exposure to fraud 
(OBJ4) and the review of all significant transactions (OBJ5) were not assigned but were 
performed as often as they were assigned ( 45% and 52% of the time). In comparison with the 
DeZoort survey results in the USA, DeZoort found that, apprising key management estimates, 
judgements, and valuations (OBJ6) and requesting information about disputes between 
auditors and management (OBJ12) were not assigned but were performed (54% and 48% of 
the time). Also, the results in Table 7-4 indicate that in both countries, for almost half of the 
objectives, at least one third of the respondents indicated their audit committee performed the 
duty without formal assignment. 
Table 7-4 Analysis of oversight work performed but not formally assigned for both the USA 
and the UK samples 
Objective DeZoort (1997) survey in U.S.A UK Sample 
Objective assigned Objective Objective assigned Objective performed 
performed but not but not assigned 
assig_ned 
Financial reporting 
(OBJl) 83 (79%) 22 (21%) 106 (86%) 17 (14%) 
OBJ2) 73 (73%) 27 (27%) 100 (86%) 16 (14%) 
(OBJ3) 87 (87%) 23 (13%) 108 (90%) 12 (10%) 
(OBJ4) 58 (60%) 38 (40%) 53 (55%) 42 (45%) 
(OBJ5) 65 (62%) 35 (38%) 32 (48%) 34 (52%) 
(OBJ6) 38 (46%) 44 (54%) 48 (70%) 20 (30%) 
Auditing 
(OBJ7) 98 (98%) 2 (2%) 101 (84%) 18 (16%) 
(OBJ8) 89 (88%) 12 (12%) 107 (84%) 19 (16%) 
(OBJ9) 59 (65%) 32 (35%) 86 (76%) 26 (24%) 
(OBJlO) 91 (87%) 13 (13%) 102 (82%) 21 (18%) 
(OBJ11) 75 (74%) 26 (26%) 88 (73%) 31 (27%) 
(OBJ12) 49 (52%) 46 (48%) 87 (73%) 32 (27%) 
(OBJ13) 61 (67%) 30 (33%) 81 (77%) 24 (23%) 
(OBJ14) 85 _(_83%)_ 18 (17%) 103 (82%) 22 (18%) 
Other corporate governance 
(OBJI5) 68 (65%) 37 (35%) 67 (62%) 41 (38%) 
(OBJ16) 60 (64%) 33 (36%) 38 (64%) 21 (36%) 
(OBJ17) 53 (65%) 28 (35%) 36 (64%) 20 (36%)_ 
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This finding is consistent with Carcello et al. (2002) who studied the disclosure in audit 
committee charters and reports by examining a random sample of 150 annual reports filed in 
2001 in the USA, and found that what audit committees report they are doing differs from 
what their charters say the committee should be doing. 
The third question provided an opportunity for audit committee members to evaluate the list 
of proposed oversight responsibilities. The results in Table 7-5 for the UK audit committee 
members sample indicate that reviewing corporate policies and practices in light of ethical 
considerations (OBJ16) and monitoring compliance with the company's code of conduct 
(OBJ17) were considered as not appropriate objectives for their audit committee (40% and 
39%) in comparison with the DeZoort survey results for audit committee members in the 
USA for the same objectives (74% and 67%). These results may be seen in the context of 
legal framework for audit committees in the UK. This framework does not clearly define any 
requirements or recommendations for audit committee members to review corporate policies 
and practices in light of ethical considerations or to monitor compliance with the company's 
codes of conduct. At the same time, in the USA, the Treadway Commission (1987) 
recommends that "public companies should develop and enforce written codes of corporate 
conduct. Codes of conduct should foster a strong ethical climate and open channels of 
communication to help protect against fraudulent financial reporting. As a part of its ongoing 
oversight of the effectiveness of internal controls, a company's audit committee should review 
annually the programme that management establishes to monitor compliance with the code". 
The NYSE recommends that, "companies must adopt and disclose (1) corporate governance 
guidelines (2) code of business conduct and ethics". Also, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
section 406, requires "each issuer to disclose, in its periodic reports, whether it has adopted a 
code of ethics for its senior financial officers". 
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Table 7-5 Comparison ofWolnizer oversight objective between the USA and the UK 
Objective DeZoort's (1997) survey in U.S.A UK Sample 
No. agreeing objective Percentage No. agreeing objective Percentage 
is appropriate/ No. is appropriate/ No. 
respondents respondents 
Financial reporting 
(OBJl) 95/118 81 97/110 88 
OBJ2) 911118 77 95/110 86 
(OBJ3) 97/118 82 104/110 95 
(OBJ4) 90/118 76 72/110 66 
(OBJ5) 77/118 65 70/110 63 
(OBJ6) 731118 62 72/110 65 
Auditing 
(OBJ7) 96/118 81 89/110 81 
(OBJ8) 99/118 84 88/110 80 
(OBJ9) 82/118 69 821110 75 
(OBJlO) 96/118 81 871110 79 
(OBJ11) 96/118 81 92/110 84 
(OBJ12) 94/118 80 81/110 74 
(OBJ13) 90/118 76 831110 76 
(OBJ14) 941118 80 84/110 76 
Other corporate governance 
(OBJ15) 921118 78 781110 71 
(OBJ16) 87/118 74 451110 40 
(OBJ17) 79/118 67 431110 39 
The results in Table 7-5 indicate that in both countries, for the other objectives, the 
respondents agree that the Wolnizer oversight objectives are appropriate for audit committees 
and for all of the proposed audit committee objectives, more than 60 per cent of respondents 
suggested the objective should be part of the audit committee function. This finding suggests 
that, in line with current recommendations and requirements for expanding the audit 
committees' oversight responsibilities (e.g. BRC 1999, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and the 
Smith Report 2003), members agree with calls for audit committees to be doing more than 
they are regarding corporate governance. 
169 
7-3. A Comparison between Egypt and the UK 
In accordance with the attempts to establish audit committees in the USA and the UK, the 
establishment of audit committees in Egypt is based on protecting shareholder interests. As a 
result, starting in 2000, The Central Bank of Egypt, which is considered a supervisor for all 
Egyptian banks, required audit committees to be established as sub-committees of the main 
board of directors charged with specific responsibilities relating to monitoring financial 
reporting, the external auditors, and internal control including internal auditing functions. In 
June 2002, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) issued a statement No.30, article No.7, to the 
listed companies in the Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE) requiring them to have 
audit committees. 
As explained in the previous chapter, the Egyptian sample consisted of 65 audit committee 
members randomly selected from the top 34 companies listed on the Cairo & Alexandria 
Stock Exchange, for the year 2002, based on their market capitalization (above $200 million 
or the equivalent in Egyptian pounds). Responses were received from 41 audit committee 
members giving a usable response rate of 63%. Four of the thirty-four companies represented 
had more than one respondent. To address the possibility of company policy response bias, 
analysis was performed comparing the results from the 41 respondents to results from only 
four respondents (one from each company). Table 7-6 shows that, the results of the T-test 
comparisons revealed significant differences (p < ,05) for any of the questions evaluated. 
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Table 7-6 T-test results for the Egyptian sample 
One-Sample Test 
Test Value= 41 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Mean Difference 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Difference Lower UJ>Q_er 
Q1 -48.535 40 .000 -14.1707 -14.7608 -13.5806 
Q2 
-39.956 40 .000 -13.3659 -14.0419 -12.6898 
Q3 -54.297 40 .000 -15.1951 -15.7607 -14.6295 
In Egypt, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in its statement No.30 in 2002 does not require 
listed companies to adopt a formal written charter for audit committees. Also, it does not 
specify any recommendations relating to audit committee reporting, despite the important role 
audit committee charters and reports play in assessing the audit committee members' ability 
to fulfil their duties and responsibilities. This means that Egyptian companies do not disclose 
the assigned responsibilities for audit committees in their annual reports. Thus, regarding the 
first question, the chi-square test and phi coefficient could not be calculated. 
The second question produced responses related to the performance of oversight 
responsibilities not formally assigned to the audit committee. In particular, the results in Table 
7-7 for the Egyptian audit committee members sample indicate that the review of external 
auditor's management letters (OBJl 0) the determining that the external auditors are free from 
undue influence and managerial interference (OBJ11 ), and requests to be informed if there is 
a dispute between auditors and managers (OBJ12) were not assigned by the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) statement, but were performed as often as they were assigned (55%, 59%, 
and 60% of the time). These findings highlight the important role that audit committees can 
play in enhancing the external auditing function. 
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Table 7-7 Analysis of oversight work performed but not formally assigned for both Egypt and 
the UK samples 
Objective Egypt Sample UKSample 
Objective assigned Objective performed Objective assigned Objective performed 
but not assigned but not assigned 
Financial reporting 
(OBJI) 26(81%) 6 (19%) 106 (86%) 17 (14%) 
OBJ2) 22 (85%) 4 (15%) 100 (86%) 16(14%) 
(OBJ3) 36 (88%) 5 (12%) 108 (90%) 12 (10%) 
(OBJ4) 15 (79%) 4 (21%) 53 (55%) 42 (45%) 
(OBJ5) 27 (77%) 8 (23%) 32 (48%) 34 (52%) 
(OBJ6) 14 (82%) 3 (18%) 48 (70%) 20 (30%) 
Auditing 
(OBJ7) 8 (80%) 2 (20%) 101 (84%) 18 (16%) 
(OBJ8) 30(81%) 7 (19%) 107 (84%) 19 (16%) 
(OBJ9) 21 (78%) 6 (22%) 86 (76%) 26 (24%) 
(OBJ10) 18(45%) 22 (55%) 102 (82%) 21 (18%) 
(OBJ11) 15 (41%) 19 (59%) 88 (73%) 31 (27%) 
(OBJ12) 16 (40%) 24 (60%) 87 (73%) 32 (27%) 
(OBJ13) 18 (82%) 4 (18%) 81 (77%) 24 (23%) 
(OBJ14) 22(81%) 5 (19%) 103 (82%) 22 (18%) 
Other corporate governance 
(OBJ15) 8 (80%) 2 (20%) 67 (62%) 41 (38%) 
(OBJ16) 7 (87%) 1 (13%) 38 (64%) 21 (36%) 
(OBJ17) 10 (83%) 2 (17%) 36 (64%) 20 (36%) 
In Egypt, as explained before, article (1 04) of law No. 159 of 1981 which was enacted to 
govern private auditors' work, and article (1) of law No.144 of 1988 which was enacted to 
govern public auditors' work, were both intended to ensure the auditors' independence by 
prohibiting them from participating in the formation of a corporation, being members of their 
Boards of Directors, or permanently performing any technical, administrative, or consulting 
duties. Despite this concern about the importance of auditors' independence in Egypt, the 
CMA in its statement does not specify any requirements for audit committee members to have 
procedures to ensure the independence and objectivity of the external auditor. This finding 
reflects the important role that audit committees can play in protecting external auditor 
independence in Egypt. 
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Also, the results in Table 7-7 for the Egyptian sample related to (OBJ12), request to be 
informed if there is a dispute between auditors and managers, are consistent with recent 
survey research. For example, Reinstein and Weirich (1996) found that audit committee 
members tend to support the auditors rather than management in audit disputes. Such support 
appears to strengthen the auditor's independence when dealing with company management. 
Beattie et al. (2000) surveyed audit partners and CFOs of large publicly traded UK companies 
and found a tendency for firms with audit committees to enter into fewer negotiations but 
more informal discussions about accounting policy disputes than did firms without audit 
committees. Also, Gibbins et al. (2001) surveyed Canadian audit partners and found that they, 
on average, rated the audit committee as only moderately important in auditor-client 
negotiations over accounting policy disputes. DeZoort and Salterio (200 1) found that greater 
independent director experience and greater audit knowledge was associated with higher audit 
committee member support for an auditor in the dispute with client management. Recently, 
DeZoort et al. (2003) found that audit committee members provided great support for the 
auditor when the auditor's materiality justification included both quantitative and 
consequences-oriented factors and when the accounting issue was subject to precise 
measurement. 
In Egypt, law No. 159 of 1981 which was enacted to govern private auditors' work and law 
No.144 of 1988 which was enacted to govern public auditors' work, do not specify any article 
concerning the solution of disputes which can arise between auditors and management 
relating to auditing processes and accounting policy. Consequently, in the light of this finding, 
audit committees in Egypt expected to play an important role in the auditor-management 
disputes. 
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In comparing the Egyptian and UK samples, the results in Table 7-7 indicate that in both 
countries, reviewing systems of internal control (OBJ3) is considered to be the most important 
audit committee oversight area (88% and 90%). This finding, as explained before, is 
consistent with the importance placed on internal control evaluation forwarded by numerous 
entities external to the audit committee's oversight responsibilities (e.g. Cadbury Committee 
1992, Kalbers and Fogarty 1993, Vinten and Lee 1993, Lee and Stone 1997, DeZoort 1997, 
Spira 1998, Braiotta 2002, BRC 1999, Turnbull Report 1999, Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002, and 
the Smith Report 2003). 
The third question provided an opportunity for audit committee members to evaluate the list 
of proposed oversight responsibilities. The results in Table 7-8 for the Egyptian audit 
committee members' sample indicate that the appointment of and fee for the external auditor 
(OBJ7) was not considered as appropriate objectives for their audit committee (15% ), at the 
same time, article (1 03) of law No. 159 of 1981, which was enacted to govern private 
auditors' work, requires each corporation to have at least one auditor who is to be appointed 
by the general assembly in the Annual General Meeting, but in practice it is the company 
management who undertake such tasks. Consequently, the selection process may be distorted 
by management. For the public auditors situation, as explained before, in Egypt the selection 
process is not found because The Central Auditing Organization appoints the external public 
auditors on behalf of the entities. Consequently, the role of management in selecting the 
external auditors is limited to the private entities. However, the change from a common 
economy to a free market economy, accompanied by a wide movement of privatisation of 
public entities, will increase concern about the selection of external auditors. At the same 
time, the CMA in its statement does not specify any requirements for audit committee 
members to make a recommendation on the appointment, reappointment or removal of 
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external auditors. Also, the CMA does not specify any requirements for audit committee 
members to keep under review the overall financial relationship between the company and its 
auditors to ensure a balance between audit quality and value for money, and provide support 
for the auditors in the audit fee negotiations with company management . 
Table 7-8 Comparison ofWolnizer oversight objective between Egypt and the UK 
Objective Egypt Sample UK Sample 
No. agreeing objective Percentage No. agreeing objective is Percentage 
is appropriate/ No. appropriate/ No. 
respondents respondents 
Financial reporting 
(OBJI) 35/41 85 971110 88 
OBJ2) 33/41 80 95/110 86 
(OBJ3) 38/41 92 104/110 95 
(OBJ4) 27/41 66 72/110 66 
(OBJ5) 28/41 68 70/110 63 
(OBJ6) 11/41 27 72/110 65 
Auditing 
(OBJ7) 6/41 15 89/110 81 
(OBJ8) 18/41 43 88/110 80 
(OBJ9) 8/41 19 82/110 75 
(OBJIO) 32/41 78 87/110 79 
(OBJ11) 34/41 83 921110 84 
(OBJ12) 31/41 76 811110 74 
(OBJ13) 12/41 29 831110 76 
(OBJI4) 11/41 27 84/110 76 
Other corporate governance 
(OBJ15) 13/41 32 78/110 71 
(OBJ16) 6/41 15 451110 40 
(OBJ17) 8/41 20 431110 39 
In comparison with the UK sample regarding the same objective, the results in Table 7-8 
indicate that (81%) of audit committee members considered it as an appropriate objective for 
their audit committee. This reflects the important role for the audit committee in 
recommending the appointment of and fee for the external auditor. In this respect, recent 
evidence underscores the importance of the audit committee in the selection and replacement 
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of the external auditor. Carcello and Neal (2000a) find that external auditors who issue initial 
going concern audit reports are less likely to be terminated when the audit committee is 
comprised entirely of independent directors. Abbott and Parker (2000a) observe that 
companies with an audit committee comprised of independent directors that meet at least 
twice annually are more likely to select a big 6 auditor (now big 4) when switching auditors. 
Also, recent evidence underlines the importance of the audit committee being involved in the 
audit fee negotiation process, Collier and Gregory (1996) find that audit committees are at 
least partially effective in preventing reduction in the audit fee to levels where the quality of 
the audit may be compromised. Also, Carcello and Neal (2000b) postulate that the existence 
of an independent and active audit committee could impact on the audit fee negotiation 
process. Specifically, by reducing the overall threat of auditors dismissal and strengthening 
the auditor's relative bargaining position during audit fee negotiations. 
Also, the results in Table 7-8 for the Egyptian audit committee members sample indicate that 
reviewing the external auditor's management letter (OBJIO), determining that external 
auditors are free from undue influence and managerial interference (OBJll ), and requesting 
to be informed if there is a dispute between auditors and managers (OBJ12) were considered 
as appropriate objectives for their audit committees (78%, 83%, and 76% respectively). Also, 
the results in the previous table, Table 7-7, indicate that these objectives were not assigned in 
the Capital Market Authority (CMA) statement but were performed as often that they were 
assigned (55%, 59%, and 60% of the time). These objectives are therefore used in measuring 
audit committee effectiveness in Egypt in the next chapter. 
The goals of audit committees and internal audit functions are closely intertwined, and the 
ability of the audit committee and internal auditors to work together significantly impacts on 
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the effectiveness of the audit committee m fulfilling its responsibilities to the Board of 
Directors, shareholders, and other outside parties (Scarbrough et al. 1998 and Atkins 2002). 
The results in Table 7-8 for the audit committee members sample in Egypt indicate that 
reviewing the plans of, and the effectiveness of the internal and external auditors (OBJ8) and 
monitoring the resources allocated to the internal audit function (OBJ13) were considered as 
non-appropriate objectives for audit committees (43% and 29%). These results were 
consistent with The World Bank Report (200 1) which argued that "in Egypt the internal audit 
function does not exist in some companies, or if it does, has a little power." Thus, one of the 
important recommendations to strengthen corporate governance in Egypt, in this report, is to 
establish and enhance the internal auditing role in monitoring management. At the same time, 
the CMA does not specify any requirement for audit committee members to review the 
internal auditing function, or any other interaction between audit committee and internal 
auditing. Along these lines, the Smith Report (2003) stated that "the audit committee should 
review and approve the internal audit function's remit, having regard to the complementary 
roles of the internal and external audit functions. The audit committee should ensure that the 
function has the necessary resources and access to information to enable it to fulfill its 
mandate, and is equipped to perform in accordance with appropriate professional standards 
for internal auditors". 
Also, regarding the external audit function, the World Bank Report (200 1) argued that "in 
Egypt there is no formal system of monitoring the external auditors and The Egyptian Society 
of Accountants and Auditors does not act as a review panel". This situation has, in turn, been 
influenced in the audit committee members' responsibility for the objective. At the same time, 
a primary responsibility of the audit committee is to oversee the financial reporting process 
(Raghunandan et al. 1998). Through their involvement with the audited financial statements, 
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the independent auditors are in a position to provide an objective assessment of the financial 
reporting process. For this reason, the audit committee should inquire about the proposed 
audit scope and approach, and any recommendations management receives from the 
independent auditors regarding the financial reporting process and related matters (Braiotta 
2002). 
Regarding the audit committee oversight responsibility related to reviewing the nature and 
magnitude of fees paid to the auditors for non-audit services (OBJ14), the results in Table 7-8 
for the Egyptian sample indicate that (27%) of audit committee members consider this 
objective as an appropriate objective for their audit committee, this ratio in the UK sample 
was (76%). This finding means that audit committee members in Egypt are not aware of the 
role that the audit committee can play in reviewing non-audit service. Also, the CMA in its 
statement does not recommend any requirements for audit committees regarding this issue. 
Similarly, consulting fees do not have to be disclosed at the companies annual general 
meeting. In the UK, the Smith Report (2003. Sec. 5.26) requires that "the audit committee 
should develop and recommend to the board the company's policy in relation to the provision 
of non-audit services by the auditor. The audit committee's objective should be to ensure that 
the provision of such services does not impair the external auditor's independence or 
objectivity". 
The results in Table 7-8 for the UK audit committee members sample indicate that reviewing 
corporate policies and practices in light of ethical considerations (OBJ16), and monitoring 
compliance with the company's code of conduct (OBJ17) were considered as not appropriate 
objectives for their audit committee (40% and 39%). Similarly, in the Egyptian sample the 
two objectives were considered as not appropriate objectives (15% and 20%). These results 
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may be referenced to the legal framework for audit committees m both countries. These 
frameworks do not clearly define any requirements or recommendations for audit committee 
members to review corporate policies and practices in light of ethical considerations or to 
monitor compliance with the company's codes of conduct. At the same time, the results in 
Table 7-8 indicate that, in both countries and regarding the other objectives, the respondents 
agree that the Wolnizer oversight objectives are appropriate for audit committees. And for all 
of the proposed audit committee objectives, more than 60 per cent of respondents suggested 
the objectives should be part of the audit committee function. 
In order to test the variances between audit committee members' responses in the UK and 
Egyptian samples for the seventeen oversight responsibilities, Table 7-9 shows the 
Independent-Sample T -test results between the two populations. The results contains the 
value for Sig.(2-tailed). The observed significance level is ( P-value > 0.05). Therefore, there 
are significant differences in responses for the three questions between two samples with 
confidence level 95%. 
Table 7-9 Independent-Samples T-test between the UK sample and Egypt sample 




V..riances t-test for Equality of Means 
95 1 Confidence 
Interval of the 
Sig. Mean Std. Error Difference 
F Sig. t df (2-tailed) Difference Difference lower Upper 
Q1 Equal variances 
.097 .755 3.2 149 .002 1.2616 .39912 .4730 2.0503 assumed 
Equal variances 
3.5 87.0 .001 1 .2616 .36429 .5376 1.9857 not assumed 
Q2 Equal variances 
14.4 .000 3.1 149 .002 2.4113 .76996 .8899 3.9328 assumed 
Equal variances 
4.3 144 .000 2.4113 .56270 1.299 3.5235 not assumed 
Q3 Equal varianoes 
3.666 .057 -13 149 .000 -5.2412 .41420 -6.06 -4.423 assumed 
Equal variances 
-14 96.2 .000 -5.2412 .36233 -5.96 -4.522 not assumed 
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These results are consistent with Hofstede (1991) who argued that there is much evidence that 
significant cultural differences exist across nations. Also, HassabElnaby et al. (2003) 
suggested that accounting does not develop in a vacuum, but reflects the particular 
environments in which it is developed. Hence accounting systems, practices and disclosure 
may be expected to differ from one country to another. 
7-4. Comparison between the UK, the USA and Egypt: An Institutional Perspective 
Corporate governance has spawned an increasing amount of interest from academics, 
practitioners, national and multilateral government bodies. Much of this attention has focused 
on the way USA and UK companies are governed (Vinten 2000). The USA corporate 
governance system has been generally characterised as short-term shareholder-oriented. This 
characterisation also applies to the UK corporate governance system, given the close 
economic ties between the UK and the USA both with respect to the degree of market 
integration and the organisation of transactions and in relation to other socio-cultural respects 
(Dockery and Herbert 2000). At the same time, it is expected that the transition economy 
process in Egypt, undergoing major economic, regulatory, and political reforms, as well as 
Anglo Saxon market acculturation, will exhibit differences in corporate governance systems. 
Such differences may be associated with significant differences in attitudes, beliefs and 
cultural values. These in turn are expected to impact on managerial behaviour, firms' 
objectives and markets for corporate control (Humphreys 1996 and Dockery and Herbert 
2000). Committees, commissions, and regulatory authorities in the USA and UK have 
identified the corporate audit committee as a key component of effective corporate 
governance (Lee and Stone 1997). Consequently, it is possible that differences in the 
regulatory environment and the importance assigned to corporate governance, as well as other 
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cultural factors, could significantly influence the nature of the audit committees' legal 
framework in the USA, the UK, and Egypt. The suggestion that Anglo Saxon management 
theories and concepts are as applicable in developing countries as they are in the UK and 
USA has been subject to much critical comment. Kanter and Corn (1994) asserted that recent 
findings about the cultural propensities of major countries appear robust, replicated in surveys 
of managers, as well as used to explain institutional patterns within countries. Also Hofstede 
(1991) argued that for many theories "it is easier to avoid the idea of the culture concept than 
to face up to it". In management literature, culture is seen as an important influence on 
practice. Along these lines Brown and Humphreys (1995) explained that the nature and extent 
of these cultural differences are such that it is unwise to assume that the management theories 
and practices developed in the west will be appropriate and applicable in Egypt. Thus, this 
section aims to investigate the problem of institutional difference in the implementation of 
USA and UK audit committee oversight responsibilities, as these countries applied the audit 
committee concept a long time ago and considers the oversight responsibilities and ways of 
measuring its effectiveness, in Egypt. 
The strength of the capital market, and indeed, of the economic system, depends heavily on 
the general confidence engendered by the credibility that attaches to a set of audited financial 
statements (Vinten and Lee 1993). Within the auditing function, the significance of the 
cultural dimension lies in the behaviour of auditees, their reaction to workplace requirements 
and their relationship to the auditor. Woodworth and Said (1996) asserted that the reaction to 
the audit itself may vary from culture to culture. An auditee from a low power distance culture 
may not accept the auditor's recommendation for change. On the other hand, an auditee from 
a high power distance culture will yield without hesitation because he feels powerless to resist 
a person of authority. Therefore, Vanasco et al.(1997) argued that, auditing has always been 
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seen as an alien phenomenon in most parts of the third world. In Egypt, the auditing 
profession has faced a lot of different circumstances. The World Bank Report (2001) 
assessment conceded that, "all the basic ingredients of sound accounting and auditing 
practices exist in Egypt". But it went on to qualify that statement by pointing out that the 
institutions that share the responsibility for setting standards are "fragmented". There is no 
single regulatory body setting standards for the profession in terms of licensing individuals, 
monitoring their training and keeping them abreast of developments in the profession. 
Accountants may be licensed through several different agencies, according to several different 
sets of requirements. The Central Auditing Organisation (COA) is responsible for all public 
sector enterprises. The Ministry of Finance and the Egyptian Society of Accountants and 
Auditors also play a role (El Makawy and Handoussa 2001 ). Therefore, in order to meet the 
requirements that true reform would establish, qualified individuals and companies are 
needed. The accounting profession must undergo the same kind of scrutiny and restructuring 
that is being applied to every aspect of national business that was once dominated by the 
public sector. But both private and public sector enterprises will benefit from this process of 
reform, which will impose performance upgrades on the accounting profession. 
In this study, the results in Table 7-10 for the Egyptian audit committee members sample 
indicate that reviewing the external auditor's management letter (OBJlO), determining the 
external auditors are free from undue influence and managerial interference (OBJ11 ), and 
requesting to be informed if there is a dispute between auditors and managers (OBJ12) were 
not assigned in the CMA statement but were performed as often as they were assigned (55%, 
59%, and 60% of the time). There is a special relationship between the audit committee and 
the external auditors, both share common objectives and their contributions reinforce one 
another's role in the strengthening of corporate accountability (Vinten and Lee 1993), this 
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finding highlights the important role that audit committees can play in enhancing the external 
auditing function in Egypt. 
Table 7-10 Analysis of oversight work performed but not formally assigned in the USA, the 
UK, and Egyptian samples 
Objective Egypt Sample DeZoort(l997)survey UKSample 
in USA 
Objective Objective Objective Objective Objective Objective 
assigned performed but assigned performed but assigned performed but 
not assigned not assigned not assigned 
Financial reporting 
(OBJI) 26 (SI%) 6 (19%) 83 (79%) 22 (2I %) I06 (86%) I7(I4%) 
OBJ2) 22 (85%) 4(I5%) 73 (73%) 27 (27%) IOO (86%) I6 (14%) 
(OBJ3) 36 (88%) 5 (12%) 87 (87%) 23 (I3%) I08 (90%) I2 (I 0%) 
(OBJ4) I5 (79%) 4 (2I %) 58 (60%) 38 (40%) 53 (55%) 42 (45%) 
(OBJ5) 27 (77%) 8 (23%) 65 (62%) 35 (38%) 32 (48%) 34 (52%) 
(OBJ6) I4 (82%) 3 (18%) 38 (46%) 44 (54%) 48 (70%) 20 (30%) 
Auditing 
(OBJ7) 8 (80%) 2 (20%) 98 (98%) 2 (2%) IOI (84%) IS (16%) 
(OBJ8) 30(8I%) 7 (19%) 89 (88%) I2 (12%) I07 (84%) I9 (16%) 
(OBJ9) 2I (78%) 6 (22%) 59 (65%) 32 (35%) 86 (76%) 26 (24%) 
(OBJIO) I8(45%) 22 (55%) 9I (87%) 13 (13%) I02 (82%) 2I (18%) 
(OBJII) I5 (4I%) 19 (59%) 75 (74%) 26 (26%) 88 (73%) 3I (27%) 
(OBJ12) I6 (40%) 24 (60%) 49 (52%) 46 (48%) 87 (73%) 32 (27%) 
(OBJ13) IS (82%) 4 (18%) 6I (67%) 30 (33%) SI (77%) 24 (23%) 
(OBJ14) 22(8I%) 5 (I9%) 85 (83%) IS (17%) I03 (82%) 22 (18%) 
Other corporate governance 
(OBJ15) 8 (80%) 2 (20%) 37 (35%) 37 (35%) 67 (62%) 41 (38%) 
(OBJ16) 7 (87%) I (13%) 33 (36%) 33 (36%) 38 (64%) 21 (36%) 
(OBJ17) 10(83%) 2 (17%) 28 (35%) 28 (35%) 36_{64%) 20 (36%) 
DeZoort's survey results for the USA and the results for the Egyptian sample in Table 7-10 
indicate that in both countries, requesting information about disputes between auditors and 
management (OBJ12) were not assigned but were performed (48% and 60% ofthe time). This 
finding was consistent with the current concern about the audit committee's role in auditor-
management dispute. Auditors professional standards (e.g., SAS No. 61, Communication With 
Audit Committees, AICPA, 1998 and SAS No. 89, Audit Adjustments, AICPA, 1999) require 
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audit committees to be notified about auditor-management disagreement. Furthermore, the 
recently passed Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) specifically charges the audit committee with the 
resolution of financial reporting disagreements between the auditors and management. 
Culture has previously been shown by empirical analysis and case study to affect the 
formulation of accounting regulation (Salter and Niswander 1995 and Vanasco et al. 1997). 
Hofstede (1991) argued that, culture includes a set of societal values that drive institutional 
form and practice. Along these lines, Gray (1988) explained that the value systems of 
attitudes of accountants may be expected to relate to and derive from societal values with 
special reference to work related values. Accounting "values" will in turn impact on 
accounting systems. Gray continued by defining four "accounting values" professionalism, 
uniformity, conservatism, and secrecy. These values interact with the other institutional 
consequences of culture (e.g. capital markets) to arrive at a final set of accounting systems 
that include financial reporting practices and professional structure. The relative force of the 
accounting values and the institutional consequences will vary from country to country in 
their impact on the final form of accounting systems (Salter and Niswander 1995). At the 
same time, HassabElnaby et al. (2003) explained that accounting literature suggests that as the 
business environment changes, the demand and use of financial information changes leading 
to the establishment and development of accounting. 
Recently, in light of public concern over business failures and the related criticism of 
incomplete or fraudulent accounting information reporting prior to such failures, the critical 
role of the audit committee in the financial reporting process has been highlighted 
(Reghunandan et al. 1998, McDaniel et al. 2002). Regulators and the accounting profession 
have touted the role of audit committees in protecting investors, and accounting research 
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suggests that market participants see audit committees as providing meaningful oversight of 
financial reporting processes (McMullen 1996, and Wild 1996). 
In this study, for financial reporting objectives, the results in Table 7-11 indicate that audit 
committee members in the Egyptian, USA, and UK samples were considered (OBJl ), (OBJ2), 
(OBJ3), and (OBJ4) as appropriate objectives for their audit committees. These results, based 
on the above analysis, were considered as a normal finding for the USA and UK, but for the 
Egyptian sample this is considered as abnormal. In particular, these findings can be referenced 
to changes in the Egyptian business environment through two main aspects which directly 
effect the development of accounting and reporting practice, these aspects are economic 
changes and the development of the stock market. 
In 1990, the Egyptian government started its economic reform and restructuring programme 
and the Egyptian economy is now labelled as a "transition economy"; it is moving away from 
its attempt at a command economy towards the implementation of an economic system based 
on market forces. The United States Agency for International Development in its report, The 
Corporate Governance Policy Framework in Egypt, 2000, states that the supply of shares 
created by the privatisations in Egypt stimulated the development of the capital market, and 
led to the creation of modem institutions to support the market. Also, HassabElnaby et al. 
(2003) explained that "privatisation may impact on the accounting practice and disclosure in 
specific environments. Government and state-controlled banks often provide capital to state 
corporations. For these corporations to be privatised, stockholders .will mainly provide the 
capital. The accounting practice and disclosure requirements for the external environment 
(public) are different from those required for government. Stockholders tend to require a more 
sophisticated level of public financial disclosure than that required by government". 
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Therefore, the implementation of an economic reform programme in Egypt has resulted in an 
active effort by people in authority and those who work in accounting and auditing to enhance 
the quality of financial reporting which is considered to be one of the factors to increase the 
effectiveness of economic performance. 
Table 7-11 Comparison ofWolnizer oversight objective between Egyptian, the USA, and the 
UK samples 
Objective Egypt Sample DeZoort(1997)survey UK Sample 
in USA 
No. agreeing Percentage No. agreeing Percentage No. agreeing Percentage 
objective is objective is objective is 
appropriate/ appropriate/ appropriate/ 
No. No. No. 
respondents respondents respondents 
Financial reporting 
(OBJl) 35/41 85 95/118 81 97/110 88 
OBJ2) 33/41 80 91/118 77 95/110 86 
(OBJ3) 38/41 92 97/118 82 104/110 95 
(OBJ4) 27/41 66 90/118 76 721110 66 
(OBJ5) 28/41 68 77/118 65 701110 63 
(OBJ6) 11/41 27 73/118 62 721110 65 
Auditing 
(OBJ7) 6/41 15 961118 81 891110 81 
(OBJ8) 18/41 43 99/118 84 881110 80 
(OBJ9) 8/41 19 82/118 69 821110 75 
(OBJlO) 32/41 78 96/118 81 871110 79 
(OBJ11) 34/41 83 96/118 81 921110 84 
(OBJ12) 31141 76 941118 80 811110 74 
(OBJ13) 12/41 29 901118 76 83/110 76 
(OBJ14) 11/41 27 94/118 80 841110 76 
Other corporate governance 
(OBJ15) 13/41 32 92/118 78 781110 71 
(OBJ16) 6/41 15 87/118 74 45/110 40 
(OBJ17) 8/41 20 79/118 67 43/110 39 
Also, in the early 1990s, as a part of its privatisation program, the Egyptian government 
decided to revitalize its capital market by . improving its reputation and the confidence of 
investors (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman 2003). The development of stock markets significantly 
influences the accounting environment of any country, especially developing countries 
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(HassabElnaby et al. 2003). The growing number of listed companies on the stock market 
creates demand for accounting and auditing services. Doupnik and Salter (1993) indicate that 
as the level of activities increase in the market, investors require more extensive financial and 
non-financial information about the companies' activities to help in making investment 
decisions. Therefore, stock markets create the need to improve corporate disclosure, corporate 
governance practices and accounting standards to attract both domestic and international 
investors. Establishing and maintaining appropriate accounting standards are critical to the 
developing of accounting. As stated by Massoud (1998): "accounting standards allow for a 
more accurate reflection of the business environment. Accounting standards serve to provide 
relevant information grounded in reliable financial reporting, whereby investors are able to 
analyse financial performance across time periods and among companies". Successful capital 
markets are built and maintained by investors' confidence in an accounting system that 
demands full and fair disclosure (HassabElnaby et al. 2003). Therefore, in Egypt, a new 
Capital Market Law No. 95 was issued in 1992 which required adherence to the International 
Accounting Standards by Executive Regulations (ERs) issued in 1993. The requirement to 
apply International Accounting Standards became fully mandatory for the first time in 1995. 
The results in Table 7-11 for (OBJ7), recommending the appointment of and fee for the 
external auditor, indicate that the USA and the UK audit committee members consider this 
objective as an appropriate objective for their audit committee (81% and 81% ), this ratio in 
the Egyptian sample was (15% ). This finding reflects the nature of the accounting and 
auditing profession in Egypt and the selection process for external auditors. Article (1 03) of 
law No. 159 of 1981 which was enacted to govern private auditors work, requires each 
corporation to have at least one auditor who is to be appointed by the general assembly in 
General Annual Meeting, but in practice it is the company management who undertake such 
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tasks. In addition, Sami (2000) argued that in Egypt many accountants are operating as virtual 
brokers. Their integrity has been fatally compromised and, rather than acting as independent 
agents they have become "de facto" defenders of their clients. It is a position in which the 
credibility of accountants is suffering to an intolerable degree. Consequently, the selection 
process may be distorted by management. The World Bank Report (2001) suggested that 
"best practice would recommend taking action to strengthen the standing of the profession 
and tighten the qualifications necessary to become an auditor. Actions could include 
supporting the creation of an independent professional body with the authority to impose 
standards of excellence and of professional conduct based on a code of ethics. Then a list of 
qualified auditors could be set up from which listed companies choose their auditor". As a 
result, the Ministry of Economy in 2001 issued six new criteria for accountancy and auditing 
in Egypt delineating principles and procedures and outlining a new code of ethics for the 
profession. Thus, audit committee members in Egypt are expected to play an important role in 
appointments and determining external auditors' fees. 
Along these lines, in the USA, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC 2003) states that" 
the auditing process may be compromised when a company's outside auditors view their main 
responsibility as serving the company's management rather than its full Board of Directors or 
its audit committee. This may occur if the auditor views management as its employer with 
hiring, firing, and compensatory powers. Under these conditions, the auditor may not have the 
appropriate incentive to raise concerns and conduct an objective review. One way to help 
promote auditor independence, then, is for the auditor to be hired, evaluated and, if necessary, 
terminated by the audit committee". Also, the SEC noted that the proposed requirement that 
the audit committee appoint the external auditor does not conflict with, and would not be 
affected by, any requirement under a company's governing law or documents or other home 
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country requirements that requires shareholders to elect, approve or ratify the selection of the 
issuer's auditor. In such an instance, however, if the issuer provides a recommendation or 
nomination of an auditor to its shareholders, the audit committee of the issuer would need to 
be responsible for making the recommendation or nomination. 
Also, the results in Table 7-11 for (OBJ14), reviewing the nature and magnitude of fees paid 
to the auditors for non-audit services, indicate that in the USA and the UK audit committee 
members have considered this objective as an appropriate objective for their audit committee 
(80% and 76%) this ratio in the Egyptian sample was (27%). This finding highlights the lack 
of public and regulators' concern regarding the non-audit services and the consequent effect 
on auditors' independence in Egypt which has faced a lot of different circumstances. The 
addition of such services as a distinct area of an auditor's practice precipitated considerable 
debate on the social, personal, and economic effects of the provision of non-audit services on 
auditors' ability to guard their independence (Sharma and Sidhu 2001). Audit committees are 
the best vehicles for achieving and maintaining balance in the relationship between the 
independent auditor and management. The disclosure of non-audit fees in the published 
accounts is also believed to further strengthen independence (Teoh and Lim 1996). Regulators 
in the USA and the UK have voiced their concern that the provision of non-audit services to 
audit clients poses threats to auditor independence parallel to exponential increases in the 
proportion of non-audit services fees to total fee revenue of accounting firms. For instance, in 
January 1999, The Independent Standards Board in the US adopted Independence Standard 
No.l, Independence Discussions with Audit Committees. The standard recommends that 
auditors communicate in writing with the audit committee matters likely to influence audit 
independence. One of the major matters of concern is the provision of non-audit services. 
Specifically, the standard requires auditors to disclose the level of audit fees, and nature and 
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level of non-audit service fees derived from the client. In the UK, legislation reqmres 
companies to disclose the level of non-audit service fees, so that interested parties can assess 
independence implications. In Egypt, to date, there is no mandatory requirement for a separate 
disclosure of non-audit fees. At the same time, consulting fees do not have to be disclosed at 
the companies annual general meeting. Consequently, the potential impairment of perceptions 
of auditors' independence by providing non-audit services will be compounded by the 
absence of a mandatory requirement for separate disclosure of non-audit fees. Therefore, audit 
committees in Egypt, before the beginning of each year, should review management's plans 
for engaging the company's independent public accountant to perform management advisory 
services during the coming year and consider both the types of services that may be rendered 
and the projected fees. 
The results for (OB116) and (OBJ17) in Table 7-11 indicate that in the UK and Egypt audit 
committee members have considered these objectives as non appropriate objectives for their 
audit committee ( 40%, 39% in UK sample and 15%, 20% in Egypt sample) these ratios in the 
DeZoort (1997) USA survey were (74% and 67%). These results may be referenced, as 
explained before, to the legal framework for audit committees in the UK and Egypt. These 
frameworks do not clearly define any requirements or recommendations for audit committee 
members to review corporate policies and practices in light of ethical considerations or to 
monitor compliance with the company's codes of conduct. 
7-5. Summary 
Audit committees have received much attention over the past few years. In particular, 
concerns persist about the scope of the audit committee's oversight responsibilities. Latest 
developments indicate that responsibilities are constantly evolving and expanding. Therefore, 
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the tasks of defining and understanding audit committee oversight responsibilities are critical 
to improving the credibility of the corporate audit committee as a corporate governance 
mechanism. Also, future efforts to improve audit committee performance will depend in part 
on understanding what audit committees are currently doing (Carcello et al. 2002). Thus, this 
chapter contributes to a better understanding of audit committee oversight by evaluating UK 
and Egyptian audit committee members' perceptions of their assigned responsibilities m 
comparison with the DeZoort (1997) survey of audit committee members in the USA. 
Because of the close economic ties between the UK and the US both with respect to the 
degree of market integration and the organisation of transactions, and in relation to other 
socio-cultural respects (Dockery and Herbert 2000), the results in general indicate that, in the 
UK sample, audit committee members tend not to recognize their responsibilities as assigned 
in annual reports, but perform many functions not listed formally in its, this is similar to 
DeZoort's USA survey results. The results also provide evidence that, in the USA, the UK, 
and Egypt, audit committee members perceive internal control evaluation as the most 
important oversight area. In addition, the results show that audit committee members, in the 
USA and the UK, agree with the current requirements and recommendations for expansion of 
the audit committees oversight responsibilities, except in the case of the UK regarding 
objectives (OBJ16) and (OBJ17). But in Egypt, audit committee members agree with eight 
oversight responsibilities. The results, in general, indicate that, there are differences in the 
institutions of those countries which applied the audit committee concept a long time ago and 
constituted the oversight responsibilities for measuring its effectiveness, and Egypt. The point 
is that management theories and concepts which have been developed in the western world, 
may need to be modified and adapted in order to fit the cultural beliefs, values and 
expectations of developing nations such as Egypt (Humphreys 1996). Also, the finding 
highlights the important role of disclosures in audit committees charters and reports for their 
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oversight responsibilities. The focus of the charter should define the scope of the committee's 
oversight responsibilities and the report should explain how these are to be discharged. 
192 
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Chapter Eight: Audit Committees Effectiveness and Composition in Egypt 
8-1. Introduction 
Audit committee effectiveness and composition have come under close scrutiny in recent 
years from a variety of policy-makers, interest groups, and researchers. In particular, this 
chapter is concerned with examining the research questions number 2, 3, and 4. Therefore, the 
chapter sets out to address two issues. The first one is to measure the effectiveness of audit 
committees in the public banking sector in Egypt. The effectiveness is measured by the extent 
to which audit committee members carry out their oversight responsibilities related to the 
functions of financial reporting, external auditing, and internal control including internal 
auditing. This issue is tested in the light of the results in the previous chapter regarding the 
oversight responsibilities of audit committees, after modification. The questionnaire that was 
directed to the audit committee members contains fifteen case studies. Each set of questions 
examined a responsibility by using a case study scenario approach. The second issue is to 
empirically examine the relationship between audit committee effectiveness and audit 
committee composition. The composition of the audit committee has been the focus of many 
governance reform efforts in western countries, the unanimous view of proponents of reform 
is that the audit committee should be composed entirely of outside directors who have 
sufficient experience in oversight areas related to accounting and auditing. Therefore, this 
section is concerned with the effect of audit committee members' independence and their 
experience in audit committee effectiveness. 
8-2. Modification of Audit Committee Oversight Responsibilities for the Egyptian 
Environment 
Regarding the problem of institutional differences when transferring Anglo Saxon 
management theories and concepts, such as the audit committee, to developing countries, 
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Humphreys (1996) explained that such theories and concepts may need to be modified and 
adapted in order to fit the cultural beliefs, values, and expectations of nations such as Egypt. 
Consequently, based on the results in the previous chapter, and evidence from prior research 
i.e. Hofstede (1980), Gray (1988), Wallace and Gernon (1991 ), Salter and Niswander (1995), 
and Humphreys (1996), audit committee oversight responsibilities need to be modified and 
selected in order to match the Egyptian environment. For this purpose, two factors have been 
considered in the modification and selecting process. Firstly, the importance of each oversight 
responsibility and secondly, the appropriateness of each oversight responsibility for the legal 
framework and institutions in Egypt. Thus, the researcher has identified some of the oversight 
responsibilities which are not currently relevant in the Egyptian banking sector environment, 
at least in the current period. 
Examples of these less relevant practices, are those which require audit committee members 
to make recommendations to the Board of Directors regarding the appointment of external 
auditors, audit fees, and any questions of resignation or dismissal (Cadbury Committee 1992). 
These responsibilities have been considered as inappropriate for the public banking sector in 
Egypt (the only sector that has applied the audit committee concept since 2000) as law No. 
159 of 1981 which states that "where companies with more than twenty five percent state 
ownership, the Central Auditing Organization has the right to inspect the company". 
Consequently, an audit committee member does not have the right to make recommendations 
to the Board of Directors regarding the appointment of the external auditors or to determine 
the audit fee. Also, the oversight responsibilities, relating to corporate governance were not 
relevant because of the nature of the public banking sector which considers financial 
institutions and audit committee roles in such institutions, as different from other 
corporations. The National Office of Financial Institutions (200 1) reported that, directors of 
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financial institutions are responsible not only to their shareholders' and depositors' interests, 
but also to the regulatory authorities. In some instances, regulators take on significant 
monitoring activities and may serve as a substitute monitoring mechanism (Beasley and 
Salterio 2001 ). Therefore, these oversight responsibilities were considered as not relevant in 
order to achieve the validity of the study. 










Audit committee' oversight responsibilities Scenarios Code 
1. Review and analysis of the application of the alternative F.R. scenario I 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and 
assessment of whether financial reporting reflects the 
appropriate accounting principles. 
2. Review and analysis of significant changes in the F.R. scenario 2 
accounting policies. 
3. Review significant accounting and reporting issues, F.R. scenario 3 
including recent professional and regulatory pronouncement, 
and understand their impact on the financial reporting. 
4. Review financial reporting and the results of the audit F.R. scenario 4 
process before submission to the main board. 
5. Review interim financial reports, and assess whether they F.R. scenario 5 
contain adequate and appropriate disclosures. 
I. Evaluation of independent auditor's performance, E.A. scenario I 
including determination of independence. 
2. Review and analysis of the scope and activates of the E.A. scenario 2 
annual audit by the external auditors. 
3. Discuss with the external auditors the auditors' judgments E.A. scenario 3 
about the quality, not just the acceptability, of the bank's 
accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting. 
4. Monitoring of corrections by management of reported E.A. scenario 4 
deficiencies in the external auditor's management letter. 
5. Must be informing ifthere is an auditors-management E.A. scenario 5 
dispute. 
l.Review and analysis of the adequacy and effectiveness of I. C. scenario I 
internal accounting and financial control ofthe bank. 
2.Review and analysis of the internal audit reports, budgets, I. C. scenario 2 
and findings. 
3.Evaluation of internal auditors' performance. I.C. scenario 3 
4.Monitoring of corrections by management of reported I.C. scenario 4 
deficiencies reported by the internal auditors. 
5.Review the internal auditing plan with the director of I.C. scenario 5 
internal auditing to ensure that internal auditing involvement 
in control systems. 
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Regarding the first objective of this chapter, Table 8-1 lists fifteen audit committees oversight 
responsibilities relating to financial reporting, external auditing, and internal control including 
the internal auditing function, which were selected in order to measure the effectiveness of 
audit committees in the public banking sector in Egypt. Table 8-1 further shows the scenarios 
code for every oversight responsibility, which is used in the data analysis. Therefore, the 
questionnaire that was directed to the audit committee members contains fifteen scenarios. A 
separate scenario is expressed for every oversight responsibility by using the case study 
scenario approach (see appendix D). 
8-3. Effectiveness of Audit Committees in the Public Banking Sector in Egypt 
As already explained, audit committee effectiveness is measured using a questionnaire 
directed to audit committee members in the public banking sector. This sector contains four 
banks: the Alexandria Bank, the Bank Misr, the Cairo Bank, and the Egyptian National Bank. 
Every bank's audit committee includes four members. Therefore, this study population 
contained sixteen audit committee members. Sixteen questionnaires were directed to the audit 
committee members (full sample) and fourteen responses were received, i.e. almost all of the 
audit committee members participants responded (an 87% response rate). Table 8-2 shows the 
results for audit committees effectiveness in the Egyptian public banking sector for the fifteen 
oversight responsibilities. 
The first oversight responsibility requires audit committee members to review and analyse 
the application of the alternative generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and assess 
whether financial reporting reflects the appropriate accounting principles. Vanasco (1994) 
explained that bank audit committees need to review accounting principles to determine that 
financial statements reflect an appropriate consideration of changes in the bank's operating 
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conditions or reporting requirements. In this study, the result in Table 8-2 indicated that four 
responses (30.8 %) from audit committee members were in favour of the first financial 
reporting oversight responsibility and nine (69.2 %) were against. 
Table 8-2 Audit committees effectiveness in the public banking sector in Egypt 
Responsibility Type In favour % Against 0/o 
Financial Reporting 
I. Review and analysis of the application of the alternative 4 30,8 9 69,2 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and 
assessment of whether financial reporting reflects the 
appropriate accounting principles. 
2. Review and analysis of significant changes in the accounting 5 38,5 8 61,5 
policies. 
3. Review significant accounting and reporting issues, 6 46,2 7 53,8 
including recent professional and regulatory pronouncement, 
and understand their impact on the financial reporting. 
4. Review financial reporting and the results of the audit 9 69,2 4 30,8 
process before submission to the main board. 
5. Review interim financial reports, and assess whether they 10 76,9 3 23,1 
contain adequate and appropriate disclosures. 
External Auditing 
6. Evaluation of independent auditor's performance, including 7 50 7 50 
determination of independence. 
7. Review and analysis of the scope and activates ofthe annual 5 41,7 7 58,3 
audit by the external auditors. 
8. Discuss with the external auditors the auditors' judgments 5 38,5 8 61,5 
about the quality, not just the acceptability, of the bank's 
accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting. 
9. Monitoring of corrections by management of reported 6 46,2 7 53,8 
deficiencies in the external auditor's management letter. 
I 0. Must be informing if there is an auditors-management 5 38,5 8 61,5 
dispute. 
Internal Control Including Internal Auditing 
!!.Review and analysis of the adequacy and effectiveness of 10 71,4 4 28,6 
internal accounting and financial control of the bank. 
12.Review and analysis of the internal audit reports, budgets, 9 75 3 25 
and findings. 
13.Evaluation of internal auditors' performance. 9 69,2 4 30,8 
14.Monitoring of corrections by management of reported 9 69,2 4 30,8 
deficiencies reported by the internal auditors. 
15.Review the internal auditing plan with the director of !I 78,6 3 21,4 
internal auditing to ensure that internal auditing involvement in 
control systems 
The second oversight responsibility requires audit committee members to review and analyse 
significant changes in accounting policies. The results in Table 8-2 show that, (38.5 %) of the 
audit committee members were in favour with the oversight responsibilities and (61.5 %) 
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were against. These results are consistent with Vinten and Lee (1993) who found little 
evidence that the committees play a part in reviewing changes on accounting policy and 
identifying such policies. The involvement of audit committees in this area is a natural 
extension of their normal responsibilities. Thus, Vinten and Lee suggested that, on accounting 
policy, it is common for committees to review changes in such policies when management or 
auditors propose these. This view is consistent with the recommendations of the Cadbury 
Committee (1992) and the Smith Report (2003) in the UK, and those of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee (1999) in the USA. 
The third oversight responsibility requires audit committee members to review significant 
accounting and reporting Issues, including recent professional and regulatory 
pronouncements, and understand their impact on the financial reporting. The results in Table 
8-2 indicate that (46.2 %) of the audit committee members were in favour of this oversight 
responsibility and (53.8 %) were against. 
For the first three oversight responsibilities, the results asserted the low effectiveness of audit 
committees in carrying out such responsibilities. In their answers, a majority of the audit 
committee members (69.2%), (61.5%), and (53.8%) transferred these three responsibilities to 
other parties such as external auditors and internal auditing departments. These oversight 
responsibilities have been considered as matters for the external auditor and internal auditing 
department. There is therefore, evidence of the low effectiveness of audit committees in 
carrying out these oversight responsibilities, implying a lack of understanding among audit 
committee members of their responsibilities and duties. These results are consistent with 
Rittenberg and Nair (1993) and DeZoort (1997), who found that audit committee members 
believe they need to better understand their assigned duties and responsibilities to improve 
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audit committee effectiveness. In this case, the absence of a requirement in the Egyptian legal 
framework for audit committees to establish written charters, is considered an important 
reason for the low effectiveness in these oversight responsibility areas. Along these lines, the 
Treadway Commission (1987) states that "to enhance their effectiveness in carrying out their 
responsibilities for oversight of the financial reporting process on behalf of the Board of 
Directors, audit committees should have written charters that set forth their duties and 
responsibilities". Also, regarding the importance of audit committee charters, Vanasco (1994) 
suggests that the audit committee must have a written charter that provides a clear 
understanding of the committee's role. The audit committee charter provides a framework for 
the committee's organization, responsibilities, duties, and relationships with management, and 
external and internal auditors. Often such charters are included in the bylaws of corporations, 
and approved by the Board of Directors. The Cadbury Committee (1992) in the UK 
recommended that the board should establish an audit committee of at least 3 non-executive 
directors with written terms of reference dealing clearly with its authority and duties. Also, in 
the USA the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) recommended that the NYSE and NASD require 
the audit committee of each listed company to first, adopt a formal written charter that is 
approved by the full board of directors and specifies the scope of the committee's 
responsibilities, and how it carriers out those responsibilities, including structure, processes, 
and membership requirements, and secondly, review and reassess the adequacy of the audit 
committee charter on an annual basis. 
The Auditing Practices Board (2002) states that " the audit committee may discuss with the 
auditors details of significant misstatements identified by the auditors that have been adjusted 
as a result of the audit process. This may assist the committee in appraising the actions and 
judgements of management as they relate to the financial reporting process". Thus, the fourth 
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oversight responsibility requires audit committee members to review financial reporting and 
the results of the audit process before submission to the main board. Table 8-2 shows that 
(69.2%) of the audit committee members are in favour of this oversight responsibility. In 
contrast to the first three best practices, the results show an increase in the audit committees' 
effectiveness. these results were also consistent with Goddard and Carol (2000) who indicated 
that audit committees should review the financial statements prior to submission to the board. 
This should lead to higher quality financial reporting in compliance with accounting 
standards. Also, Collier (1993) asserted that, the function of the audit committee was to 
review all audited or unaudited financial statements prior to their submission to the board and 
to report thereon to the board. 
The fifth oversight responsibility requires audit committee members to review interim 
financial reports, and assess whether they contain adequate and appropriate disclosures. Table 
8-2 shows that (76.9%) ofthe audit committee members are in favour of this responsibility. In 
contrast to the first three oversight responsibilities, the results, as with the fourth oversight 
responsibility, show an increase in the audit committees' effectiveness. These results are 
consistent with the USA Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) recommendation 10, which requires 
audit committee members to undertake timely reviews of quarterly financial results and 
discuss review-related issues with the auditors. Also, the USA Treadway Commission (1987) 
states that the audit committee's oversight responsibilities undertaken on behalf of the Board 
of Directors extend to the quarterly reporting process. The audit committee should review the 
controls that management has established to protect the integrity of the quarterly reporting 
process. 
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The sixth oversight responsibility reqmres audit committee members to evaluate the 
independent auditor's performance, including the determination of independence. The results 
in Table 8-2 indicate that (50%) of the audit committee members were in favour of this 
responsibility and show that the audit committee members are ineffective in their role. In 
contrast, Reinstein and Weirich (1996) surveyed 731 CP As nationwide to ascertain if they 
perceived that audit committees enhanced their auditing independence, they found moderate 
support. Similarly, historical analysis suggests that audit committees were established 
primarily to safeguard the independence of external auditor (Carcello and Neal 2000b ). Also, 
Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) asserted that, with respect to audit function, the audit 
committee is expected to determine that auditors are free from managerial restrictions and 
interference. 
In terms of the audit committee's ability to influence the level of audit effort, DeZoort (1997) 
notes that audit committee members generally believe the review of the external auditor's 
work to be a primary audit committee duty. The UK Cadbury Committee (1992) recognized 
that audit committees had a role in ensuring audit quality. This principle is reflected in the 
audit committee's duties, which should normally include a discussion with the auditor on the 
nature and scope of the audit. Along these lines, the USA Blue Ribbon committee (1999) 
stated that "if the audit committee is to effectively accomplish its task of overseeing the 
financial reporting process, it must rely, in part, on the work, guidance and judgement of 
outside auditors". Therefore, in this study, the seventh oversight responsibility requires audit 
committee members to review and analyse the scope and activities of the annual audit by the 
external auditors. The result in Table 8-2 indicate that (41.7%) of the audit committee 
members were in agreement with this responsibility. Although the oversight responsibility is 
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considered as a primary audit committee's duty, the results indicate a low level of audit 
committee effectiveness. 
Regarding communication between audit committees and external auditors, the USA Blue 
Ribbon Committee (1999) requires that "a company's outside auditor discuss with the audit 
committee the auditor's judgements about the quality, not just the acceptability, of the 
company's accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting; the discussion should 
include such issues as the clarity of the company's financial disclosures and degree of 
aggressiveness or conservatism of the company's accounting principles and underlying 
estimates and other significant decisions made by management in preparing the financial 
disclosure and reviewed by the outside auditors". Consequently, the eighth oversight 
responsibility, in this study, requires audit committee members to discuss with the external 
auditors the auditors' judgments about the quality, not just the acceptability, of the bank's 
accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting. The results in Table 8-2 show that 
(38.5%) of the audit committee members were in favour of this responsibility and (61.5%) 
were not. Regarding this responsibility, the lesser effectiveness may be related to the nature of 
the public banking sector in Egypt, which is audited by the Central Auditing Organizations 
not by a private auditor, as explained before, based on law No. 159 of 1981. Thus audit 
committee members in this sector do not have a full right to discuss with the external auditors 
the auditors' judgments about the quality, not just the acceptability, of the bank's accounting 
principles as applied in its financial reporting. 
While management is responsible for the financial reporting process, the audit committee 
contributes to the integrity of that process by its oversight function. Because management at 
all levels influences the accuracy of financial reporting, the committee should continually 
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assess management's competence and integrity. Effective oversight requires the committee to 
have significant interaction with management, to ask difficult questions, and to obtain 
reasonable answers (Reinstein and Weirich 1995 and Price Waterhouse 1999). In this study, 
the ninth oversight responsibility requires audit committee members to monitor corrections 
by management of reported deficiencies in the external auditor's management letter. The 
results in Table 8-2 indicate that ( 46.2%) of the audit committee members were in favour of 
this responsibility and (53.8%) not. 
The tenth oversight responsibility requires audit committee members to be informed if there 
is an auditor-management dispute. The results in Table 8-2 indicate that (38.5%) of the audit 
committee members were in favour of this responsibility. The results show a low level of 
audit committees effectiveness. In contrast, Beattie et al. (2000) surveyed audit partners and 
CFOs of large publicly traded UK companies and found a tendency for firms with audit 
committees to enter into fewer negotiations but more informal discussions about accounting 
policy disputes than did firms without audit committees. Gib bins et al. (200 I) surveyed 
Canadian audit partners and found they, on average, rated the audit committee as only 
moderately important in auditor-client negotiations regarding accounting policy disputes. 
Also, DeZoort and Salterio (200 1) found that, greater independent director experience and 
greater audit knowledge was associated with higher audit committee member support for an 
auditor in disputes with client management. 
The National Office of Financial Institutions (2001) states that "it is imperative that the audit 
committee determine annually that the financial institution has an effective and efficient 
system of internal controls in place to safeguard assets and to prevent and detect fraud". The 
effectiveness of audit committees regarding internal control, including internal auditing 
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responsibility, is measured usmg next five case studies as a proxy for internal control 
oversight responsibilities. 
The eleventh oversight responsibility requires audit committee members to review and 
analyse the adequacy and effectiveness of internal accounting and financial control of the 
bank. The results in Table 8-2 show an increase in audit committee effectiveness for this 
responsibility; (71.4%) of the audit committee members were in favour. This finding is 
consistent with the importance placed on internal control evaluation forwarded by numerous 
entities external to the audit committee's oversight responsibilities (e.g. Treadway 
Commission 1987, Cadbury Committee 1992, Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002, SEC 2003, and 
Smith Report 2003). Also, this finding is consistent with the survey results in the previous 
chapter which concluded that audit committee members perceive internal control evaluation 
as the most important oversight area. 
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA 1993) states that internal auditing can play an 
important role in preventing errors and fraud, and is a useful mechanism in the checks and 
balances of effective corporate governance. Thus, the goals of audit committees and internal 
auditing are closely intertwined, and the ability of the audit committee and internal auditing to 
work together significantly impacts on the effectiveness of the audit committee in fulfilling its 
responsibility to the Board of Directors, shareholders, and other outside parties. In this study, 
the twelfth oversight responsibility requires audit committee members to review and analyse 
the internal audit reports, budgets, and findings. The results in Table 8-2 indicate a moderate 
level of audit committee effectiveness regarding this responsibility, (75%) of the audit 
committee members are in favour of it and (25%) otherwise. This finding is consistent with 
Scarbrough et al. (1998) and Atkins (2002) who state that the goals of audit committees and 
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internal auditing are closely intertwined, and the ability of the audit committee and internal 
auditing to work together significantly impacts on the effectiveness of the audit committee in 
fulfilling its responsibilities to the Board of Directors, shareholders, and other outside parties. 
The review of the internal control systems allows audit committee members to obtain an 
independent opinion on the strength of the internal controls in the organization and makes the 
executive accountable for implementing control recommendations (Collier 1993). In this 
study, the thirteenth oversight responsibility requires audit committee members to evaluate 
the internal auditors' performance. The results indicate that (69.2%) of the audit committee 
members were in favour of this responsibility and (30.8%) were against it. This finding is 
consistent with the Price Waterhouse survey (1997) of large European companies which 
found that (88%) had an internal audit function and, in most cases, audit committees reviewed 
and approved the scope of work and activities ofthe internal auditors. 
Research by Price Waterhouse (1993) published by the Institute oflnternal Auditors Research 
Foundation in the USA, suggested that the audit committee should consider and review with 
management and the director of internal auditing; significant findings during the year and 
management's responses thereto. The fourteenth responsibility in this study requires audit 
committee members to monitor corrections by management of reported deficiencies reported 
by the internal auditors. The results in Table 8-2 indicate a moderate level of audit committee 
effectiveness regarding such responsibility, (69.2%) of the audit committee members are in 
favour of it and (30.8%) otherwise. This finding is consistent with the UK Institute oflnternal 
Auditors survey (2002), carried out among almost 200 organizations, which found that in 
most cases the primary internal audit reporting line was to the audit committee, which, in 
banks and building societies is often comprised of non-executive directors. 
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Scarbrough et al. (1998) explained that one of the responsibilities of the audit committee is to 
ensure that management has designed and implemented an effective internal control system. 
To fulfill this responsibility, audit committees must review the internal audit programme and 
ensure that its scope is adequate. Therefore, in this study, the fifteenth oversight 
responsibility requires audit committee members to review the internal auditing plan with the 
director of internal auditing to ensure that the involvement of internal auditing in control 
systems. The results in Table 8-2 indicate a moderate level of audit committee effectiveness 
regarding this responsibility, (78.6%) of the audit committee members are in favour with it 
and (21.4%) otherwise. This finding is consistent with Scarbrough et al. (1998) who state that 
audit committees must review the internal audit programme and ensure that its scope is 
adequate. 
In general, the results indicate that regarding internal control, including internal auditing 
responsibility, there is greater audit committee effectiveness than is the case for the results 
regarding the external auditing responsibilities. This increase in audit committee effectiveness 
may be referenced to the nature of the public banking sector, which are considered as 
financial institutions. The National Office of Financial Institutions (200 1) reported that, audit 
committee roles in financial institutions are different from other corporations. Financial 
institution directors are responsible not only to their shareholders' and depositors' interests, 
but also to the regulatory authorities. But this increase in audit committee effectiveness for 
these oversight responsibilities may be different for other sectors in Egypt. The World Bank 
Report (2002) argued that the internal audit function of Egyptian companies, if it exists, is 
weak. 
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One Sample T-Test 
In order to test the overall differences in audit committee members' responses for the fifteen 
best practices, Table 8-3 shows the result of One Sample T-Test for the audit committee 
members sample. The results contains the value for Sig.(2-tailed). Since the observed 
significance level is less than 0.0005, SPSS displays it as 0.000. This does not mean that the 
probability is 0. It is less than 0.0005 (Norusis 2000). 
Table 8-3 One-Sample T-Test results for audit committee members sample 
One-Sample Test 
Test Value= 14 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Mean Difference 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Difference Lower Upper 
F.R. Case 1 -92.376 12 .000 -12.31 -12.60 -12.02 
F.R. Case 2 -88.183 12 .000 -12.38 -12.69 -12.08 
F.R. Case 3 -86.593 12 .000 -12.46 -12.78 -12.15 
F.R. Case 4 -95.263 12 .000 -12.69 -12.98 -12.40 
F.R. Case 5 -104.988 12 .000 -12.77 -13.03 -12.50 
EA Case 1 
-90.139 13 .000 -12.50 -12.80 -12.20 
EA Case 2 -83.531 11 .000 -12.42 -12.74 -12.09 
E.A. Case 3 -88.183 12 .000 -12.38 -12.69 -12.08 
E.A. Case 4 
-86.593 12 .000 -12.46 -12.78 -12.15 
EA Case 5 -88.183 12 .000 -12.38 -12.69 -12.08 
I.C. Case 1 -101.476 13 .000 -12.71 -12.98 -12.44 
I.C. Case 2 -97.658 11 .000 -12.75 -13.04 -12.46 
I. C. Case 3 -95.263 12 .000 -12.69 -12.98 -12.40 
I.C. Case 4 -95.263 12 .000 -12.69 -12.98 -12.40 
I.C. Case 5 -112.349 13 .000 -12.79 -13.03 -12.54 
Based on the observed significance level, this study concludes that there are differences in the 
audit committee members' responses for the fifteen best practices. These differences may be 
referenced to the differences in the qualifications between audit committee members 
regarding independence and experience in accounting and auditing. Klein (2002) argued that 
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differences in audit committees' performance might result if audit committee members are not 
independent of management and lack experience in accounting and auditing. The 
qualifications of audit committee members will be tested in the next section. 
8-4. Impact of Audit Committee Composition on Audit Committee Effectiveness 
This section empirically examines the relationship between audit committee composition and 
audit committee effectiveness. Since the composition of the audit committee has been the 
focus of many governance reform efforts in western countries, the unanimous view of the 
proponents of reform is that the audit committee should be composed entirely of outside 
independent directors who have a sufficient experience in oversight areas related to 
accounting and auditing. Therefore, this section is concerned with examining the effect of the 
level of independence and experience of audit committee members on audit committee 
effectiveness, which is measured in the previous section using the linear multiple regression 
model. In addition to the independent variables of interest, the researcher controlled for the 
effect of other factors likely to affect audit committee effectiveness. These control variables 
are outside directors in the board, audit committee meetings attended by audit committee 
members, and audit committee size. 
8-4-1. Independence of the Audit Committee Member 
The independence of audit committee members was determined based on the definition of 
independence used by various committees, reports, and trading venues, (for example, the 
Treadway Commission 1987, the Cadbury Committee 1992, BRC 1999, the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act of 2002, SEC 2003, and the Higgs Report 2003), see chapter five. The definition is 
characterized as follows: no director who, (1) is a current or former employee (within the last 
3 years), or (2) has a business relationship or is an executive officer for a firm that has a 
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business relationship with the firm, or (3) is part of a cross compensation committee link 
between boards, or ( 4) is a member of the immediate family of an executive officer, shall be 
considered independent. Using the above definition of independence (INDEP), Table 8-4 
shows that (50%) of audit committee members are classified as independent and (50%) are 
classified as non-independent. 
Table 8-4 Classification of audit committee members' independence 
Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Independence 7 50.0 50.0 
Non-independence 7 50.0 100 
Total 14 100 
In the context of audit committee effectiveness, this study expects that the independent audit 
committee member is more likely to achieve a higher level of audit committee effectiveness 
than a non-independent member. Therefore, this study hypothesises that: 
Hl: There is a significant positive association between the independence of the audit 
committee members and audit committee effectiveness 
8-4-2. Audit Committee Member Experience 
The experience of audit committee members was determined based on the definition of 
experience used by various committees and reports (for example, the BRC 1999, the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 2002, and the Smith Report 2003). Thus, audit committee member experience 
was coded using two levels. The first level included audit committee members who have (1) 
the highest level of education in accounting and auditing, or (2) professional certifications in 
auditing, or (3) their background indicates either formal training or familiarity with the review 
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of financial reporting and auditing. Members in this group included auditors, accountants, 
CFOs, and accounting academics. The second category included all other members not 
captured in the first category. 
Using the above definition of experience (EXPER), Table 8-5 shows that (57.1 %) of audit 
committee members were classified as experienced in accounting and auditing and (42.9%) 
were classified as non-experienced. 
Table 8-5 Classification of audit committee members' experience 
Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Experience 8 57.1 57.1 
Non-experience 6 42.9 100 
Total 14 100 
In the context of audit committee effectiveness, this study expects that if audit committee 
members have experience of accounting and auditing they are more likely to achieve a higher 
level of audit committee effectiveness than members with no such experience. Therefore this 
study hypothesises that: 
H2: there is a significant positive association between the experience of the audit committee 
members and audit committee effectiveness. 
Control Variable 
In addition to the independent variables of interest, the researcher controlled for the effects of 
other factors that are likely to affect the audit committee effectiveness. The control variables 
are outside directors in the board, audit committee meetings, and audit committee size: 
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Outside directors in the board 
Deli and Gillan (2000) and Abbott and Parker (2000a) asserted that audit committee 
composition is, to some degree, mechanically related to the composition of the full board. 
Also, Menon and Williams (1994) find that, audit committee activity increases with the 
independence of the full board. This suggests that it may be appropriate to control for full 
board independence when examining the composition of the audit committee. Therefore, in 
this study, in order to control for the possibility that the percentage of outside directors on the 
board is the driving force in audit committee effectiveness, the researcher included a control 
variable (OUTSIDER%) defined as the percentage of outside directors serving on the board. 
Audit Committee Meetings 
Since the primary role of the audit committee is to monitor financial reporting and internal 
controls on behalf of the shareholders, one would expect that effective monitoring necessarily 
requires audit committee activity. Menon and Williams (1994) argue that to be effective 
monitors it is not enough that audit committees be independent- they must also be active. An 
audit committee activity is an important dimension of overall effectiveness because activity 
signals monitoring (Archambeault and DeZoort 200 I). As a result, the number of audit 
committee meetings held during the year is a common proxy for committee activity. 
Therefore, in this study, in order to control for the possibility that the number of meetings 
attended by audit committee members is the driving force in audit committee effectiveness, 
the researcher included a control variable (# MEET) defined as the average number of audit 
committee meetings attended in the year by audit committee members. 
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Audit Committee Size 
The audit committee composition may vary from company to company. The number of 
members of the audit committee is determined by the size of the board of directors and the 
size of the organisation (Vanasco 1994). To this end, concern about audit committee size has 
lead to a number of recommendations about the number of members needed to help ensure 
that audit committees are large enough to provide adequate oversight. For example, the Blue 
Ribbon Committee (BRC 1999) recommends that the NYSE and NASD require audit 
committees to be comprised of a minimum of three directors, each of whom is financially 
literate. Similarly, the UK Cadbury Committee (1992) recommended that "the board should 
establish an audit committee of at least 3 non-executive directors". Also, the Smith Report 
(2003) recommends that "audit committees should include at least three members, who should 
all be independent non-executive directors". However, the size of each committee should be 
appropriate to the company's circumstances and will depend on the extent of the committee's 
responsibilities. Therefore, in this study, in order to control for the possibility that the audit 
committee size is the driving force in audit committee effectiveness, the researcher included a 
control variable(# MEMBERS) defined as the number of directors on the audit committee. 
Table 8-6 provides a summary of the research test and control variables. Information related 
to the number of outsider directors, number of audit committee meetings attended by the audit 
committee member, and the number of directors in the audit committee, was gathered from 
the banks' annual reports in the Central Bank of Egypt database. 
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8-4-3. Audit Committee Effectiveness Model 
This study uses logistic regression to analyze relations between audit committee effectiveness 
and audit committee composition variables. The general model used to test the research 
hypotheses is: 
%EFFECT= BO + Bl INDEP + B2 EXPER + BJ %OUTSIDER + B4 # MEET +BS # 
MEMBERS+E 
Where the dependent variable is a number of audit committee member responses considered 
as in favour of the oversight responsibilities as a percentage of overall responsibilities 
numbers. The independent and control variables are: 
INDEP 
EXPER 
= 1, if audit committee member is considered as independent, 0 otherwise. 
= 1, if the audit committee member consider as experienced in accounting 
and auditing. 
% OUTSIDER = Number of outsider board directors as a percentage of overall board 
#MEET 
members 
=Number of audit committee meetings attended by audit committee member 
in the year 
#MEMBERS =Number of directors on the audit committee 
E =Residual 
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The extent to which audit committees carries out its 
oversight responsibilities related to financial reporting 
function; external auditing function; and internal control 
including internal auditing function 
No director who, (1) is a current or former employee 
(within the last 3 years), or (2) has a business 
relationship or is an executive officer for a firm that has 
business relationship with the firm, or (3) is part of a 
cross compensation committee link between boards, or 
(4) is a member ofthe immediate family of an executive 
officer, shall be considered independent 
Audit committee member experience was coded using 
two levels. The first level included audit committee 
members whose have highest level of education in 
accounting and auditing; professional certifications 
auditing; background indicates either formal training or 
familiarity with review of financial reporting and 
auditing. The second category includes all other 
members not captured in the first category. 
Number of outsider board directors as a percentage of 
overall board members 
Number of audit committee meeting attended by audit 
committee member in the year 
The number of directors on the audit committee 
Linear Multiple Regression Model Results 
Source 
Wolnizer 1995, DeZoort 
1997, and Lee and Stone 
1997 
BRC 1999, Archambeault 
and DeZoort 2001, and 
Deli and Gillan 2000 
Dezoort 1998, BRC 1999, 
and Archambeault and 
DeZoort 200 1 
Deli and Gillan 2000, and 
Abbott and Parker 2000 
Menon and Williams 
1994, McMullen and 
Raghunandan 1996, 
Carcello and Neal 1998, 
BRC 1999, Song and 
Windram 2000, Deli and 
Gillan 2000, and 
Archambeault and 
DeZoort 2001 
Deli and Gillan 2000, 
Archambeault and 
DeZoort 2001, and Collier 
and Gregory 1999 
Table 8-7 contains the results from the multiple linear regression used to empirically test the 
research hypothesis (Hl and H2). Panel (B) in Table 8-7 shows that the adjusted R square is 
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(.785). The value means that the observed variability in audit committee effectiveness is 
explained by independence and control variables. 





Model B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .167 .363 
INDEP .180 .034 .812 
EX PER 8.245E-02 .033 .368 
#MEETS 2.139E-02 .031 .136 
%OUTSIDER 
.573 1.034 .284 
#MEMBERS -7.69E-02 .065 -.552 
a. Dependent Variable: Effectiveness of Audit committee 
Panel (B): 
Model Adjusted F Si g. 
R Square 
1 .785 10.468 .002 







The test of null hypothesis (H1 and H2) is based on the ratio ofthe regression mean square to 
the residual mean square (Norusis 2000). Panel (B) in· Table 8-7 which shows the overall 
significance of the model, F is (10.468). Since the observed significance level is less than 
(0.05), so that the researcher rejected the null hypothesis that the observed variability in audit 
committee effectiveness is not explained by independence and control variables. The 
coefficient for the independent and control variables are listed in the column labelled "B" in 
panel (A) of Table 8-7. Using these coefficients, the estimated regression equation is: 
Y = .167 + .180 * INDEP + .082 * EXPER + .573 *%OUTSIDERS+ .021 *#MEET-
.076 * # MEMBERS 
Where Y is the predicated audit committee effectiveness. 
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Results of Hypothesis Testing 
The first hypothesis predicted that, there is a significant positive association between 
independence of audit committee members and audit committee effectiveness. The results in 
Table 8-7, panel (B) provide support for H 1. The observed significance level for the 
independence of audit committee members is ".001" (P-Value < .05) and the coefficient with 
audit committee effectiveness is positive. These results suggest that firms with high levels of 
outside independent audit committee members are significantly more likely to have effective 
audit committees than other firms. The results are consistent with the empirical researches, 
which support such concerns about audit committee member independence. McMullen and 
Reghunadan (1996) found that companies without reporting problems were more likely to 
have an audit committee composed solely of outside directors than companies with reporting 
problems. Also, DeZoort and Salterio (2001) found that independent director experience was 
positively related to audit committee member support for a ' substance over from' position in 
an auditor-client dispute. Beasley (1996) found that the percentage of outside directors was 
significantly lower for firms with fraudulent activity than for firms without fraudulent 
activity, and that fraudulent firms had audit committees with a significantly lower percentage 
of outsiders than non-fraudulent firms. 
The second hypothesis predicted that, there is a significant positive association between the 
experience of audit committee members and audit committee effectiveness. The results in 
Table 8-7 panel (B) provides support for H2. The observed significance level for audit 
J 
committee member' experience is ".036" (P-Value < .05) and the coefficient with audit 
committee effectiveness is positive. The results suggest that firms with higher levels of audit 
committee members who have sufficient experience in oversight areas related to accounting 
and auditing are significantly more likely to have effective audit committees. These results are 
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consistent with a number of studies which highlight the importance of relevant audit 
committee member experience as a component of overall committee effectiveness. Also, the 
results are consistent with survey research of audit committee effectiveness, which suggests 
that audit committee members' perceived expertise in accounting and auditing is related to 
committee effectiveness as defined by a panel of audit partners, internal audit directors and 
chief financial officers (Kalbers and Fogarty 1993). For example, McMullen and 
Raghunandan (1996) found that the companies with no reporting problems were more likely 
to have a CP A on the audit committee than companies that had experienced reporting 
problems. DeZoort (1998) found that member experience in auditing and internal controls had 
a positive effect on member performance in internal control evaluation tasks. Similarly, 
DeZoort and Salterio (2001) found that independent director experience was positively related 
to audit committee member support for an auditor who advocated a 'substance' approach to 
accounting in a 'substance versus form' dispute with client management. 
Results of Control Variables 
The research control variable results do not generally support the predictions of the prior 
literature. In this study, results for control variables often lack significance. Table 8-7 panel 
(B) shows the observed significance level for (%OUTSIDERS), (# MEET), and (# 
MEMBERS) variables are (.512); (.595); and (.268) respectively (P-Value > .05). The results 
indicated that there is no significant association between the control variables and audit 
committee effectiveness. Also, (# MEMBERS) variable has a negative relation to audit 
committee effectiveness (B = - .076). 
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Matrix of Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
To assess multicollinearity, the researcher calculated a matrix of Pearson correlation 
coefficients. Correlation matrices are useful for looking at the strength of the linear 
relationship between pairs of variables (Norusis 2000). Table 8-8 shows results of Pearson 
correlation coefficients. 




committee INDEP EX PER #MEETS %OUTSIDER #MEMBERS 
Pearson Correlation Effectiveness of 
1.000 Audit committee .780 .633 .129 .136 .100 
INDEP .780 1.000 .289 -.102 .260 .359 
EXPER .633 .289 1.000 .293 .218 .130 
#MEETS .129 -.102 .293 1.000 .560 .346 
%OUTSIDER .136 .260 .218 .560 1.000 .934 
#MEMBERS .100 .359 .130 .346 .934 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Effectiveness of 
.001 Audit committee .008 .330 .322 .367 
INDEP .001 .158 .365 .185 .104 
EXPER .008 .158 .155 .227 .329 
#MEETS .330 .365 .155 .019 .112 
%OUTSIDER .322 .185 .227 .019 .000 
#MEMBERS .367 .104 .329 .112 .000 
N Effectiveness of 
Audit committee 14 14 14 14 14 14 
INDEP 14 14 14 14 14 14 
EXPER 14 14 14 14 14 14 
#MEETS 14 14 14 14 14 14 
%OUTSIDER 14 14 14 14 14 14 
#MEMBERS 14 14 14 14 14 14 
The correlation matrix in Table 8-8 indicates significant pairwise correlations among the two 
independent variables and audit committee effectiveness. These findings are consistent with 
prior audit committee studies (Kalbers and F ogarty 1993, Menon and Williams 1994, 
McMullen and Reghunadan 1996, Beasly 1996, Carcello and Neal 1998, DeZoort 1998, and 
DeZoort and Salterio 2001). Table 8-8 shows that, Pearson correlation between the 
independence of audit committee members and audit committee effectiveness is . 780 and the 
Pearson correlation between the experience of audit committee members and audit committee 
effectiveness is .633. These results indicate that there is strength in the linear relationship 
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between independence and experience of audit committee members and audit committee 
effectiveness. At the same time, the results indicate that there is a lower linear relationship 
between the control variables (number of audit committee meetings, number of outside 
directors on the full board, and number of directors in the audit committee) and audit 
committee effectiveness (.129, .136, and .100 respectively). Table 8-8 reveals the value for 
Sig.(l-tailed), it is .001 and .008 respectively (P-Value < .05) for the independence and 
experience of audit committee members. For control variables it is .330, .322, and .367 
respectively (P-Value > .05). 
8-5. Summary 
This chapter contains two objectives. The first one was to measure the effectiveness of audit 
committees in the public banking sector in Egypt. The effectiveness is measured by the extent 
to which audit committees carry out their oversight responsibilities regarding the functions of 
financial reporting, external auditing, and internal control including internal auditing by using 
fifteen oversight responsibilities. The results asserted low effectiveness of audit committee 
members in carrying out their oversight responsibilities related to financial reporting 
functions. The results are consistent with Rittenberg and Nair (1993) and DeZoort (1997), 
who found that audit committee members believe they need a better understanding of their 
assigned duties and responsibilities to improve audit committee effectiveness. In this case, the 
absence in the Egyptian legal framework of a requirement for audit committees to establish 
written charter in the Egyptian legal framework, is considered an important reason for low 
effectiveness in these responsibilities areas. Accordingly, the audit committees need a 
reference guide setting out its responsibilities. A detailed charter focuses the efforts of the 
audit committee and increases its effectiveness. 
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In contrast, some case study results indicated increases in audit committee effectiveness such 
as in the financial reporting responsibility 4 and 5, and internal control best practices. This 
increase in audit committee effectiveness may also be related to the nature of the public 
banking sector, which are considered as financial institutions. The National Office of 
Financial Institutions (200 1) reported that, audit committee roles in financial institutions are 
different from other corporations. Financial institution directors are responsible not only to 
their shareholders' and depositors' interests, but also to the regulatory authorities. The result 
of the One Sample T-Test for the audit committee members sample indicated that there are 
differences in the audit committee members' responses for the fifteen responsibilities. These 
differences may be referenced to the differences in qualifications between audit committee 
members regarding independence and experience in accounting and auditing. 
For the second objective, the results provide support for the research hypothesis that the 
independence and experience of audit committee members are significantly and positively 
related to audit committee effectiveness. The results indicate that banks with audit committees 
that consist solely of independent directors who have experience in accounting and auditing 
are likely to have higher audit committee effectiveness. The results support the view of a 
variety of policy-makers, interest groups, and researchers, who have argued for a heightened 
role for the audit committee in matters related to accounting and auditing. The results also 
have implications for policy makers who have the ability to prescribe who may sit on audit 
committees, for corporate boards in appointing audit committee members, and for auditors in 
developing strategies for communicating with audit committees and assessing their 
effectiveness. 
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Chapter Nine: Conclusions, Limitations, and Recommendations 
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Chapter Nine: Conclusions, Limitations, and Recommendations 
9-1. Introduction 
This study aims to measure audit committees effectiveness in order to have indicators about 
its oversight responsibilities in general and particular its development in Egypt. To achieve 
this aim, the research objective was broken down into the following key components: 
1. To investigate the differences in audit committee members' perception of their 
oversight responsibilities between the USA, the UK, and Egypt. 
2. To measure the effectiveness of audit committees in the public banking sector in 
Egypt. 
3. To assess the relationship between the independence of audit committee members and 
the effectiveness of audit committees in the public banking sector in Egypt. 
4. To assess the relationship between the experience of audit committee members and the 
effectiveness of audit committees in the public banking sector in Egypt. 
5. To investigate the obstacles which face audit committees in the public banking sector 
in Egypt and their effect on audit committee effectiveness. 
9-2. Conclusions 
Companies in both developed and emerging markets have learnt that corporate governance 
has become a vital issue in order to be able to merge with local and foreign companies, to tap 
international financial markets and to operate in a truly competitive environment. Corporate 
governance all over the world has become a powerful tool for attracting foreign direct 
investment (OECD 1999). A transparent and effectively monitored market environment for 
international equity flows enhances the stability of these flows and serves as an early warning 
system for corporate and financial distress. In Egypt, corporate governance has gained more 
importance in recent years due to the integration of the Egyptian economy with the global 
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economy, internationalization of capital markets, and the increasingly important role played 
by the private sector in the economy. This study is concerned with the audit committee as one 
of the most important corporate governance tools and measures their effectiveness in the 
public banking sector in order to investigate the obstacles which have been faced and suggest 
ways to overcome these obstacles. 
This study is grounded in an institutional framework, and old institutional economics m 
particular, this is because of its suitability and practicality for studying audit committees in 
Egypt within their intricate societal web. Old institutional economics (OIE) emphasises the 
interplay between institutions and actions in the economy, society, and culture which are 
involved in the issues surrounding the transference of Anglo Saxon management and 
accounting theories and concepts such as audit committees to developing countries such as 
Egypt. In conforming to the institutional framework, this study provides a clear picture of the 
social constructions of risk, and the role of cultural differences in· the applicability of Anglo 
Saxon management and accounting theories and practices in Egypt (see chapter 2). Also, 
beside the treatment of rules and routines as the carriers of organisational memory, Scapens 
(1994) reported that they can be regarded as a basis for the evolution of organisational 
behaviour. He also argued that evolution is not the creation of optimal behaviour, but merely 
the production (and possible adaptation) of behaviour through time. regarding audit 
committees, Green (1994) explained that the role of the audit committee is constantly 
evolving, and as a result of recommendations by the accounting profession and regulators and 
pressure from the financial press, investors, and academics, the rules and expectations 
surrounding the practice of financial reporting are in a constant state of flux. Often these 
changes are precipitated by a "crisis" such as the collapse of a financial institution or the 
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bankruptcy of a large corporation. The resulting changes, then, can be seen as an attempt to 
protect the public from inadequate financial statement disclosure and improve audit standards. 
Audit committee guidelines and codes of best practice, like corporate governance, arise in the 
context of, and are affected by, differing national frameworks of law, regulations, and stock 
exchange listing rules as well as differing societal values. Therefore, to understand one 
nation's audit committee practice in relation to another one must understand not only the best 
practice documents but also the underlying legal framework. Consequently, it is possible that 
differences in the regulatory environment and the importance assigned to corporate 
governance, as well as other cultural factors, could significantly influence the nature of the 
audit committees' legal framework in different countries. Therefore, this study compared the 
legal framework for audit committees in Egypt in the light of the frameworks in the UK and 
the USA (see chapter 5). This comparison shows that there are differences between the three 
legal frameworks, particularly in respect to Egypt. 
The audit committee concept is still a new phenomenon in Egypt and therefore audit 
committee experience is relatively limited. The legal framework in Egypt, in particular the 
Capital Market Authority (CMA) statement No.30 article No. 7 of 2002, fails in many areas. 
(1) The CMA does not require the listed companies in the Cairo & Alexandria Stock 
Exchange (CASE) to adopt a formal written charter for audit committees. (2) The requirement 
for independent audit committee members appeared in the CMA statement, but 
"independence" requirements for audit committee members, was not defined. (3) Despite the 
CMA considering the importance of audit committee member experience, the statement does 
not specify the requirements for financial experience of audit committee members. (4) The 
CMA does not specify any recommendations related to the annual number of audit 
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committee meetings. (5) The CMA does not specify any recommendations related to the 
audit committee's resources and authority. (6) The CMA does not specify any 
recommendations to the listed companies related to the audit committee members training. (7) 
The CMA does not require companies to disclose the audit committee report in their annual 
reports. Also, regarding audit committees' oversight responsibilities, this comparison shows 
that in Egypt the CMA statement does not specify the necessary oversight responsibilities as: 
(1) The evaluation of exposure to fraud. (2) The appointment, reappointment and removal of 
the external auditors. (3) Involving in the audit fee negotiation process. (4) Ensuring the 
independence of the external auditor. (5) Requesting to be informed of the auditor-
management disputes. (6) Reviewing the nature and magnitude of non-audit services. (7) 
Reviewing the internal auditing function or any interaction between the audit committee and 
internal auditing. (8) Reviewing corporate policies and practices in light of ethical 
considerations. (9) Monitoring compliance with the company's codes of conduct. At the same 
time, in Egypt, oversight responsibilities such as (1) the review off all financial statements, 
whether interim or annual (2) the review of all existing accounting policies (3) and the review 
of systems of internal control, are similar to those in the USA and the UK legal framework. 
On the other hand, in the UK, the legal framework for audit committees does not clearly 
define requirements for audit committee members to review corporate policies and practices 
in light of ethical considerations or to monitor compliance with the company's codes of 
conduct. 
Based on the above comparison of legal frameworks for audit committee in the USA, the UK, 
and Egypt, the legal framework in Egypt is considered weak. This finding is consistent with 
Babic (200 1) who argued that in developed market economies, a system of corporate 
governance has been built gradually through centuries, and today it can be defined as a 
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"complex mosaic" consisting of laws, regulations, politics, public institutions, professional 
associations and ethics codes. However, in transition economy countries a lot of details of the 
mosaic are still missing. Trying to develop a system of good corporate governance in these 
countries is made difficult by problems such as weak legal and judicial systems, and absent or 
underdeveloped institutions and scarce human resource capabilities (CIPE 2002). 
The missing element in the context of corporate governance development in transition 
economies is the lack of institutions associated with successful market economies (OECD 
2001 ). In market economies there is a standard set of institutions that have been successful as 
the tools used to control corporations. Institutions are the 'rules of the game' in a society 
(Y eager 1999). They are the rules that the society establishes to reduce the uncertainty of 
human interactions. The institutional framework has three components: formal rules, informal 
rules and enforcement mechanisms. While both the formal legal environment and the informal 
institutional constraints affect corporate governance, institutional theory states that when 
formal institutions are weak, informal constraints play a larger role in shaping firm behaviuor 
(Young et. al. 2002). 
It is expected that the transition economy process in Egypt, undergoing major economic, 
regulations, and political reforms, as well as Anglo Saxon market acculturation, will exhibit 
differences in corporate governance systems. Such differences may be associated with 
significant differences in attitudes, beliefs and cultural values. These in turn are expected to 
impact on managerial behaviour, firms' objectives and market for corporate control 
(Humphreys 1996 and Dockery and Herbert 2000). This study used a survey strategy in order 
to examine audit committee oversight responsibility from the internal perspective of the UK 
and Egyptian audit committee members in comparison with the DeZoort (1997) study in the 
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USA. The survey used Wolnizer's (1995) list of seventeen prescribed audit committee 
objectives, which DeZoort had used for audit committee members in the USA. The survey 
related to accounting and reporting, auditors and auditing, and corporate governance in 
general, it was used as a basis to assess audit committee members' abilities to recognize their 
assigned objectives and explore their perceptions of the key tasks. Wolnizer' s (1995) set of 
seventeen audit committee objectives provided a basis for measuring audit committee 
members' responses, which DeZoort (1997) used in the USA survey. The respondents were 
asked three questions related to their assigned responsibilities. (1) Is the objective assigned 
formally to your committee? (2) Is the objective performed, but not assigned to your 
committee? (3) Is the objective appropriate for audit committees? (See appendix C). 
Because of the close economic ties between the UK and the USA, both with respect to the 
degree of market integration and the organisation of transactions and in relation to other 
socio-cultural respects (Dockery and Herbert 2000), the results in general indicate that, in the 
UK sample, audit committee members tend not to recognize their responsibilities as assigned 
in annual reports, but perform many functions not listed formally in annual reports, similarly 
with the DeZoort USA survey results (see chapter 7). The results also provide evidence that, 
in the USA, the UK, and Egypt, audit committee members perceive internal control 
evaluation as the most important oversight area. The results also provide evidence that audit 
committee members, in the USA and the UK, agree with the current requirements and 
recommendations for expansion of their oversight responsibilities, excepting the UK for 
objectives (OBJ16) and (OBJ17). But in Egypt audit committee members agree with only 
eight oversight responsibilities. The results, in general, indicated that, there are differences 
between the institutions of those countries which applied the audit committee concept a long 
time ago, and constituted the oversight responsibilities for measuring its effectiveness, and the 
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evidence from Egypt. The point being that management theories and concepts which have 
been developed in the Anglo Saxon world may need to be modified and adapted in order to fit 
the cultural beliefs, values and expectations of developing nations such as Egypt (Humphreys 
1996). Also, the findings highlight the important role of disclosures in audit committee 
charters and reports in their oversight responsibilities. The focus of the charter should define 
the scope of the committee's oversight responsibilities and the report should explain how 
these are to be discharged. 
Stevenson (2002) explained that institutional economics, in part, is about problem solving. 
Problem solving is a purposeful activity involving establishing frames for recognition, 
processes of remediation, and objectives for resolution, all of which are value-based 
undertakings. Therefore, in this study the effectiveness of the audit committees in the public 
banking sector in Egypt was measured by looking at, particularly, the extent to which audit 
committee members carry out their oversight responsibilities regarding financial reporting, 
external and internal auditing in order to find ways to improve audit committees practice in 
Egypt. In this study, audit committee oversight responsibilities, after modification based on 
the results in chapter seven, is used as a tool to examine the effectiveness via a questionnaire 
instrument. The questionnaire that was directed to the audit committee members contains 
fifteen scenarios. A separate scenario is expressed for every oversight responsibility by using 
the case study scenario approach. The results, in general, asserted the low effectiveness of 
audit committee members in carrying out their oversight responsibilities (see chapter 8). The 
results are consistent with Rittenbery and Nair (1993) and DeZoort (1997), who found that 
audit committee members believe they need a better understanding of their assigned duties 
and responsibilities to improve audit committee effectiveness. Also, Menon and Williams 
(1994) support this contention with findings showing that companies which had nominally 
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formed an audit committee were often reluctant to rely upon it. They concluded that audit 
committees are often created for the purposes of appearance rather than to enhance 
stockholders' control of management. According to Fogarty (1996) the key attribute of 
institutional theory lies in its ability to highlight the distinction between what organizations 
actually accomplish and what their structure suggest to the external environment they should 
accomplish. In this case, the lack of requirements in the Egyptian legal framework regarding 
audit committee disclosure (committee charters and reports) is considered an important reason 
for low effectiveness of these oversight responsibilities. Accordingly, the audit committees 
need a reference guide setting out its responsibilities and a detailed charter to focus the efforts 
of the audit committee and increases its effectiveness. 
Since the composition of the audit committee has been the focus of many governance reform 
efforts in the USA and the UK, the unanimous view of proponents of reform is that the 
committee should be composed entirely of outside directors who have sufficient experience in 
oversight areas related to accounting and auditing. Therefore, in this study, the effect of audit 
committee members' independence and experience on audit committee effectiveness was 
examined by using the linear multiple regression model. The results indicate that audit 
committee effectiveness is significantly and positively related to the independence and 
experience of audit committee members (see chapter 8). 
9-3. Limitations 
It is important to recognise the limitations inherent within the research study. In this study 
there are some limitations. 
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Firstly, the Egyptian sample included only audit committee members from the public banking 
sector. This is because the public banking sector is considered as the only sector which has 
established audit committees in Egypt since 2000 following the Central Bank of Egypt 
Chairman's decision. Thus, audit committee members in this sector have appropriate 
experience in audit committee oversight responsibilities which enabled the researcher to 
measure their effectiveness. 
Secondly, the survey results for the UK and Egyptian samples should be interpreted 
cautiously. As with all mail survey research, the possibility of a non-response bias limits the 
interpretability of the results (DeZoort 1997). Although no significant differences were found 
between early and late respondents, it is possible that audit committee members who chose 
not to participate might have substantially different opinions from those who participated. 
Thirdly, interpretation of the survey results is also tempered by the lack of information about 
the relationships between objectives. In this study, all of the Wolnizer objectives are assumed 
independent. In fact, many of the objectives listed could be correlated. For example, 
respondents might have perceived OBJ3 (Evaluate internal control) as an important general 
objective that subsumes another objective such as OBJ4 (Evaluate exposure to fraud), which 
failed to emerge as an important objective. 
9-4. Recommendations 
El-Issawi et al. (1999) argued that the move towards a free-market economy in Egypt has 
been remarkably swift. Intriligator (1996) explained that, the goal of rapid transition to a 
market economy will probably not be realised in the absence of those economic, legal, 
political, and social institutions that enable such an economy to function. In the absence of 
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these institutions, the enterprises of the Egyptian economy, whether privatised or not, will not 
have the proper incentives to produce and invest (Abdel Shahid 2001). Hence, it is necessary 
to establish the relevant economic, legal, political and social institutions so as to prevent the 
further collapse of the Egyptian economy. The stabilisation, liberalisation, privatisation and 
other aspects of the current economic reform programme alone will not create these 
institutions, the Egyptian government should therefore play a major role in their establishment 
(World Bank Report 2001 ). Thus, the success of corporate governance and its necessary tools, 
such as audit committees, are of concern to the Egyptian government in order to support the 
market economy. In this study, one important step toward solving the low effectiveness of 
audit committees in Egypt is to create relevant legal institutions for the Egyptian environment 
context. To do so, there is a need to increase the awareness of the government in general, and 
the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in particular, about other audit committees requirements, 
which are not included in the current legal framework. These requirements are suggested 
based on this study results, and the relevance of these requirements in the Egyptian 
environment. Thus, the study suggests below recommendations for increasing the 
effectiveness of audit committees in Egypt. 
Recommendations Regarding Audit Committee Disclosure 
1. The CMA should require the listed companies in the Cairo & Alexandria Stock 
Exchange (CASE) to adopt formal written charters for their audit committees 
describing their responsibilities, compositions, qualifications, authority, and functions. 
The charter should be approved by the Board of Directors and disclosed at least once 
every three years in the annual report to shareholders; 
2. The CMA should recommend that listed companies in the Cairo & Alexandria Stock 
Exchange (CASE) contain in their annual reports a separate section that describes the 
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role and responsibilities of the audit committee and the actions taken by the audit 
committee to discharge those responsibilities. The audit committee section should 
include: (a) a summary of the role of the audit committee, (b) the names and 
qualifications of all members of the audit committee during the period, (c) the number 
of audit committee meetings and attendance by each member, and (d) a report on the 
way the audit committee has discharged its responsibilities during the year. The 
chairman of the audit committee should be present at the AGM to answer questions, 
through the chairman of the board, on the report on the audit committee's activities 
and matters within the scope of the audit committee's responsibilities. 
Recommendations Regarding Audit committee Composition 
1. The World Bank Report (2001) argued that the concept of non-executive or 
independent directors is not well established in Egypt. Thus, the study recommends 
the CMA define the independence requirements for audit committee members. The 
study suggests the following definition for independence: 
"a director is independent if he or she has no relationship to the company that may 
interfere with the exercise of his or her independence from management and the 
company. A director is not independent if the director is: 
(a) an employee (including non-employee executive officers) of the company or any 
of its affiliates (three year cooling-off period following termination of employment); 
(b) a partner, controlling shareholder or executive officer of an organization that has a 
business relationship with the company or a person who has a direct business 
relationship with the company, unless the company's board of directors determines in 
its business judgment that the relationship does not interfere with the director's 
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exercise of independent judgment (the board's determination is unnecessary in case of 
a three-year cooling-off period after the termination of the relationship); 
(c) an executive of another corporation where any of the company's executives serves 
on that corporation's compensation committee; or 
(d) an immediate family member of an individual who is an executive officer of the 
company or any affiliates (three-year-cooling-off period after the termination of such 
employment relationship)". 
2. Each member of the audit committee must be financially literate, as such qualification 
is interpreted by the company's Board of Directors in its business judgment, or must 
become financially literate within a reasonable period of time after his or her 
appointment to the audit committee. Further, at least one member of the audit 
committee must have accounting or related financial management expertise. In this 
respect, the study recommends the CMA to define the experience requirements for 
audit committee members. The study suggests the following definition for 
"experience" as: (a) significant past employee experience in finance or accounting, (b) 
a requisite professional certification in accounting, or (c) any other comparable 
experience or background which results in the individual's financial sophistication, 
including being or having been a CEO or other senior officer with financial oversight 
responsibilities. 
3. Each audit committee must have the authority to engage independent counsel and 
other advisors, as it determines necessary to carry out its duties and each company 
must provide appropriate funding for the audit committee. 
'-
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4. The Capital Market Authority should recommend that listed companies in the Cairo & 
Alexandria Stock Exchanges (CASE) provide audit committee members with more 
background information and training to enable them to be more effective. 
Recommendations Regarding to Audit committee Oversight Responsibilities 
1. The audit committee should review the interim and annual financial statements before 
submission to the Board of Directors. 
2. The audit committee should review the company's process of assessing the risk of 
fraudulent financial reporting and the programme that management establishes to 
monitor compliance with the code of corporate conduct. 
3. The audit committee should have primary responsibility for making recommendations 
regarding the appointment, reappointment and removal of the external auditors. These 
recommendations should be made to the board and thence to shareholders for their 
approval in the annual general meeting. 
4. The audit committee should review all auditor-client economic relationships to 
determine their impact on the objectivity of the auditor's work. Consequently, an audit 
committee could influence management to lessen audit fee pressures to ensure greater 
auditor vigilance during negotiations concerning financial reporting matters. 
5. The audit committee should have procedures to ensure the independence and 
objectivity of the external auditor annually. At the same time, the external auditors 
should discuss with, and disclose to, the audit committee any relationships with public 
audit clients that in the auditor's professional judgement may reasonably be thought to 
bear on their independence. 
6. The audit committee should develop and recommend to the board, the company's 
policy in relation to the provision of non-audit services by the auditor. The audit 
235 
committee's objective should be to ensure that the provision of such services does not 
impair the external auditor's independence or objectivity. 
7. Despite the CMA having considered the important role of the audit committee 
regarding internal control, it does not specify any requirement for audit committee 
members to review the internal auditing function or any interaction between the audit 
committee and internal auditing function. Thus, the study recommends that the audit 
committee should: (a) monitor and review the internal audit activities, where there is 
no internal audit function, the audit committee should consider annually where there is 
a need for an internal audit function and make recommendations to the board, (b) 
ensure that the function has the necessary resources and access to information to 
enable it to fulfil its mandate, and (c) approve the appointment or termination of 
appointment of the head of the internal audit. 
9-5. Summary 
Over the past decade, dramatic changes have occurred in the roles of Boards of Directors, 
audit committees, management, internal auditors and independent auditors as well as in the 
relationships among these groups. The principal motivation of these changing dynamics is the 
growing public pressure for greater corporate accountability. Corporate accountability can be 
achieved through improvements in the quality of financial reporting which will facilitate an 
increased level of auditor independence based on the establishment of audit committees. So, 
the role of the audit committee has become a key element for the quality of financial 
reporting. 
The implementation of an economic reform programme in Egypt has resulted in an active 
effort by people in authority and those who work in accounting and auditing to enhance the 
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quality of financial reporting which is considered to be one of the factors necessary to 
increase the effectiveness of economic performance. Through these efforts, evolved the idea 
of implementing audit committees in Egyptian firms. Recently, Egypt introduced the audit 
committee concept to the Egyptian banking sector to enhance the credibility of financial 
reports and strengthen communication among directors, auditors, and management, which 
will, in turn, enhance the quality of auditing and financial reporting. 
This study surveys the literature relating to audit committees and their role in enhancing the 
quality of auditing and financial reporting. Also this study discusses the role of various 
authoritative bodies and accounting organizations in enhancing the effectiveness of audit 
committees. In this study, survey and case study scenarios were the main instruments for the 
empirical investigation. Surveys were used to gather data from UK and Egyptian audit 
committee member samples in order to examine audit committee oversight responsibilities 
from the internal perspective of UK and Egyptian audit committee members in comparison 
with the DeZoort (1997) study in the USA. The results provided evidence that audit 
committee members in the USA and the UK agree with the current requirements and 
recommendations for expansion of audit committees oversight responsibilities, while the 
Egypt audit committee members agree with only eight oversight responsibilities. The results, 
in general, indicate that, there are differences in the institutions of those countries which 
applied the audit committee concept a long time ago and constituted the oversight 
responsibilities for measuring its effectiveness, and Egypt. The point is that management 
theories and concepts which have been developed in the Anglo Saxon world may need to be 
modified and adapted in order to fit the cultural beliefs, values and expectations of developing 
nations such as Egypt. Case study was used to gather data from audit committee members in 
the public banking sector in Egypt in order to measure the effectiveness of audit committees 
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and examine the effect of audit committee member's independence and experience on audit 
committee effectiveness. The results, in general, asserted the low effectiveness of audit 
committee members in carrying out their oversight responsibilities. In this case, the results 
highlighted the important role of the audit committee charter which should define the 
oversight responsibilities. Also, the results indicate that audit committee effectiveness is 
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UK Listed Companies in the Times Top 250 (FTSE) 31/12/2002 
Market 
# Company Name Capitalisation Comments 
£m 
1 ARM Holdings 485.639124 
2 AWG 764.211419 
3 Abbot Group 235.62057 
4 Aberforth Smaller Companies Tst 270.93325 
5 Acambis 271.813898 
6 Aegis Group 860.842604 
7 Aga Foodservice Group 262.678892 
8 Aggregate Industries 951.647944 
9 Aggreko 394.8575 
10 Alba 212.497722 
11 Alliance Trust 1161.72 
12 Amec 427.133656 
13 Amlin 460.371171 
14 Antofagasta 1232.320869 
15 Aquarius Platinum 248.116181 
16 Arriva 548.863615 
17 Associated British Ports Hldgs 1303.182559 
18 Autonomy Corporation 218.644097 
19 Avis Europe 558.102 
20 BBA Group 854.116835 
21 BPB 1201.286772 
22 Balfour Beatty 599.254297 
23 Bankers Investment Trust 290.08025 
24 Barratt Developments 927.246119 
25 Beazley Group 224.889863 
26 Bell way 494.13 
27 Berkeley Group 798.885933 
28 Bodycote International 208.251 
29 Bovis Homes Group 418.449406 
30 Brambles Industries 1097.44 
31 Brit Insurance Holdings 567.315066 
32 Britannic Group 643.21 
33 British Assets Trust (Ord) 332.095841 
34 British Empire Sec & General Tst 255.727942 
35 British Vita 508.463311 
36 Brixton 544.8615 
37 Brown (N.) Group 397.936 
38 Burberry Group 1122.5 
39 Cable & Wireless 1066.000799 
40 Cairn Energy 458.519259 
41 Caledonia Investments 481.072175 
42 Candover Investments 249.755243 
43 Capital Radio 403.904086 
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44 Carillion 237.099381 
45 Carlton Communications 900.8175 
46 Carpetright 442.8075 
47 Carphone Warehouse Group 660.961932 
48 Cattles 943.538589 
49 Celltech Group 941.85 
50 Chelsfield 849.169045 
51 Chrysalis Group 327.712 
52 Chubb 727.039228 
53 City Of London Investment Trust 377.712 
54 Close Brothers Group 798.218753 
55 Coats 344.764 
56 Cob ham 1034.363232 
57 Collins Stewart Holdings 335.674997 
58 Colt Telecom Group 685.785909 
59 Computacenter 518.927506 
60 Cookson Group 382.08105 
61 Corus Group 850.4725 
62 Countrywide Assured Group 368.896152 
63 Cox Insurance Holdings 237.224429 
64 Croda International 330.966 
65 DFS Furniture Co 375.26107 
66 Dairy Crest Group 422.113476 
67 Davis Service Group 533.530886 
68 De La Rue 541.163016 
69 De V ere Group 310.80525 
70 Debenhams 1017.520682 
71 Derwent Valley Hldgs 286.74 
72 Dimension Data Holdings 389.144399 
73 Dunedin Income Growth Inv Tst 248.155 
74 EMI Group 1095.32 
75 Easyjet 1070.327578 
76 Edinburgh Investment Trust 640.983325 
77 Edinburgh US Tracker Trust 378.713288 
78 Egg 1179.36 
79 Electra Investment Trust 329.419242 
80 Electrocomponents 1245.58 
81 Enodis 195.7648 
82 Enterprise Inns 963.265477 
83 Euromoney Institutional Investors 229.58 
84 Eurotunnel/Eurotunnel SA 451.837859 
85 Expro International Group 247.667705 
86 FKI 510.761941 
87 Fidelity European Values 258.866167 
88 First Choice Holidays 450.963523 
89 FirstGroup 981.40138 
90 Fleming Claverhouse Inv Trust 229.898027 
91 Fleming Continental Euro Inv Tst 248.217585 
92 Fleming Japanese Inv Trust 254.48515 
93 Fleming Mercantile Inv Trust 599.557 
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94 Foreign & Col Invest Trust 1548.996943 
95 Foreign & Colonial Eurotrust 237.256 
96 Forth Ports 366.933237 
97 GWRGroup 215.313595 
98 Galen Holdings 938.069505 
99 Game Group 134.978569 
100 Geest 327.006991 
101 Go-Ahead Group 292.395 
102 Grainger Trust 246.14 
103 Great Portland Estates 452.783624 
104 Greene King 502.0275 
105 Greggs 389.459308 
106 HIT Entertainment 329.856304 
107 HMV Group 479.066202 
108 Halm a 404.561313 
109 Hammers on 1303.25724 
110 Hiscox 455.173943 
111 Holidaybreak 248.380147 
112 ICAP 997.4965 
113 IMI 922.425 
114 ISIS Asset Management 266.119067 
115 Inchcape 553.189532 
116 Informa Group 213.988923 
117 Intermediate Capital Group 501.0525 
118 International Power 1069.5275 
119 Interserve 188.564878 
120 Intertek Testing Services 620.419989 
121 Investee 615.728405 
122 JIB Sports 336.858879 
123 JPMorgan Fleming American IT 273.158033 
124 JPMorgan Fleming Overseas IT 237.801856 
125 Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group 1321.475645 
126 Jarvis 393.793929 
127 Johnston Press 1036.959 
128 Kelda Group 1665.896 
129 Kidde 586.188324 
130 Kingston Comms 254.096757 
131 Laing (John) 179.82148 
132 Laird Group 213.187 
133 Lastminute.Com 243.405276 
134 Law Debenture Corp 224.2625 
135 LogicaCMG 1119.641572 
136 London Merchant Securities 287.541229 
137 London Merchant Securities (Dfd) 91.064549 Subsidiary ofNo. 
136 and also, the 
market capitalisation 
was under $200 m 
or equal in England 
pound 
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138 London Stock Exchange 937.7775 
139 Lonmin 1212.376835 
140 Luminar 285.051036 
141 MFI Furniture Group 664.097719 
142 MITIE Group 259.107272 
143 Manchester United 272.79 
144 Mars halls 360.787705 
145 M a tal an 882.21 
146 McAlpine (Alfred) 250.855691 
147 McCarthy & Stone 323.303981 
148 Meggitt 506.294988 
149 Merchants Trust 296.92575 
150 Merrill Lynch Euro Inv Tst 290.293884 
151 Mersey Docks & Harbour Co 399.885605 
152 Michael Page International 398.484515 
153 Millennium & Copthorne Hotels 592.41 
154 Minerva 288.6195 
155 Misys 1013.76 
156 Monks Investment Trust PLC 410.597737 
157 Murray Income Trust (Ord) 270.114138 
158 Murray International Trust (Ord) 258.741432 
159 National Express Group 540.208271 
160 Nestor Healthcare Group 187.660096 
161 New Look Group 478 
162 Northern Foods 885.055509 
163 Northgate 243.808 
164 Novar 467.067716 
165 PHS Group 408.465907 
166 PZ Cussons 196.874931 
167 PZ Cussons A 155.710625 Subsidiary ofNo. 
166- PZ Cussons 
168 Paragon Group of Companies 202.339838 
169 Peninsular & Oriental Steam Nav Co 1116.955 
170 Pennon Group 790.785587 
171 Persimmon 1190.43328 
172 Pilkington 729.003592 
173 Pillar Property 459.59176 
174 PizzaExpress 239.29598 
175 Powderject Pharmaceuticals 376.237311 
176 Premier Farnell 684.886977 
177 Premier Oil 448.659 
178 Provident Financial 1510.100189 
179 Punch Taverns 468.72 
180 Quintain Estates and Development 321.315951 
181 RAC 412.96 
182 RIT Capital Partners 594.272 
183 RMC Group 967.779 
184 Rank Group 1577.234018 
185 Rathbone Brothers 219.413878 
186 Redrow 373.197 
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187 Renishaw 214.76 
188 Rotork 253.2905 
189 SIG 206.360784 
190 SMG 302.458903 
191 SSL International 485.9025 
192 Schroder Ventures Intl.Inv.Tst 426.345696 
193 Scottish Investment Trust 536.295229 
194 Scottish Mortgage & Trust 748.411258 
195 Second Alliance Trust 390.72 
196 Securicor 529.289422 
197 Securities Trust of Scotland 255.30525 
198 Selfridges 340.854839 
199 Serco Group 665.114902 
200 Shaftesbury 271.5475 
201 Shanks Group 237.354 
202 Signet Group 1154.948964 
203 Singer & Friedlander Group 252.268933 
204 SkyePharma 248.557042 
205 Slough Estates 1401.765 
206 Smith (DS) 466.764 
207 Smith (WH) Group 888.7315 
208 Soco International 278.175756 
209 Somerfield 422.028 
210 South Staffordshire Group 287.941136 
211 Spectris 354.206582 
212 Spirax-Sarco Engineering 304.704 
213 St.Ives 369.411772 
214 St.Jamess Place Capital 553.039284 
215 Stagecoach Group 388.998874 
216 Stanley Leisure 491.056978 
217 T & S Stores 345.231 
218 TBI 244.516528 
219 TR Property Investment Trust 264.95359 
220 Tate & Lyle 1517.355 
221 Taylor & Francis Group 387.43131 
222 Taylor Nelson Sofres 589.456 
223 Taylor Woodrow 934.670441 
224 Temple Bar Inv Tst 275.706 
225 Templeton Emerging Markets IT 453.9695 
226 Thistle Hotels 527.133 
227 Tibbett & Britten Group 186.001989 
228 Travis Perkins 1125.498284 
229 Trinity Mirror 1254.834 
230 Tullow Oil 348.885102 
231 Ultra Electronics Holdings 295.7325 
232 Ultraframe 228.694689 
233 United Business Media 967.15 
234 VT Group 375.730553 
235 Viridian Group 652.878 
236 Waste Recycling Group 222.473 
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237 Weir Group 427.11678 
238 Wellington Underwriting 389.216754 
239 Wembley 241.273386 
240 Westbury 311.0395 
241 Wetherspoon(J D) 356.691125 
242 W illiam Hill 957.511222 
243 Wilson Bowden 684.01 
244 Wilson Connolly Hldgs 302.50838 
245 Wimpey( George) 993.024537 
246 Witan Inv Tst 924.9255 
247 Wolverhampton & Dudley 449.091443 
248 Wood Group (John) 771.115082 
249 Woolworths Group 505.6875 
250 X ansa 182.787806 
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Appendix (B): 
The Top 100 Companies In Terms of Market Capitalization( CASE) 31112/2002 
Company Name Currency Market Comments 
capitalization 
1 Te1ecom Egypt LE 17,112,149,000 
2 MIDOR $ 3,511,200,000 
3 Cairo Barclays Bank LE 3,360,000,000 
4 Egyptian Company for Mobile 
Services (MobiNil) LE 2,881,000,000 
5 Orascom Construction Industries LE 2,310,000,000 
6 Suez Cement Building Materials 
& Construction LE 2,112,000,000 
7 Golden Pyramids Plaza $ 1,854,930,000 
8 Commercial International 
Bank (Egypt) LE 1,820,000,000 
9 Assiut Cement LE 1,674,534,224 
10 Egyptian Media Production 
City Entertainment LE 1,628,840,000 
11 Abou Kir Fertilizers Chemicals LE 1,601,435,011 
12 Egyptian Iron & Steel LE 1,448,967,215 
13 AI Ahram Beverages (ABC) LE 1,328,981,400 
14 Exxon Mobil (Egypt) LE 1,300,498,635 
15 Eastern Tobacco Food & Beverage LE 1 ,270, 750,000 
16 Arab International Investment Co. 
(LAFICO) $ 1 '155,000,000 
17 Commercial International 
Investment Company (CIIC) LE 1,149,120,121 
18 Delta Sugar LE 1 '135,434,550 
19 HSBC Bank Egypt LE 1,001,083,500 
20 Alexandria National Iron & Steel LE 1,000,890,577 
21 National Cement LE 937,056,000 Under Limit 
22 Sugar & Integrated Industries LE 900,000,000 Under Limit 
23 ECEM.CA Egyptian Cement 
Company (EEC) LE 812,000,000 Under Limit 
24 National Societe Generale Bank 
(NSGB) LE 807,600,000 Under Limit 
25 Orascom Telecom Holding (OT) LE 799,700,000 Under Limit 
26 Dreamland Urban Development LE 790,430,000 Under Limit 
27 Torah Cement LE 781,044,264 Under Limit 
28 Delta International Bank LE 740,000,000 Under Limit 
29 CA Misr Exterior Bank LE 723,276,700 Under Limit 
30 Tholathia Manufacturig and Trade LE 700,000,000 Under Limit 
31 National Tourism & Hotels $ 693,000,000 
32 BIOC.CA Glaxo Wellcome LE 692,1 72,000 Under Limit 
33 EKHO.CA Egyptian Kuwaiti 
Holding $ 681,912,000 
34 HELW.CA Helwan Portland 
Cement LE 655,192,669 Under Limit 
35 National Gas Company (NA TGAS) LE 650,000,000 Under Limit 
36 Misr Romania Bank $ 623,700,000 
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37 Tholathiya Investment LE 600,000,000 Under Limit 
38 Egyptian International 
Pharmaceuticals (EIPICO) LE 584,204,400 Under Limit 
39 Oriental Weavers LE 576,450,000 Under Limit 
40 World Trade Center Co. Cairo $ 554,400,000 
41 Arab Insurance Group $ 548,856,000 
42 Ameriyah Cement LE 525,000,000 Under Limit 
43 Nile City Investment LE 515,000,000 Under Limit 
44 Reach Trade & Marketing LE 500,000,000 Under Limit 
45 Egyptian Arab Engineering 
Real Estate & Investment LE 490,500,000 Under Limit 
46 Arab Iron Factory LE 485,500,000 Under Limit 
47 Egypt Aluminum LE 484,400,000 Under Limit 
48 Alexandria Containers and goods LE 477,732,000 Under Limit 
49 Marine and Petroleum Services $ 475,629,000 
50 Misr International Bank 
(M !Bank) LE 464,906,250 Under Limit 
51 Misr Iran Development Bank $ 462,000,000 
52 Arab African International Bank $ 462,000,000 
53 Orascom for Investment $ 462,000,000 
54 Amoun LE 440,460,000 Under Limit 
55 R.G. Investment LE 439,185,000 Under Limit 
56 Chipsy Food Industries LE 431,271,141 Under Limit 
57 Natural Gas & Mining Project 
(Egypt Gas) LE 420,180,000 Under Limit 
58 Misr Shipping $ 415,800,000 
59 Amoun Pharmaceutical 
Industries LE 400,000,000 Under Limit 
60 Arabia Tourism Development 
and Real Estate Investment LE 400,000,000 Under Limit 
61 Arab Company For Touristic 
Projects LE 400,000,000 Under Limit 
62 Egyptian American Bank (EAB) LE 381,168,000 Under Limit 
63 Zahraa Maadi Investment 
& Development LE 380,000,000 Under Limit 
64 Suez Canal Bank Financial Services LE 361,790,000 Under Limit 
65 Export Development Bank of Egypt 
(EDBE) LE 350,500,000 Under Limit 
66 Societe Arabe Internationale 
De Banque (SAIB) $ 349,272,000 
67 El Watany Bank of Egypt LE 334,750,000 Under Limit 
68 Beni Suef Cement Company LE 330,000,000 Under Limit 
69 Medinet Nasr Housing Housing 
& Real Estate LE 323,840,000 Under Limit 
70 Cairo & Paris Bank $ 315,315,000 
71 Dreamland Pyramids Golf LE 313,464,130 Under Limit 
72 Misr Cement (Qena) LE 312,000,000 Under Limit 
73 Delta Industries (IDEAL) LE 302,250,000 Under Limit 
74 Remco for Touristic Villages 
Construction LE 30 I ,530,000 Under Limit 
75 El Masreyah Tourism & Hotels 
(EGOTH) LE 300,000,000 Under Limit 
76 Canal Shipping Agencies LE 298,000,000 Under Limit 
77 Arab Banking Corporation LE 293,325,000 Under Limit 
Paint & Chemicals Industries LE 
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78 Paint & Chemicals Industries LE 289,400,000 Under Limit 
79 IDEAL Trading LE 277,200,000 Under Limit 
80 Americana Group for Food & 
Tourism Projects LE 275,000,000 Under Limit 
81 DINA For Agriculture Investment LE 275,000,000 Under Limit 
82 Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt $ 274,219,067 
83 Heliopolis Housing LE 273,939,704 Under Limit 
84 Arab Cables Company LE 270,288,000 Under Limit 
85 Mantrac LE 260,000,000 Under Limit 
86 Orascom Hotel Holdings (OHH) LE 259,775,100 Under Limit 
87 Suez Canal Educational Services LE 259,490,000 Under Limit 
88 Sinai Cement LE 256,250,000 Under Limit 
89 AI Amal Clay Brick LE 255,450,000 Under Limit 
90 El Masreyah Glass LE 253,750,000 Under Limit 
91 Amreyah Pharmaceuticals Industries LE 252,000,000 Under Limit 
92 Taba Tourism Development LE 250,000,000 Under Limit 
93 Misr Beni Suef Cement LE 246,300,000 Under Limit 
94 Egyptian Real Estate Group LE 242,316,279 Under Limit 
95 Isiss for Hotels & Touristic Real Estate LE 236,994,862 Under Limit 
96 Alexandria Cement LE 232,800,000 Under Limit 
97 Saudi Egyptian Construction $ 231,000,000 
98 Misr Hotels (Hilton) LE 226,908,000 Under Limit 
99 Credit Agricole Indosuez (Egypt) LE 225,011,808 Under Limit 
100 South Egypt Drug Industries Co. LE 223,768,000 Under Limit 
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Appendix (C) 
Dear Audit Committee Member 
I am a PhD Student at Durham Business School. The topic of my research is "Audit 
committees: an investigation of their effectiveness". I am conducting a survey to investigate 
Audit Committee Members' perception of their oversight responsibilities related to financial 
reporting, internal control, internal and external auditing, and overall corporate governance. 
This survey contributes to a better understanding of audit committee oversight by evaluating 
U.K audit committee members' perceptions of their assigned responsibilities. 
The survey will only require five minutes of your time to complete. Respondents are 
not required to disclose their company or their personal details. Furthermore, I can assure you 
that the responses in the questionnaires will be used solely for the purpose of academic 
research and will not be made available to anybody other than the examination markers at the 
University. Your contribution will be highly appreciated. 
I would be grateful if you could complete the questionnaire in full and return it in the 
reply paid envelope provided at your earliest convenience. Please ensure that replies are 
posted by Friday 28 February to provide me adequate time to analyse the results. Should you 
require any further information as to the nature of my research or the results of the survey, 
then you may contact me via the telephone number or email address provided below. 





School of Business 
m.m.y.soliman@durham.ac.uk 
momostafasol@yahoo.com 
Office: (0191) 374 2211 xtn: 2250 
Mobile: 077 5119 7226 
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Is the duty Is the duty Is the duty 
assigned performed, but appropriate for 
Oversight Responsibilities formally to not assigned, to audit 
your your committee? committees? 
committee? 
Financial Reportin2: Yes No Yes No Yes No 
1 Review all financial statements, 
whether interim or annual. 
2 Review all existing accounting polices. 
3 Review systems of internal control. 
4 Review exposure to fraud. 
5 Review all significant transactions. 
6 Appraise key management estimates, 
judgements and valuations. 
Auditin2: 
7 Recommend the appointment of and 
fee for the external auditor. 
8 Review the plans for, and the 
effectiveness of, the internal and 
external auditors. 
9 Review the arrangements for 
coordinating the work done by internal 
and external auditors. 
10 Review the external auditor's 
management letter. 
11 Determine the auditors are free from 
undue influence and managerial 
interference. 
12 Request to be informed if there is a 
dispute between auditors and 
managers. 
13 Monitor the resources allocated to the 
internal audit function. 
14 Review the nature and magnitude of 
fees paid to the auditors for non-audit 
services. 
Other corporate 2overnance: 
15 Facilitate communication between the 
external auditors and the Board of 
Directors. 
16 Review corporate policies and 
practices in light of ethical 
considerations. 
17 Monitor compliance with the 
company's code of conduct. 
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Appendix (D) 
Dear Audit Committee Member 
In order to evaluate the establishment of the audit committees m the Egyptian 
banking sector, measure its effectiveness, and determine the obstacles they face in fulfilling 
the monitoring role for the financial reporting, external auditing, and internal control- which 
include internal auditing- this study is directed to you as an audit committee member in the 
Egyptian banking sector which established audit committees in 2000, in light of the USA and 
the UK best practice. 
This study contains two parts. First a group of personal questions. Second a group of 
suggested issues related to financial reporting, external auditing, and internal control. You are 
required to study every issue and determine your recommendations and the party that can 
solve the issue, in light of your responsibility as an audit committee member. 






Part One: Personal Data 
1. What is your position in the bank? 
D Current employee 0 Previous 0 External professional 
2.1f you were a previous employee, when did you leave? 
Year -------------------
3. If you are considered an external professional member, are you a partner in, or an 
executive officer of, any organisation to which the corporation (bank) made, or from 
which the corporation received payments in any of the past five years? 
D Yes ONo 
4. Are you accepting any compensation from the bank or any of its affiliates other 
than compensation for board services? 
D Yes ONo 
5 .. Are you a member ofthe immediate family of an individual who is, or has been in 
any of the past five years, employed by the bank or any of its affiliates as an executive 
officer? 
DYes 






Major Year acquired 




Part Two: Suggested/Expected issues 
First: scenarios related to financial reporting 
F. R. scenario 1. During the audit committee's meeting, a memorandum has been presented 
from the internal auditing department's chairman, explaining that revenues -from services the 
bank presented to its customers in the past year- have been collected this year, and were 
included in the current year's income statement. This represents a deficiency in the 
application of the alternative generally accepted accounting principles. Therefore the internal 
auditing department's chairman required the proper application of alternative generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) be reviewed and analyzed. 
Recommendations 
Suggested party to solve this issue 
D External auditor D Internal auditing department D Board of Directors 
D Audit committee D Accounting department 
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F. R. scenario 2. The accounting department presented a memorandum to the audit 
committee during its meeting explaining that, because of the nature of the computer 
equipment in the bank characterized by a rapid depreciation rate, the accounting department 
has changed the depreciation method from fixed instalments to reducing balance. 
One of the audit committee members rejected this action because it represented a change in 
the accounting policies impacting on the accuracy of the bank's financial reporting, and 
demanded the other audit committee members review and analyze to see if there were 
significant changes in the accounting policies and their impact on the financial statements. 
Recommendations 
If you do not agree with the audit committee member's opinion, suggest the other party that 
can solve this issue: 
D External auditor 0 Internal auditing department D Board of Directors 
D Accounting department 
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F. R. scenario 3. During the audit committee's meeting, a memorandum has been presented 
from the accounting department's chairman recommending that the bank and its affiliates 
implement standard No.l 0 of the Egyptian Accounting Standards which was issued recently. 
This standard will allow the re-evaluation of the bank's assets and state the required 
accounting procedures governing this issue. The reason for this re-evaluation was that the 
assets' book value was clearly lower than its fair market value. 
The internal auditing department's chairman demanded the audit committee to review the 
recent professional and regulatory pronouncements, and evaluate their impact on the financial 
reports. One of the audit committee members rejected this demand alleging that this matter is 
not one of the audit committee responsibilities. 
Recommendations 
If you agree with the audit committee member's opinion, suggest the other party which can 
solve this issue: 
0 External auditor D Internal auditing department D Board of Directors 
D Accounting department 
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F. R. scenario 4. One of the audit committee members rejected the inclusion of the meeting 
between the external auditor, the audit committee, and the management in the next 
committee's scheduled meeting, based on the assumption that this is not within the 
committee's range of responsibilities. 
The purpose of the meeting was to review the financial reports and the results of the audit 
before submission to the board of directors. 
Recommendations 
If you agree with the audit committee member's opinion, suggest the other party with which 
the external auditors and the management should meet: 
D Accounting department 0 Internal auditing department 0 Board of Directors 
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F. R. scenario 5. The next schedule for the audit committee meeting included the review of 
interim financial reports and the assessment of whether they contained adequate and 
appropriate disclosures. The reason was that the internal auditing department chairman 
directed a memorandum to the audit committee chairman explaining that the interim financial 
reports did not have the appropriate disclosure. 
One of the audit committee members rejected the request and demanded that the committee 
members concentrate their attention on the review of the final financial reports at the end of 
the year and assess whether they contain adequate and appropriate disclosure. 
Recommendations 
If you agree with the audit committee member's opinion, suggest the other party that can 
solve this issue: 
0 External auditor 0 Internal auditing department 0 Board of Directors 
D Accounting department 
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Second: scenarios related to the external auditing 
E. A. scenario 1. Audit committee members were informed that the accounting department 
manager in one of the bank's branches is an immediate family member of a member in the 
Central Auditing Organization, which is considered to be the external auditor for the bank. 
When this matter was discussed in the audit committee meeting, an audit committee member 
demanded from the accounting department chairman an evaluation of the independence of 
The Central Auditing Organization members and that this evaluation be directed to The 
Central Auditing Organization managers in order for them to take the appropriate actions to 
monitor the independence of its members. 
Recommendations 
If you don't agree with the audit committee member's opinion, suggest the other party that 
can solve this issue: 
D External auditor 0 Internal auditing department 0 Board of Directors 
D Audit committee 
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E. A. scenario 2. At the beginning of this year, the accounting department chairman directed 
a memorandum to the audit committee demanding that it direct a letter to The Central 
Auditing Organization (which is considered the external auditor) requiring it to present the 
scope and activities of the annual audit to the accounting department in order for them to be 
reviewed and analyzed. 
During the audit committee meeting, one of the audit committee members explained that, the 
scope and activities of the annual audit must be reviewed and analyzed by the audit committee 
members and not by the accounting department. 
Recommendations 
If you don't agree with the audit committee member's opinion, suggest the other party that 
can solve this issue: 
D Accounting department 0 Internal auditing department D Board of Directors 
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E. A. scenario 3. The audit committee received a suggestion from The Central Auditing 
Organization (which is considered to be the external auditor) stating that the bank and its 
affiliates should implement the principles of The Uniform Accounting System, which is 
applied in industrial/trading companies, in order to improve the accuracy in the bank's 
financial reporting. But one of the audit committee members rejected the discussion about this 
suggestion in the audit committee meeting and required the chairman to convert this 
suggestion to the accounting department which, in general, is more capable of discussing the 
external auditors' judgment about the quality, not just the acceptability, of the bank's 
accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting. 
Recommendations 
If you don't agree with the audit committee member's opinion, suggest the other party that 
can solve this issue: 
D Audit committee 0 Internal auditing department 0 Board of Directors 
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E. A. scenario 4. The Central Auditing Organization directed a report to the audit committee 
including a group of suggested corrective actions related to some of the accounting mistakes 
which were made by the accounting department, and required the audit committee members 
to monitor the corrections which must undertaken by the accounting department. 
Regarding the same matter, the audit committee received a letter from the internal auditing 
chairman requiring the audit committee chairman to transfer the corrective actions, that were 
suggested by the external auditor, to the internal auditing department in order to monitor the 
corrections, based on the fact that this matter is one of the internal auditing department 
responsibilities not the audit committee's responsibility. 
Recommendations 
If you don't agree with the internal auditing chairman's opinion, suggest the other party that 
can solve this issue: 
0 Audit committee D Accounting department 0 Board of Directors 
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E. A. scenario 5. During the audit committee meeting, a memorandum was presented from 
the accounting department chairman explaining that, there is a conflict of opinions between 
the accounting department and The Central Auditing Organization members regarding how to 
deal with the fire equipment which the bank bought a the beginning of this year. 
This memorandum explained that, the accounting department's opinion was that the fire 
equipment must be treated as a capital expense, but the Central Auditing Organization 
member's opinion was that it must be treated as an income expense. 
Recommendations 
The party that you suggest to solve this issue 
D Audit committee D Internal auditing department 0 Board of Directors 
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Third: scenarios related to the internal control including internal auditing 
I. C. scenario 1. The board of directors transferred a memorandum received from the external 
auditor to the audit committee explaining that, the internal accounting and financial control 
systems applied in the bank are not adequate for the nature of the bank. 
The board of directors required the audit committee to review and analyze the adequacy and 
effectiveness ofthese control systems. 
During the audit committee meeting, one of the audit committee members suggested that the 
adequacy and effectiveness of internal accounting and financial control must be reviewed and 
analyzed by the board of directors and not by the audit committee members. 
Recommendations 
If you don't agree with the audit committee member's opinion, suggest the other party that 
can solve this issue: 
D Audit committee D Internal auditing department D Accounting department 
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I. C. scenario 2. The audit committee chairman demanded the internal auditing chairman 
supply him with the internal audit reports, budgets, and findings in order for them to be 
presented to the audit committee members during the next audit committee meeting for 
review and analysis. The internal auditing chairman rejected the suggestion of sending these 
reports to the audit committee based on the fact that the audit committee does not have the 
right to review and analyze these reports, and that they must be sent to the board of directors. 
Recommendations 
If you don't agree with the internal auditing chairman's opinion, suggest the other party that 
can solve this issue: 
D Audit committee D Accounting department 0 External auditor 
283 
I. C. scenario 3. Based on a group of recommendations, related to the internal control system 
applied in the bank, received from the Central Auditing Organization, the audit committee 
chairman requested the internal auditors performance reports from the internal auditing 
department chairman in order for the audit committee members to be able to evaluate their 
performance and suggest corrective actions to improve the internal auditors' performance. 
The internal auditing chairman rejected the suggestion of sending these reports to the audit 
committee based on the fact that this matter is not one of the audit committee duties. 
Recommendations 
If you don't agree with the internal auditing chairman's opinion, suggest the other party that 
can solve this issue: 
0 Audit committee D Accounting department 0 Board of Directors 
0 External auditor 
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I. C. scenario 4. The audit committee chairman has received a memorandum from the 
external auditors stating a group of fraudulent, illegal acts, and deficiencies in the internal 
control system implemented in the banl<. The memorandum requires the audit committee 
members to take corrective actions in order to avoid these occurrences in the future. 
When the audit committee chairman presented this memorandum during the audit committee 
meeting, the members were divided into two groups. The first recommended that this 
memorandum must be directed to the board of directors in order that the proper corrective 
actions be taken. 
The second group recommended that, the audit committee must be informed of the fraud, 
illegal acts, and deficiencies in the internal control system in order for them to take the proper 
corrective actions. 
Recommendations 
The party that you suggest to solve this issue 
D External auditor D Internal auditing department 0 Board of Directors 
D Audit committee 0 Accounting department 
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I. C. scenario 5. The audit committee chairman demanded to meet with the internal auditing 
chairman to review the internal auditing plan in order to ensure that internal auditing was 
involved in the control system. 
The internal auditing chairman rejected this meeting based on the fact that it must be 
conducted with the full body of the board of directors 
Recommendations 
If you don't agree with the internal auditing chairman's opinion, suggest the other party that 
can solve this issue: 
0 Audit committee D Accounting department D External auditor 
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